Judicial review proceedings have been issued in the High Court challenging the government’s decision to export arms to Saudi Arabia for possible use in the conflict in Yemen.

Conor McCarthy has been instructed by Leigh Day in the claim brought by the Campaign Against the Arms Trade.

The challenge follows increasing evidence that Saudi Arabian forces are violating international humanitarian law in Yemen. This evidence includes recent findings by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen (appointed by the UN Security Council) that airstrikes by coalition forces in Yemen were violating the rules of distinction, proportionality and the prohibition on indiscriminate targeting as well as other rules of international law regarding the conduct of hostilities.

The United Kingdom has presently licensed the export of around £4.6 billion of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia.

If permission for the judicial review is granted,  then the High Court will be asked to consider whether the continued arms exports contravene the UK government’s commitments under UK and EU rules regulating the export of military equipment.

Conor McCarthy is acting for the claimant, and instructed by Leigh Day, led by Martin Chamberlain QC.

Paul Lasok QC and Anneliese Blackwood in Supreme Court Win

The Supreme Court has allowed HMRC’s appeals against UBS AG (“UBS”) and DB Group Services (UK) Ltd (“DB”) in relation to detailed schemes designed to avoid the payment of tax on bankers’ bonuses. The determinations and decisions which UBS and DB appealed against required the payment to HMRC of nearly £100 million. In each case, the scheme used by UBS and DB respectively was intended to take advantage of Chapter 2 of Part 7 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (“ITEPA”), as amended by Schedule 22 to the Finance Act 2003. The judgement of the Supreme Court was given by Lord Reed, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Carnwath and Lord Hodge agreed.

Lord Reed noted that there were two key factors identified in Barclays Mercantile [2004] UKHL 51, at para 34. First, “tax is generally imposed by reference to economic activities or transactions which exist, as Lord Wilberforce said, ‘in the real world’”. Secondly, tax avoidance schemes commonly include “elements which have been inserted without any business or commercial purpose but are intended to have the effect of removing the transaction from the scope of the charge”. He went on to note that Carnwath LJ said in the Court of Appeal in Barclays Mercantile, [2002] EWCA Civ 1853, at para 66, that taxing statutes generally “draw their life-blood from real world transactions with real world economic effects”. Lord Reed stated that where an enactment is of that character, and a transaction, or an element of a composite transaction, has no purpose other than tax avoidance, it can usually be said, in the words of Carnwath LJ, that “to allow tax treatment to be governed by transactions which have no real world purpose of any kind is inconsistent with that fundamental characteristic.” He concluded that, as Ribeiro PJ said in Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd [2003] HKCFA 46, at para 35, where schemes involve intermediate transactions inserted for the sole purpose of tax avoidance, it is quite likely that a purposive interpretation will result in such steps being disregarded for fiscal purposes although not always. Some enactments, properly construed, confer relief from taxation even where the transaction in question forms part of a wider arrangement undertaken solely for the purpose of obtaining the relief.  He concluded that the position was ultimately summarised by Ribeiro PJ in Arrowtown Assets, at para 35: “The ultimate question is whether the relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction, viewed realistically”.

Lord Reed considered that section 423 of ITEPA, when construed purposively, was not intended to apply to the schemes in question. He found that the reference in section 423(1) to “any contract, agreement, arrangement or condition which makes provision to which any of subsections (2) to (4) applies” was to be construed as being limited to provision having a business or commercial purpose, and not to commercially irrelevant conditions whose only purpose is the obtaining of the exemption. On the facts he found that the restrictions on the shares in the UBS and DB schemes respectively were commercially irrelevant conditions whose only purpose was the obtaining of the exemption. As a consequence he concluded that the schemes involved the provision of unrestricted shares and as such fell outside the tax exemption provided for in Chapter 2 of Part 7 of ITEPA.

Paul Lasok QC and Anneliese Blackwood appeared on behalf of HMRC.

To view the full judgment, please click here.

 

The Court of Appeal this week upheld the Secretary of State’s decision to close the Renewables Obligation to new large-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) projects two years early, despite previous statements by the Government (made in the interests of providing “certainty” to investors) that the RO would remain open until 31 March 2017, in a decision which is likely to have significant implications for the future of similar renewable energy subsidies.

Dismissing Solar Century Holdings Ltd’s appeal from the judgment of Green J, the Court held that the existence of Government’s Levy Control Framework, which caps the cost of levy-funded spending for energy and  climate change goals, prevented any legitimate expectation arising to the effect that the RO would not be closed before that date if deployment of solar PV exceeded forecasts.

Floyd LJ held that the Government was entitled to formulate and re-formulate policy when rational grounds existed for doing so, unless to do so would amount to an abuse of power. Statements in the Levy Control Framework that the Government was committed to “maintaining support levels” for “existing investments” did not include investments which were in the pipeline but which had not yet been accredited under the RO scheme.

Further, the adoption of a “grace period” of an extra year for certain pipeline projects to accredit did not offend against any principle against retrospectivity and was not unfair in the public law sense, despite the fact that the relevant date by which projects would have to meet the criteria to qualify for the grace period had already passed when the closure order was made. The Secretary of State had set the date of the publication of his consultation proposals, to prevent a “gold rush” of projects seeking to qualify for accreditation in time. It it was lawful to close the scheme in its entirety to new entrants with effect from 1 April 2015, it was difficult to see how it could be unlawful to soften that blow by extending the scheme for a further year to those who had reached a particular stage of investment.

To view the full judgment, please click here.

Robert Palmer appeared for the Secretary of State.

Case C-72/15 OJSC Rosneft Oil Company v. HM Treasury; the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation, and Skills; the Financial Conduct Authority

On 23 February 2016 the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU heard Case C-72/15 Rosneft, concerning that company’s challenge to the sanctions imposed by the EU on the Russian Federation, and in particular on the Russian oil sector, in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

The case was referred by the High Court in February 2015 ([2015] EWHC 248 (Admin)) and raises questions both as to the legality of the EU’s sanctions against Russia, and important constitutional issues concerning the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice to rule on the validity of decisions adopted under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The debate at the oral hearing focused on the interpretation of Article 275 TFEU, which limits the CJEU’s jurisdiction in relation to foreign and security policy matters, on the scope of Article 215(2) TFEU, which concerns restrictive measures adopted against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities, and on the role of the national courts in protecting fundamental rights affected by EU foreign policy decisions.

The judgment is likely to contain important findings by the CJEU as to the proportionality of sectorally-targeted sanctions, such as those targeting the Russian oil industry, and the jurisdiction of both national courts and the CJEU itself to consider challenges to the validity of EU foreign policy decisions. The Court is, in particular, considering whether EU law recognises the concept of a non-justiciable acte de gouvernement.

Gerry Facenna QC appeared on behalf of the United Kingdom. The hearing was also attended by Rosneft, the UK Financial Conduct Authority, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, the EU Council and the Commission. The Advocate General’s Opinion is due on 31 May 2016.

In the proceedings in the High Court, Tim Ward QC and Julianne Kerr Morrison also acted for HM Treasury and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.

The European Court in Rywin v. Poland (read here) has found by a 4-3 majority  that the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights was not breached by the contemporaneous  carrying out of criminal proceedings and a parliamentary commission of inquiry into a corruption scandal which concerned a well-known film producer. The work of the commission of inquiry had given rise to extensive media comment and the lower house of Parliament had approved the commission’s report in which five high-ranking State officials were alleged to have been guilty of corruption in connection with the legislative procedure for the amendment of the Broadcasting Act and the film producer was mentioned as being the “agent” of those officials. The film producer was subsequently convicted of attempted fraud. The Court considered that the presumption of innocence had not been breached by the wording of the resolution setting up the parliamentary commission of inquiry and the findings of the commission’s report. The Court also found that there had been no violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) or of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3. It considered that the reasoning of the judgments delivered by the criminal courts did not reveal anything to suggest that the judges had been influenced by the statements of the members of the commission or by the findings in its report and that the authorities had been attentive to the producer’s state of health during his imprisonment and that the general conditions of his detention could not be criticised.

Jeremy McBride acted for Mr Rywin.

High Court dismisses claim against Google, holding that, where a pro-competitive innovation by a dominant company is alleged to have harmed competition on a related market, the effect on competition in that market must be serious or appreciable in order to constitute an abuse of dominance.

In a judgment handed down today, the High Court dismissed a claim for abuse of dominance brought against Google by online map provider Streetmap.

Streetmap alleged that, by displaying a clickable image of a map, taken from Google Maps, at the top of its search engine results page in response to certain search queries, Google gave Google Maps an unfair advantage over other online map providers, and thereby abused its (assumed) dominant position in the market for online search.

In an important judgment on the application of competition law (The prohibition on abuse of dominance is contained in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998) in rapidly developing online markets, Mr Justice Roth rejected Streetmap’s case, holding that:

• since the introduction of a clickable map image on its search page was a pro-competitive measure on the market where Google was dominant, for its conduct to be abusive, it had to be reasonably likely to have a serious or appreciable effect on competition in the related market for online maps;
• on all the evidence, the introduction of the clickable map image on Google’s search page had not taken custom away from Streetmap.  Therefore, it was not reasonably likely to gives rise to anti-competitive foreclosure;
• in any event, Google’s conduct was objectively justified.  Since the alternative technical solutions proposed by Streetmap would have entailed significant practical problems, or imposed a substantial additional burden on Google, it had not been required to implement them by any obligation of proportionality.

Google was represented by Jon Turner QC, Josh Holmes and Ben Lask.

To view the full judgment, please click here.

A full case note will be issued shortly.

The Chinese dissident Wang Yam was jailed for life for the murder of the reclusive author Allan Chappelow. In the criminal trial, for unspecified national security and witness protection reasons, the trial judge ordered that the defence case should be heard in secret.

Mr Yam subsequently applied to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (“ECtHR”), arguing that the secret trial constituted a breach of his right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. By an order of the English court, however, Mr Yam was prevented from disclosing any information regarding the secret aspects of his trial, or the reasons for the secrecy, to the ECtHR.

On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the order, concluding that it was within the power of the lower court to prevent an applicant from placing material before the ECtHR. It held that it was for the ECtHR to decide whether such disclosure was really required and that, in any event, there was a common law power pursuant to which an order for non-disclosure to the ECtHR could be made. The case in the ECtHR remains ongoing.

A copy of the judgment can be found here.

Nikolaus Grubeck, led by Lord Pannick QC and Kirsty Brimelow QC, acted for the Appellant.

Press coverage includes: BBC, The Guardian, London Review of Books.

In a judgment released today, the Court of Appeal held that the UK Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Agency had acted lawfully in carrying out inspections of Roche in late 2013 and in communicating material from that inspection to the European Medicines Agency.

On a previous inspection in 2012, critical deficiencies had been found in Roche’s pharmacovigilance system (pharmacovigilance is the obligation on a pharmaceutical company to monitor and pass on to the authorities reports of adverse reactions to, and lack of therapeutic effect of, its medicines).  The European Commission had then asked the EMA to consider action against Roche under the EU Penalties Regulation – action that could result in a large fine against Roche.

The 2013 inspections were carried out under the general MHRA’s powers to inspect: such inspections are routine in cases where critical deficiencies have previously been identified in order to ensure that the deficiencies have been corrected.  Roche’s claim that the MHRA had not acted lawfully centred on the fact that the EMA had, before the inspections, made a request under Article 8(3) of the Penalties Regulation for information derived from the inspections to be passed to the EMA.  Roche claimed that in the circumstances the MHRA had acted unfairly.  Roche also sought a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the EU on (a) whether the EMA had power to make such a request of the MHRA under Article 8(3) and (b) whether the MHRA was right to take the view, in its reports to the EMA, that the Roche company being inspected was responsible under the Penalties Regulation for pharmacovigilance deficiencies by another group company.

The Court of Appeal rejected its claim of unfairness and refused a reference.  On the question of unfairness, Sales LJ (giving the lead judgment) agreed with the trial judge (Carr J) that there was no unfairness.  The Court agreed with the MHRA’s submissions that the legislative framework clearly contemplated that information from routine inspections could be passed to the EMA and used in for the purposes of the Penalties Regulation.  The Court also agreed with the MHRA that it “rather strained credulity” that Roche’s experienced representatives during the inspections were “ingénus” who could not be taken to have understood that that was likely to happen.  In her concurring judgment, Arden LJ noted that where the EU legislator had created a regime such as the Penalties Regulation, with a number of procedural protections, the English court should be slow to find a breach of the common law duty of fairness.

The Court went further than had Carr J in upholding the MHRA’s case that it was acte clair that Article 8(3) permitted the EMA to make the request that it had made to the MHRA: there was therefore no basis for a reference to the CJEU.  But the Court also agreed with Carr J that, since the Article 8(3) request had not in fact affected to Roche’s disadvantage the information that would have been passed to the EMA in any event, the Court would not anyway have granted declaratory relief about that issue.  As to the question of Roche’s responsibility under the Penalties Regulation for deficiencies of its group company, the Court of Appeal agreed with the MHRA’s submissions that the situation where the MHRA might have expressed views to the EMA and European Commission (which would then have to decide if those views were right, any decision being challengeable on appeal to the General Court) was far from the type of situation where a court would grant declaratory relief of a view expressed by a Government department.

The judgment is important both for its account of the relationship between the Penalties Regulation and the powers of inspection set out in the Medicines Directive, but also more generally in dealing with the situations in which the Court will make references to the CJEU in a context where what is being sought is declaratory relief.

George Peretz QC represented the MHRA.

A copy of the judgment can be found here.

The High Court has today dismissed Enfield Council’s judicial review of the Department for Transport’s minimum service specification for the ongoing East Anglia rail franchise competition.

The East Anglia franchise serves 131 train stations, extending to Peterborough, Southend, Felixstowe and Cambridge, and includes a significant part of London.  A competition is underway to select the train operating company that will take over the operation of the rail services when the current franchise comes to an end in October 2016.

In September 2015 the Department for Transport issued to intending bidders for the franchise an Invitation To Tender (ITT), to which was attached a Train Service Requirement document setting out the minimum services to be provided at each station.  Enfield Council issued a judicial review claim challenging the ITT because, contrary to the Council’s expectation, the Train Service Requirement did not specify a service of 4 trains per hour throughout the day for Angel Road train station.  Instead, the Train Service Requirement specified a service for Angel Road station reaching 4 trains per hour only during the evening peak hours, meaning that the station is likely to be served by fewer trains at other times of the day.

The Council’s challenge alleged that the ‘failure’ to specify a service of 4 trains per hour throughout the day was unlawful because it breached the Council’s legitimate expectations arising from certain assurances given by Department for Transport officials.  The Council also alleged that the Department for Transport was unreasonable in basing its service specification on economic modelling that took account only of transport-related costs and benefits, and therefore did not give any weight to the risk to the viability of a new housing development project (known as the ‘Meridian Water’ scheme) in the Angel Road area in circumstances where a 4 trains per hour service was not provided.  The Council also argued that, by not taking account of that risk to a development that could make available a significant number of new ‘affordable homes’ in London, the Department for Transport had breached its duties under the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012.

Dismissing the challenge in full, Mrs Justice Elisabeth Laing held that the Council did not have a legitimate expectation for a 4 trains per hour service; and, further, the Department for Transport had been entitled to rely on economic modelling focussed on transport-related costs and benefits, and therefore to leave out of account the risk to the Council’s Meridian Water development scheme.  Such an approach was not contrary to the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012.

Monckton barrister Alan Bates appeared on behalf of the Department for Transport.