The Competition Appeal Tribunal has handed down judgment in the class action Justin Gutmann v First MTR South Western Trains Limited, London & South Eastern Railway Limited, Govia Thameslink Railway Limited & Others [2025] CAT 64.

The claim concerned the Defendants’ sale of a particular kind of rail fare known as a Boundary Fare. The CAT concluded that, on the assumption that the Defendants each holds a dominant position, none of the conduct alleged against them constitutes an abuse of that position. The CAT accordingly dismissed the claim.

All instructed counsel in these proceedings were members of Monckton Chambers.

Philip Moser KC, Stefan Kuppen, and Alexandra Littlewood (instructed by Hausfeld & Co. LLP and Charles Lyndon Ltd) appeared on behalf of Mr Gutmann.

Tim Ward KC, James Bourke, and Hugh Whelan (instructed by Slaughter and May) appeared on behalf of First MTR South Western Trains Limited.

Paul Harris KC, Anneliese Blackwood, Michael Armitage and Clíodhna Kelleher (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) appeared on behalf of London & South Eastern Railway Limited and Govia Thameslink Railway Limited and others.

Anneli Howard KC, Brendan McGurk KC and Khatija Hafesji (instructed by Linklaters LLP) intervened on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport.

Jack Williams is appearing in the Supreme Court between Tuesday 14^th October and Thursday 16^th October 2025 in Dillon v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Jack acts for the lead respondents / cross-appellants (Dillon et al),and is led by John Larkin KC and Jude Bunting KC.

The case concerns the compatibility of the Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 with the non-diminution guarantee in Article 2 of the Windsor Framework (formerly the Northern Ireland Protocol). The Act brought to an end Troubles-related inquests, new civil claims, Police Ombudsman and police investigations.

The case will establish the meaning and effect of Article 2, as well as the role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in domestic law post Brexit, and the circumstances in which Acts of Parliament can be disapplied for incompatibility with the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement (and Windsor Framework).

Jack and other members of Chambers will be speaking about some of these topics next week in a UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement Masterclass Webinar. More information and sign up details are available here.

The CAT has certified the first public sector CPO for collective proceedings, funded by the Government, in relation to allegedly excessive and unfair pricing for Motorola’s provision of emergency communication  services, which are essential for public safety in Great Britain (the “Airwave Services”). The PCR, Ms Clare Spottiswoode, sought certification of the proposed collective proceedings on an opt-out basis, with aggregate damages estimated to be in the region of £600–650 million, relying on the CMA’s Final Report in its market investigation, which was upheld by the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal.

The PCR brings her proposed collective proceedings on behalf of a class, comprised for the main part of public sector purchasers of Airwave Services such as Central Government Departments, local authorities, police, fire and ambulance services as well as a range of private companies, NGOs, charities and voluntary organisations.

The Tribunal concluded that the PCR meets the authorisation condition and that the proposed collective proceedings meet the eligibility condition. The Tribunal rejected Motorola’s objections to certification and dismissed its application for strike out for part of the claim. In particular, it held:

• the issues of dominance and duration of the claim were properly matters for trial rather than strike out; and
• the proposed class definition was clear and workable, rejecting Motorola’s contention that it would give rise to a conflict of interest;
• the claim should be certified on an opt-out basis (rather than opt-in as Motorola contended) as there would be a significant impediment to access to justice if smaller users and public sector class members were required to opt-in when they lacked the resources and expertise to actively participate in the proceedings. Opt-in proceedings were more practicable since the calculation of aggregate damages would be easier and the Tribunal could oversee a suitable method for distribution once the damages had been quantified. Class members would benefit from the additional safeguard of judicial supervision over any collective settlement in opt-out proceedings (which was not available for opt-in proceedings).

The Tribunal also amended clauses 7 and 9 of the PCR’s Litigation Funding Agreement following concerns raised by Motorola.

Anneli Howard KC acted for the PCR – a copy of the judgment is here.

The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal brought by Illuminate Skin Clinics Limited, a GMC-registered medical practice offering a range of aesthetic skin care and wellness treatments, including treatments for collagen loss, excess fat, Botox and dermal fillers.  The full decision can be found here.

Describing the appeal as giving rise to important and difficult points of law in what became a lead case, behind which a number of similar cases are stayed, the Upper Tribunal expressed the hope that its decision would provide much-needed guidance for other businesses in the sector. Different approaches had previously been taken by the FTT in various cases concerning the meaning of the term medical care in the context of cosmetic procedures – an issue that had not previously been considered by the Upper Tribunal.

The appeal succeeded on the basis that the FTT had confined its assessment of the therapeutic purpose of the care provided by the Appellant within too narrow a compass, contrary to the relevant case law. The Upper Tribunal concluded that the FTT’s expectations as to how a diagnosis might be evidenced was too high and over-generalised. It allowed the appeal, set aside the FTT’s decision, and remitted it to the FTT, with clear guidance on the approach to be adopted on reconsideration: In summary, the supply in question must be made by a registered person and must have a therapeutic purpose. The assessment of a suitably qualified medical practitioner is significant in identifying that purpose. That practitioner is not obliged to elaborately record a diagnosis. Where a supply has both a therapeutic purpose and a cosmetic purpose, it is necessary to identify the principal purpose. That will involve a multi-factorial analysis which is likely to include consideration of the factors listed by the Upper Tribunal in its decision.  Paragraphs 104 and 105 record the approach to be adopted in future cases.

Melanie Hall KC and Ciar McAndrew of Monckton Chambers represented the Appellant.

A proposed opt-out collective action seeking compensation for approximately 50 million UK consumers is to be brought against Apple in relation to Apple Pay, the digital wallet that enables iPhone users to make contactless payments.

Julian Gregory and Alastair Holder Ross of Monckton Chambers are instructed by Milberg London LLP to act for the proposed class representative, the financial campaigner and journalist James Daley.

The claim will argue that Apple has abused a dominant position by limiting access to the near field communication (NFC) chip in iPhones, making Apple Pay the only digital wallet available on iOS. It is said that banks and card issuers have been forced to accept Apple’s unfair terms to enable contactless payments via iPhone, including fees on every contactless and online transaction made using Apple Pay. The claim will allege that these costs are ultimately passed on to UK consumers who receive a range of financial products from the relevant banks and card issuers (including current account services), whether or not they themselves use Apple pay or own an iOS device.

Funding has been secured from the litigation funder Omni Bridgeway, and proceedings will be issued in the Competition Appeal Tribunal in the coming weeks.

Oxera Consulting are providing expert economic analysis, and Tom de la Mare KC of Blackstone Chambers is also instructed.

Media coverage includes articles by Consumer Voice, Litigation Finance Insider and Legal Funding Journal.

The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) has handed down judgment in a freedom of information appeal brought by Clare Page, a mother who wished to obtain teaching materials used by a charity (School of Sexuality Education) for a sex education session at her daughter’s school, as well as the names of the individuals who delivered the session.

Ms Page’s request was refused by the school, including on the basis that disclosing the materials would constitute a breach of confidence. This decision was subsequently upheld by both the Information Commissioner and, on appeal, the First-tier Tribunal.

The Upper Tribunal has dismissed Ms Page’s further appeal. Amongst other matters, the judgment concludes that section 405 of the Education 1996 – which allows parents to withdraw their children from sex education in state schools – contains an implied obligation to provide information about what will be taught, but does not require a school to provide all materials that will be used.

The judgment is available here.

Will Perry successfully acted for the Information Commissioner.

The case has previously been reported in the Daily Mail, Times and Telegraph.

The Supreme Court has today given its judgment in The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKSC 34.

Monckton member Peter Mantle was the sole advocate on behalf of HMRC, who were successful.

The appeal, brought by Prudential, concerned the relationship between the VAT grouping provisions (s 43 VATA  1994) and the VAT time of supply rules (‘TOSR’).

The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, essentially that the VAT TOSR had to be applied to determine whether a supply had to be disregarded for VAT purposes by reason of s 43(1) VATA 1994. It was the time of supply ascertained in accordance with the TOSR which dictated whether or not a supply had taken place when the supplier and recipient were members of the same VAT Group, not the date of actual performance of the services.

The Supreme Court decided that the ratio of the Court of Appeal in BJ Rice must be confined to its own facts.

The Supreme Court then rejected new arguments based on EU law by Prudential, not argued below. The dispute related to whether VAT was chargeable in respect of success fees due to the supplier under the relevant investment fund management services agreement which had been paid after the supplier had left the VAT Group, but where the actual performance of the relevant services had ended when it had left the VAT Group. The Supreme Court held that the wording of Regulation 90 of the 1995 VAT Regulations, on continuous supplies, applied to the facts. Regulation 90 was not just a permissible  implementation of article 66 PVD. In this case, on the proper interpretation of article 64(1) PVD, the success fees were “successive payments” within the scope of that article The CJEU’s jurisprudence has not limited the application of article 64(1) PVD so that it only applies where the payment is made at a moment when the performance of the services is ongoing. That article also applies where the contractual consideration comprises an element which is uncertain or contingent at the time when the performance of the services is completed and where the “successive payment” comprises that element of the consideration. Thus in the relevant circumstances Regulation 90 is compatible with article 64 and changes not only the time at which VAT becomes chargeable but also the chargeable event. HMRC are not required to treat the success fees as, in effect, a gratuitous payment because the parties were within the same VAT group at the time the services were performed. The supplier was therefore correct to add VAT to its invoices for success fees earned several years after it had completed its performance of its services to Prudential. Prudential’s appeal was dismissed.

Peter Mantle acted for HMRC, instructed by HMRC Legal Group (Salford)

Read Supreme Court details on the appeal.

A new collective action filed with the Competition Appeal Tribunal alleges that Amazon has breached competition law by implementing price parity policies that prevent or strongly discourage third-party sellers from charging lower prices for their products on other e-commerce platforms and their own websites.

The proposed class representative, the Association of Consumer Support Organisations (“ACSO”), alleges that the price parity policies, which are monitored and enforced by Amazon, unlawfully protect Amazon from price competition from other e-commerce platforms, thereby strengthening Amazon’s market dominance and enabling Amazon to charge third-party sellers higher marketplace fees than would otherwise be the case absent Amazon’s price parity policies. Third-party sellers in turn pass on Amazon’s inflated marketplace fees to consumers by charging higher prices for the products they sell on Amazon’s UK marketplace.

The claim has been widely publicised, including by the Telegraph, MLex, The Lawyer, Law360, Law.com, ICLG News and CDR News.

Ben Lask KC, Luke Kelly and Jenn Lawrence are acting on behalf of ACSO, instructed by Stephenson Harwood.

Dr Victoria McCloud has brought a legal challenge in the European Court of Human Rights on the back of the recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16, alleging violations of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

It has received extensive media coverage, including by the Guardian, the National and PinkNews.

Jenn Lawrence is acting on behalf of Dr Victoria McCloud, alongside Amanda Weston KC and Oscar Davies of Garden Court Chambers.

How far should the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) go in shaping its proceedings in a way that makes it affordable for the claimant to pursue its claim?  That was the question at the heart of the CAT’s judgment this week, deciding on case management issues in Yew Freight Trading Limited v Puro Ventures Limited [2025] CAT 46.

The proceedings are a claim by a company, Yew Freight, concerning arrangements operated by the defendant, Puro Ventures, relating to the UK-wide promotion and supply of courier services under Puro Ventures’ brand, ‘Speedy Freight’.  Yew Freight is one of a number of ‘franchisees’ appointed by Puro Ventures in respect of assigned exclusive territories.  Each franchisee operates a call centre, and carries out marketing, with a view to serving customers located within its assigned territory.  Franchisees may also themselves operate vehicle fleets and carry out collections and deliveries.  However, customers’ contracts, relating to courier services orders they have placed through a franchisee’s call centre or online facility, are between the customer and Puro Ventures, rather than being between the customer and the franchisee.

By its claim, Yew Freight alleges that Puro Ventures has operated, and is continuing to operate, policies which unlawfully restrict ‘passive sales’ by franchisees to customers located outside the franchisee’s assigned territory.  Yew Freight’s primary case is that those policies constitute an ‘infringement by object’, such that the policies can be recognised as constituting an agreement that restricts competition, and is thus caught by s.2 of the Competition Act 1998 (‘CA98’), without it being necessary for anti-competitive effects to be shown.

Puro Ventures denies this, contending that: (a) its policies are not an infringement ‘by object’; (b) the policies do not produce anti-competitive effects; alternatively, (c) even if the policies are caught by s.2 CA98, they qualify for exemption under s.9 CA98.

Yew Freight is a considerably smaller company than Puro Ventures and estimates the financial value of its claim to be £240,000.  Against that background, Yew Freight asked the CAT to take several case management measures to limit the costs risks to which Yew Freight would be exposed by pursuing its claim.  The measures sought by Yew Freight included: (i) a split trial arrangement under which the question whether Puro Ventures policies constituted an ‘infringement by object’ would be tried first, with no or limited economic evidence, leaving other issues, including Puro Ventures claim to exemption under s.9 CA98, to be tried subsequently, if necessary; (ii) allocation of the proposed first trial to the CAT’s fast-track procedure, with that trial being listed to start within the next 6 months; and (iii) a cost-capping order to limit the amount that Yew Freight could have to contribute to Puro Ventures’ costs if the claim was unsuccessful.  Puro Ventures opposed those proposed measures, submitting that the appropriate approach was for the CAT to ensure that both parties’ costs were budgeted strictly.

The CAT panel (comprised of Andrew Lenon KC, Rosalind Kellaway and James Wolffe KC) considered the parties’ rival proposals at a case management hearing on 26 June 2025.  At that hearing, the CAT received detailed submissions both on: (i) the case law on the concept of ‘infringement by object’; and (ii) the appropriate principles for determining whether an action should be allocated to the fast-track procedure and/or subject to a cost-capping order.

In its judgment following that hearing, the CAT declined to order the case management measures proposed by Yew Freight.

In respect of the split trial proposal, the CAT decided that, having considered the case law on the concept of ‘infringement by object’, this was a case in which some expert economic evidence would be needed for assessing whether Puro Ventures’ policies were caught by that concept.  Given that economic evidence would also be needed for considering Puro Ventures’ claim to exemption under s.9 CA98, all issues necessary for enabling the CAT to decide whether Puro Ventures’ policies have contravened competition law should be considered at one trial.

In respect of the other measures proposed by Yew Freight, the CAT decided that, as the first trial could not be held within 6 months, the proceedings did not qualify for being allocated to the fast-track procedure.  That being so, there was no requirement for the CAT to make a cost-capping order.  The CAT considered whether it should exercise its discretion to make a cost-capping order and, for that purpose, applied the principles developed in the High Court of England and Wales for deciding whether to make such an order in civil proceedings.  Applying those principles, the CAT decided that the fact that the claimant had limited financial resources and might not be able to continue the proceedings if no cost-capping order was made, was not sufficient reason to make such an order.  The CAT would, however, ensure that both parties’ costs were carefully budgeted and controlled to ensure that they were proportionate.

Monckton barristers represented both parties: Julian Gregory for the Claimant (instructed by Nexa Law), and Alan Bates for the Defendant (instructed by Knights PLC).