“The WTO-option”: Two questions of process

Thomas Sebastian spoke yesterday at an event organised by UK Legal Future at the House of Commons.

His remarks dealt with the so-called “WTO Option”. Thomas addressed two questions of process: (1) Whether the UK will be able to rely on WTO rules post-Brexit even if other WTO Members object to its proposals for revised “schedules”? (2) Whether any post-Brexit UK-EU transitional arrangements will have to be approved by the WTO?

A copy of his speech is available here.

Brexit from an EU perspective – the Magical Mystery Tour

25 January and 8 February 2017

Christopher Muttukumaru CB writes that, thus far, the Brexit debate has focused purely on the UK wish list. What are some of the significant legal issues which the Commission and the other 27 Member States may need to consider in order to protect the EU’s interests? This post is based on a presentation at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment in The Netherlands on 18 January 2017 and updated to reflect the Government White Paper on the United Kingdom’s policy on exit from the European Union.

The UK Prime Minister has now made two speeches (2 October 2016 and 17 January 2017) in which she has set out her wish list for the upcoming Brexit negotiations. On 2 February, a White Paper was published by the UK Government (The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union). This post covers some legal and legal policy issues that arise from the UK’s wish list, but from an EU perspective. This post should be read with earlier Monckton posts identified below.

The issues covered in this post. Although the picture is constantly changing, the issues arising from the UK wish list covered here are: (a) the instability that will result from the unknown numbers of agreements (and their content) that the UK wishes to negotiate and from the non-UK national constitutional implications that will inevitably flow from the EU/UK agreements; (b) the harm that could be done to the principle of uniform application of EU laws, to the extent that they continue to apply in the UK, if the UK successfully argues that it should  be free from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU; (c) the question whether the UK’s plans to replicate the EU acquis in domestic law are capable of early and effective  enactment; (d) the question whether there will be any supervisory regime in place to enforce the replicated rules or the new UK/EU trade agreements after the European Commission ceases to have an enforcement role.

The UK Government’s wish list for the negotiations

By early January 2017, there were a number of emerging themes in the UK Prime Minister’s preferred vision of the UK’s post-Brexit future, including:

(a)The UK’s future was to be a global future;

(b) “It is not a… negotiation to establish a relationship anything like the one we have had for the last forty years or more. So it is not going to be a “Norway model”. It’s not going to be a “Switzerland model”…. I want it to include cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism work. I want it to involve free trade in goods and services. I want  to give British companies the maximum freedom to trade with and operate in the Single Market – and let European companies do the same here…”

(c)  “…And we are not leaving to return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.”

That was a reasonably clear signal that the UK would not seek to retain membership of the Single Market or the EEA; nor would the UK accept the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Since the UK Prime Minister rejected the Norway model, that seems to suggest that she had similarly excluded the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court.

On 17 January 2017, the UK Prime Minister clarified her previous views: “…being out of the EU but a member of the Single Market would mean complying with the EU’s rules and regulations that implement the [Four Freedoms] …It would mean accepting a role for the [CJEU] that would see it still having direct legal authority in our country… So we do not seek membership of the Single Market. Instead we seek the greatest possible access to it… through a Free Trade Agreement. That…may take in elements of current Single Market arrangements in certain areas – on the export of cars and lorries, for example, or the freedom to provide financial services across national borders…”

Also on 17 January, Mrs May said that she would not want to be limited by the Common Commercial Policy or by the Common External Tariff. So she would not want the UK to be part of the Customs Union. But the UK did want a customs agreement with the EU.

The White Paper, published on 2 February 2017, shows signs of having been drafted in haste, largely cutting and pasting the UK Prime Minister’s earlier wish lists of 2 October and 17 January.

A summary of the overall position in the White Paper is this. There will of course have to be a withdrawal agreement under Article 50 of the TEU. Moreover, the UK “will pursue a new strategic partnership with the EU, including an ambitious and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and a new customs agreement” (chapter 8 of the White Paper). In addition, to avoid a “disruptive cliff edge…we should consider the need for phasing in any new arrangements we require as the UK and EU move towards a new partnership” (chapter 12 of the White Paper) – in other words, a transitional agreement. Thus the UK seems to have in mind the probability that at least four agreements would be required to establish a new strategic partnership with the EU.

The Magical Mystery Tour had begun.

Point (a) Timing: the impact of uncertainty.

Leaving aside the extensive debate about how long the negotiations as such will take, there are a number of other unpredictable factors in respect of timing. Few observers would doubt that unquantifiable delay is going to result in instability, both for businesses and for individuals. Critically, on what basis should nationals of other Member States plan, for example, an entity considering investment in the UK; or an EU national resident and working in the UK planning for their future; or otherwise?

First the original starting point had appeared to be that the UK would seek (i) two agreements (withdrawal agreement under Article 50  and an agreement governing future legal  relations with the EU – a trade agreement) or (ii) three agreements (a withdrawal agreement, a long term trade agreement and  a transitional trade agreement ). In fact the better view is now that there is an option (iii) which is in play – four agreements (withdrawal agreement; free trade agreement; customs agreement; transitional trade agreement).

Secondly, what national constitutional requirements might be triggered in the 27 other Member States  by the agreements between the UK and the EU, however many there are? The withdrawal agreement will be governed by Article 50 and will be concluded by the Council and not by the individual Member States. It is unlikely to require ratification by each Member State. But the Article 50 agreement will be limited in scope and, in essence, will deal with the treatment of existing rights and obligations, including rights of residence , budgetary matters, and transitional measures. Any future trading agreement (and other agreements) will be negotiated in line with the Treaty provisions on agreements with third countries. A trading agreement (and other agreements) would therefore be subject to ratification in line with national constitutional requirements, if applicable. In other Member States, for example, there are bound to be  constitutional requirements which apply, including the possibility that  any agreement other than the withdrawal agreement could  be subject to a national referendum.

Thirdly, on 17 January 2017, the UK Prime Minister said: “…the Government will put the final deal that is agreed between the UK and the EU to a vote in  both Houses of Parliament.” This appears to mean that, before the UK signs the negotiated agreements with the EU, the UK Parliament will be given a chance to debate the deal(s)  and vote on it/them. Under the UK parliamentary system, depending on the kind of vote that is offered, that does not mean that the vote will be binding on the UK Government. But, if it is binding, and if the deal is rejected by Parliament in whole or in part, what is the scope  for further delay? Questions about  the type of vote, as well as its effect and timing, are under debate in the UK Parliament at the time of writing.

Fourthly, as a result of the judgments in the Supreme Court in the Miller litigation, new legislation has been introduced in the UK Parliament to permit the triggering of Article 50. But this is unlikely to undermine the timing of the Article 50 notice.

Point (b). Rejection of a continuing role for the CJEU

There are two aspects to the question  whether the Commission, acting on behalf of the 27 Member States,  should accept the UK negotiating position on CJEU jurisdiction – (a) in respect of the  EU acquis to be preserved by the Great Repeal Bill and (b) in relation to the Single Market rules to which the UK will have to adhere if it wishes to have partial access to the Single Market permanently or on a transitional basis. A Customs Agreement might raise different questions unless it replicates aspects of  the provisions of the Customs Union.

In the context of the UK wish list to enjoy such partial Single Market access , there are at least six issues which arise for other Member States to consider  if the UK continues to oppose the future jurisdiction of the CJEU. Some of these points apply equally to the EU acquis as will be preserved by the Great Repeal Bill.

First if the  UK wishes to have partial access to the Single Market permanently or on a transitional basis, that must mean acceptance of EU rules and regulations in those sectors. If so, is it plausible to think that the other 27 Member States would not  demand the uniform application of the same rules for all States  which are party to a new agreement under which partial UK access to the Single Market is permitted?

Secondly, although many Brexit supporters resist it (as do the UK Prime Minister and the White Paper), the rationale for a role for the CJEU is that it ensures that the law applies uniformly across the EU. As Mr Justice Bingham said in the Samex case, the ECJ (as it then was) could apply “… [its] panoramic view of the Community and its institutions, a detailed knowledge of the Treaties and of much subordinate legislation made under them, and an intimate familiarity with the functioning of the Community market which no national judge denied the collective experience of the Court of Justice could hope to achieve…”

Thirdly, the EFTA Court could be an option to deliver a measure of uniformity even though I have drawn the inference that that has been excluded by the UK. But Judge Bauchenbacher’s speech in October 2016 at King’s College, London, might offer a view of the EFTA Court’s jurisdiction and approach which might attract the UK Government. That said, it could be an uphill struggle to persuade the 27 EU Member States to agree.

Fourthly, the White Paper , having rejected a role for the CJEU (chapter 2) , recognizes that “ensuring a fair and equitable implementation of our future relationship with the EU requires provision for dispute resolution”. The paper continues:” Dispute resolution mechanisms ensure that all parties share a single understanding …of interpretation and application. “ The White Paper describes at length the dispute resolution mechanism in the CETA (Canada/EU Free Trade Agreement) model as an example of what could be agreed by the EU and the UK. Crucially, the 27 Member States, if they intend effectively to safeguard  the interests of their nationals, are likely to consider whether a dispute resolution mechanism which applies only at the international level with no direct effects in UK domestic law and enforceable at the instance of EU nationals, confers adequate protection on them.

Fifthly, a dispute resolution mechanism would not guarantee uniformity of legal approach. To the extent that the Single Market rules continue partially to apply to the UK  in a post Brexit world, there would be two supra-national judicial bodies whose views on the same rules could theoretically diverge. There could of course be provision made for a choice of forum  for disputes under the EU/UK consensus , but that would not adequately respond to the question of divergent jurisprudence. Moreover  if a preliminary opinion were sought of the CJEU on the compatibility  with the EU treaties of a dispute resolution mechanism,  the CJEU’s Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR  might make uncomfortable reading for the 27 Member States and the UK.

Sixthly, if  it is eventually decided  that the UK Supreme Court should  become the final appellate court in cases involving relevant “preserved” parts of the acquis (or, far more improbably in respect of any new rules which are agreed in  EU/UK agreements), a critical issue will be whether the UK courts will be able, either by express provisions of the withdrawal treaty (and the Great Repeal Bill – see below ) or by rules of domestic judicial interpretation, to follow, or at least take account of, the judgments of the CJEU in respect of relevant preserved EU laws. Happily the White Paper seems to agree with the concerns expressed above since it asserts: “In general, the Government also believes that the preserved law should continue to be interpreted in the same way as it is at the moment” (chapter 1.5 of the White Paper). The question is: how will that be achieved?

The wise outcome would be for the parties to the withdrawal agreement and trade agreements to decide what should happen, both in a transitional period and beyond it. In that way, the 27 Member States would be properly protecting the interests of their commercial entities and citizens operating in, or living in (as the case may be), the UK.

Point ( c ) UK domestic legislation which implements  the consensus – the Great Repeal Bill

Under normal circumstances, the domestic implementation of an international agreement would be of limited interest to another Member State – unless their own national  interests might be at stake if the consensus is not properly implemented. At present, the Commission performs a watchdog role and protects the interests of all Member States.

On 17 January, repeating what had been said on 2 October 2016, the UK Prime Minister affirmed: “[Re certainty] We will provide certainty wherever we can…It is why , as we repeal the European Communities Act, we will convert the “acquis” …into British law…the same rules and laws will apply on the day after Brexit as they did before.”

This passage helpfully signalled the importance of legal stability after Brexit in the short term. An equally significant issue is what will happen in the long term since the proposal is to repeal, amend or reenact EU rules over the ensuing period.

But the issues are not limited to the existing EU acquis. In the light of the evolving signals from the UK Government, there  are at least three types of rights and obligations arising from the Brexit treaties which will have to be covered in the UK’s domestic laws: (a) rights under the present EU acquis; (b) rights under the withdrawal treaty under Article 50; (c) rights under the trade treaties, permanent or transitional.

Will the replication  scheme work as intended?

If, in the short term, the EU acquis is going to be replicated in UK domestic law, it inevitably means that the UK will protect EU Law rights and obligations until such time as the rules are revoked or amended. So it is a transitional measure, with no signal as to the UK Parliament’s likely future approach.

Unfortunately, the apparent clarity of the Prime Minister’s promise on 17 January in respect of legal stability  has been watered down in the White Paper  or, as the case may be, become more realistic. It now says: “…wherever practical and appropriate, the same [EU] rules and laws will apply on the day after we leave the EU as they did before [emphasis added] ”.  There are of course obvious problems with simple replication,  such as how to deal with cases where the European Commission would previously have had an enforcement role (see point (d)) but will no longer have such a role in a post Brexit world. But what else does the new qualification mean? We are promised a further White Paper on the Great Repeal Bill, which may answer some of these points.

In these cases, it is also self-evident that the rules will be incorporated as if they had been frozen at relevant time, eg. the point at which exit takes effect. What if, before the rules are subject to a process of domestic amendment or revocation, the rules subsequently change at the EU level?

Previous posts (see list at the end of this post) have covered the complexity of the replication exercise. One example is as follows. EU legislation is subject to the application of fundamental EU principles. It follows that the rules of interpretation requiring compliance with the fundamental principles will no longer apply unless the withdrawal agreement requires it (possibly as a quid pro quo for post hoc access to the Single Market) or the UK Government implements them. The rules would include principles such as non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, proportionality and fiscal neutrality. How, in this context, should EU businesses plan ahead if there are doubts about the level of protection that they will be afforded by UK domestic legislation?

Here are two further complications to keep in mind. First, by way of example, in evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee of the UK Parliament, the Secretary of State for Environment, Foods and Rural Affairs said: “We think that in the region of about two thirds of the [environmental] legislation that we are intending to bring  into UK law will be able to be rolled forward with just some technical changes, so roughly a third won’t, which means that obviously there will be work to do to ensure that those measures continue to work once we leave the EU”. This is hardly surprising. But from the perspective of EU entities or nationals seeking to plan ahead, might there be similar difficulties in other policy sectors?

Secondly, EU Member States will need to take into account the UK’s devolution arrangements, in particular in relation to  Scotland. Scotland enjoys considerable devolved lawmaking competence in a number of policy areas and may have its own views about how the EU acquis should be replicated.

Point (d) Policing the consensus

On the hypothesis either that replicated EU rules would continue to apply domestically or that, if continued access to agreed EU sectors was agreed, adherence to relevant Single Market rules would be the price of access, how would the preserved rules be enforced in a world where the Commission no longer had an enforcement function? The White Paper is silent in this regard.  The UK could of course establish new domestic supervisory bodies to carry out the functions of the Commission. But there would be no obligation to do so unless the trade agreements required it.  In any case, it is questionable whether the EU would be prepared to accept surveillance by a national body in  cases within the scope of  the trade agreements.

Things happen in negotiations. So far the UK Government has a wish list and the EU is waiting for notice under Article 50 before disclosing its negotiating position. Things will happen – compromise is inevitable if deals are to be struck. Meantime, how should a waiting world (businesses and individuals)  plan ahead for the lengthy period which the Magical Mystery Tour is likely to take?

Related posts:

George Peretz QC (11 October and 1 November 2016)

Christopher Muttukumaru CB ( 31 August, 5 October and 30 November 2016)

Supreme Court rules that Government cannot invoke Article 50 under the Royal Prerogative

The Supreme Court has this morning given judgment in the case of R(Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2017] UKSC 5.  In summary, the Court has (by majority of 8 to 3) dismissed the Government’s appeal against the Divisional Court’s judgment , and has ruled that the Government has no power under the Royal Prerogative to invoke Article 50 TEU.  An Act of Parliament is now required to authorise the executive to trigger the Article 50 process. As regards the additional devolution arguments made on behalf of Northern Irish citizens and the devolved Governments of Scotland and Wales, the Court has unanimously held that UK ministers are not legally compelled to consult the devolved legislatures before triggering Article 50.

The Supreme Court’s judgment can be found here.

The press summary can be found here.

A transcript of Lord Neuberger’s summary given in open court can be found here.

All the parties’ written cases can be found here.

To read the case note written by Fiona Banks, Monckton Chambers please click here.

The judgment, 96 pages long and containing detailed dissents from Lords Reed, Carnwarth and Hughes, will be discussed in detail by Gerry Facenna QC , Anneli Howard  and Jack Williams  at a forthcoming Monckton seminar this Thursday. More details here. For now a few matters are particularly noteworthy.

First, the Court’s judgment clarifies the proper framework for analysing prerogative powers. After establishing that a relevant prerogative power exists (see [34] and [54]), the next stage is to determine the extent of that prerogative power. This comes before any question of abrogation by statute arises. Thus, the Court delimits prerogative powers generally, and the foreign relations treaty prerogative specifically, in confirming that executive powers cannot change domestic law (see, in particular,  [50]-[57]). It was therefore unnecessary to consider subsequent questions of whether the relevant prerogative power had been excluded or abrogated by statute, or whether its purported exercise was otherwise unlawful, once the Court found that domestic law and rights would be affected if Article 50 were triggered by prerogative power (see [60] – [89]). As the Court stated, “rather than the Secretary of State being able to rely on the absence in the 1972 Act of any exclusion of the prerogative power to withdraw from the EU Treaties, the proper analysis is that, unless that Act positively created such a power in relation to those Treaties, it does not exist” ([86]).

Second, the Supreme Court upheld the Divisional Court’s two-pronged reasoning that prerogative power does not extend to either changing domestic law or affecting domestic rights (see [83]). This may have significant consequences for the use of prerogative powers in the international sphere where domestic or acquired rights would be affected, and is of potentially wider application than if the Court had confined its analysis to circumstances where acts on the international stage result in changes to the (domestic) constitutional framework. It may, combined with the findings in relation to the principle of legality ([87]), have implications for what the authorisation bill needs to cover.

Third, the judgment lays to rest the heated academic debate as to whether a preliminary reference was required on the reversibility of Article 50 for the purposes of this litigation. The Court stated, in accordance with the Secretary of State’s own case, that the reversibility of otherwise of an Article 50 notification “would make no difference to the outcome of these proceedings” ([26]). As such the Court was prepared to proceed on the assumption that an Article 50 notification was unilaterally irrevocable (as all parties in the litigation agreed was prudent), without deciding the issue or expressing any views either way on the matter.

Finally, the Court’s ruling on the Sewel Convention reiterates that constitutional conventions are a political constraint only which, whilst playing an important role in the operation of the UK constitution, are not for the Court to police in terms of their scope and application (see [136] – [151]). The reservations for ruling on the scope of a convention may be slightly surprising to some (the courts have previously ruled on the nature and scope of conventions, if not enforcing them).

Anneli Howard is instructed by Mischcon de Reya to represent Mrs Gina Miller, the First Respondent.

Gerry Facenna QC, David Gregory, and Jack Williams are instructed by Bindmans LLP on behalf of the Pigney Respondents/Interested Parties (known as “The People’s Challenge”).

All views are entirely personal and do not represent the views of other Members of Monckton Chambers or clients.

Single market challenge: Adrian Yalland and Peter Wilding v SSEU (Article 127 EEA)

Monckton Chambers’ members are advising on a challenge to the Government’s plan for the United Kingdom to leave the single market. The claim was commenced by two members of the think-tank British Influence on 29 December 2016.  The claim challenges the Government’s statement that the United Kingdom automatically leaves the European Economic Area following its departure from the EU under Article 50 TEU.  It seeks a declaration that the United Kingdom can only leave the single market by following the formal withdrawal procedure under Art 127 of the EEA Agreement and with Parliament’s prior authorisation in the form of an Act of Parliament.

A permission hearing has been listed before the Divisional Court on 3rd February, which will also deal with a parallel claim brought by four individuals who live in the UK or in other EEA States.

George Peretz QC and Anneli Howard are acting for the claimants Adrian Yalland and Peter Wilding.

Daniel Beard QC and Julianne Kerr Morrison are acting for the Government.

The case has already received extensive coverage including The Times and The Guardian.

The UK merger regime has emerged unscathed from the Government’s review of industrial strategy

The Prime Minister today unveiled a new, more interventionist industrial strategy – intended to boost the UK economy after Brexit. Last year it appeared that part of that strategy would involve extending the Government’s powers to block mergers on non-competition grounds, but that aspect of the plan appears to have been scaled back.

In July, Theresa May said that it would have amounted to ‘asset stripping’ if the US drugs company Pfizer had been allowed to take over the British company AstraZeneca, opining that a “proper industrial strategy … should be capable of stepping in to defend a sector that is as important as pharmaceuticals is to Britain”.

This would have required changes to the UK merger regime, under which takeovers are generally assessed solely by reference to competition considerations – save where they could undermine defence, media plurality or financial stability.

Various concerns were raised. Among others, the CMA noted that allowing proposed takeovers to be blocked on the basis of additional non-competition criteria would make the merger regime less clear and less certain, which might reduce investment into the UK.

It seems that the Government has listened. No such proposal was contained in today’s Green Paper on industrial strategy, which instead acknowledges that the “UK has benefitted greatly from its open economy”.  In an interview with the Financial Times on Friday, the Prime Minister indicated that any changes were likely to be limited to mergers affecting critical national infrastructure, such as UK nuclear power plants.

This is likely to come as a relief to most competition lawyers, who will have plenty of other changes to get to grips with over the coming years as a result of Brexit (as discussed here).

The magical mystery tour: the Brexit negotiations from an EU perspective

On 17 January, Christopher Muttukumaru CB spoke to a large group of lawyers and administrators in the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment about the imminent Brexit negotiations. The group included officials from other Government departments, including Foreign  Affairs.

He covered  the UK  Prime Minister’s speeches on Brexit. He explored legal aspects of the principal issues that the Dutch Government will face as the Brexit negotiations gather pace.

The issues included the lack of legal clarity and consistency that will result if the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU is removed in relation to those parts of the Single Market rules which will continue to apply to the UK.

The discussion also covered the complexity of the proposal to replicate in domestic law the  provisions of the EU acquis in a Great Repeal Bill. There is clear evidence that that exercise will not be a simple technical transfer to UK domestic law. In the environmental field, for example, the DEFRA Secretary of State has already accepted that one third of the environmental acquis is not capable of simple replication.

With the loss of Commission responsibility for enforcement in a post-Brexit world, there was lively discussion about the alternatives.

AG’s Opinion concerning EU Singapore agreement gives pointer on process for a post-Brexit trade deal

Advocate General Sharpston has today delivered a substantial Opinion in proceedings under Article 218(11) TFEU concerning the EU Singapore Free Trade Agreement, concerning the allocation of competences of the EU and Member States in entering into trade agreements it has obvious significance for the UK’s forthcoming discussions.  The short summary is that the Advocate General concludes that the trade agreement can only be concluded by the EU and the Member States acting jointly.

She identifies a number of aspects of the agreement that fall within the EU’s exclusive competence but identifies various matters that fall into an area of shared competence.  These include matters of real significance such as transport, including government procurement relating to transport and services linked to transport; intellectual property; certain labour and environmental matters; and issues concerning disputes and transparency.  She also concludes that the EU has no competence to be bound by that part of the agreement which purports to terminate existing bilateral agreements between Singapore and individual Member States.  She expressly acknowledges that this outcome would render the process of ratification both cumbersome and complex and may have adverse effects on the relations between the EU and the state it is trying to reach agreement with.  She notes also that if the agreement goes forward for approval by Member States they are left with the choice of accepting or rejecting the whole agreement but that if a Member State were to reject the agreement on grounds relating to matters on which the EU enjoys exclusive competence that Member State would be acting in breach of its Treaty obligations.

The full text of the Opinion can be found here.

Article 50 Supreme Court Hearing – Day Four

The full transcript of yesterday’s (the fourth and final day’s) proceedings in the Supreme Court in the Article 50 case can be found here.

The Justices will now take time to further review the written and oral submissions, and deliver their judgment(s) in the New Year. The Court has stated that it aims to give at least three working days’ notice before publishing the decision.

All the written arguments from the parties are linked to here.

Four members of Monckton are instructed for different parties in the case:

Gerry Facenna QC, David Gregory, and Jack Williams are instructed by Bindmans LLP on behalf of the Pigney Respondents/Interested Parties (known as “The People’s Challenge”).

Anneli Howard is instructed by Mischcon de Reya to represent Mrs Gina Miller, the First Respondent.

Article 50 Supreme Court Hearing – Day Two

The full transcript of yesterday’s proceedings in the Supreme Court in the Article 50 case can be found here.

Four members of Monckton are instructed for different parties in the case:

Gerry Facenna QC, David Gregory, and Jack Williams are instructed by Bindmans LLP on behalf of the Pigney Respondents/Interested Parties (known as “The People’s Challenge”).

Anneli Howard is instructed by Mischcon de Reya to represent Mrs Gina Miller, the First Respondent.

Article 50 Supreme Court Hearing – Day Three

The full transcript of today’s proceedings in the Supreme Court in the Article 50 case can be found here.

Four members of Monckton are instructed for different parties in the case:

Gerry Facenna QC, David Gregory, and Jack Williams are instructed by Bindmans LLP on behalf of the Pigney Respondents/Interested Parties (known as “The People’s Challenge”).

Anneli Howard is instructed by Mischcon de Reya to represent Mrs Gina Miller, the First Respondent.