A new collective action filed with the Competition Appeal Tribunal alleges that Amazon has breached competition law by implementing price parity policies that prevent or strongly discourage third-party sellers from charging lower prices for their products on other e-commerce platforms and their own websites.

The proposed class representative, the Association of Consumer Support Organisations (“ACSO”), alleges that the price parity policies, which are monitored and enforced by Amazon, unlawfully protect Amazon from price competition from other e-commerce platforms, thereby strengthening Amazon’s market dominance and enabling Amazon to charge third-party sellers higher marketplace fees than would otherwise be the case absent Amazon’s price parity policies. Third-party sellers in turn pass on Amazon’s inflated marketplace fees to consumers by charging higher prices for the products they sell on Amazon’s UK marketplace.

The claim has been widely publicised, including by the Telegraph, MLex, The Lawyer, Law360, Law.com, ICLG News and CDR News.

Ben Lask KC, Luke Kelly and Jenn Lawrence are acting on behalf of ACSO, instructed by Stephenson Harwood.

Dr Victoria McCloud has brought a legal challenge in the European Court of Human Rights on the back of the recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16, alleging violations of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

It has received extensive media coverage, including by the Guardian, the National and PinkNews.

Jenn Lawrence is acting on behalf of Dr Victoria McCloud, alongside Amanda Weston KC and Oscar Davies of Garden Court Chambers.

How far should the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) go in shaping its proceedings in a way that makes it affordable for the claimant to pursue its claim?  That was the question at the heart of the CAT’s judgment this week, deciding on case management issues in Yew Freight Trading Limited v Puro Ventures Limited [2025] CAT 46.

The proceedings are a claim by a company, Yew Freight, concerning arrangements operated by the defendant, Puro Ventures, relating to the UK-wide promotion and supply of courier services under Puro Ventures’ brand, ‘Speedy Freight’.  Yew Freight is one of a number of ‘franchisees’ appointed by Puro Ventures in respect of assigned exclusive territories.  Each franchisee operates a call centre, and carries out marketing, with a view to serving customers located within its assigned territory.  Franchisees may also themselves operate vehicle fleets and carry out collections and deliveries.  However, customers’ contracts, relating to courier services orders they have placed through a franchisee’s call centre or online facility, are between the customer and Puro Ventures, rather than being between the customer and the franchisee.

By its claim, Yew Freight alleges that Puro Ventures has operated, and is continuing to operate, policies which unlawfully restrict ‘passive sales’ by franchisees to customers located outside the franchisee’s assigned territory.  Yew Freight’s primary case is that those policies constitute an ‘infringement by object’, such that the policies can be recognised as constituting an agreement that restricts competition, and is thus caught by s.2 of the Competition Act 1998 (‘CA98’), without it being necessary for anti-competitive effects to be shown.

Puro Ventures denies this, contending that: (a) its policies are not an infringement ‘by object’; (b) the policies do not produce anti-competitive effects; alternatively, (c) even if the policies are caught by s.2 CA98, they qualify for exemption under s.9 CA98.

Yew Freight is a considerably smaller company than Puro Ventures and estimates the financial value of its claim to be £240,000.  Against that background, Yew Freight asked the CAT to take several case management measures to limit the costs risks to which Yew Freight would be exposed by pursuing its claim.  The measures sought by Yew Freight included: (i) a split trial arrangement under which the question whether Puro Ventures policies constituted an ‘infringement by object’ would be tried first, with no or limited economic evidence, leaving other issues, including Puro Ventures claim to exemption under s.9 CA98, to be tried subsequently, if necessary; (ii) allocation of the proposed first trial to the CAT’s fast-track procedure, with that trial being listed to start within the next 6 months; and (iii) a cost-capping order to limit the amount that Yew Freight could have to contribute to Puro Ventures’ costs if the claim was unsuccessful.  Puro Ventures opposed those proposed measures, submitting that the appropriate approach was for the CAT to ensure that both parties’ costs were budgeted strictly.

The CAT panel (comprised of Andrew Lenon KC, Rosalind Kellaway and James Wolffe KC) considered the parties’ rival proposals at a case management hearing on 26 June 2025.  At that hearing, the CAT received detailed submissions both on: (i) the case law on the concept of ‘infringement by object’; and (ii) the appropriate principles for determining whether an action should be allocated to the fast-track procedure and/or subject to a cost-capping order.

In its judgment following that hearing, the CAT declined to order the case management measures proposed by Yew Freight.

In respect of the split trial proposal, the CAT decided that, having considered the case law on the concept of ‘infringement by object’, this was a case in which some expert economic evidence would be needed for assessing whether Puro Ventures’ policies were caught by that concept.  Given that economic evidence would also be needed for considering Puro Ventures’ claim to exemption under s.9 CA98, all issues necessary for enabling the CAT to decide whether Puro Ventures’ policies have contravened competition law should be considered at one trial.

In respect of the other measures proposed by Yew Freight, the CAT decided that, as the first trial could not be held within 6 months, the proceedings did not qualify for being allocated to the fast-track procedure.  That being so, there was no requirement for the CAT to make a cost-capping order.  The CAT considered whether it should exercise its discretion to make a cost-capping order and, for that purpose, applied the principles developed in the High Court of England and Wales for deciding whether to make such an order in civil proceedings.  Applying those principles, the CAT decided that the fact that the claimant had limited financial resources and might not be able to continue the proceedings if no cost-capping order was made, was not sufficient reason to make such an order.  The CAT would, however, ensure that both parties’ costs were carefully budgeted and controlled to ensure that they were proportionate.

Monckton barristers represented both parties: Julian Gregory for the Claimant (instructed by Nexa Law), and Alan Bates for the Defendant (instructed by Knights PLC).

The Court of Appeal yesterday handed down judgment in Fertré v Vale of White Horse District Council [2025] EWCA Civ 1057. In its judgment the Court of Appeal determined that those with pre-settled status (“PSS”) granted under the EU Settlement Scheme, but without a directly effective right to reside in the UK under the Withdrawal Agreement (“WA”) are not protected by the non-discrimination provisions of Article 23 WA. As such, the Appellant was not the subject of unlawful discrimination under the WA when she was refused homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996.

The judgment is likely to carry wider significance regarding access to welfare supports for those with PSS but without a directly effective right to reside under the WA.

Clíodhna Kelleher acted for the AIRE Centre in its intervention in the proceedings.

The Supreme Court has handed down judgment in D.E.L.T.A. Merseyside Limited and another v Uber Britannia Limited [2025] UKSC 31. Monckton members appeared on both sides of the appeal.

The appeal, brought by Uber, concerned the construction of the regulatory regime for the provision of private hire vehicles (“PHVs”) outside London under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (the “1976 Act”). The issue was whether a PHV operator is required to enter into a contract as principal with the passenger at the point of booking. The Supreme Court has held that the 1976 Act does not contain such requirement.

Tim Ward KC acted for Uber, instructed by Hogan Lovells International LLP.

Jen Coyne acted for D.E.L.T.A., led by Philip Kolvin KC and instructed by Aaron & Partners LLP.

Read Supreme Court details on the appeal.

Eurospares (Continental Parts) Limited v (1) Porsche Cars Great Britain Limited (2) Porsche Retail Group Limited

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has today issued an interim injunction, ordering Porsche to continue to supply parts to an independent reseller of luxury car spare parts, Eurospares, pending the determination of Eurospares’ claim alleging breach by Porsche of the Competition Act 1998 in the design of its selective distribution system.

The background to the application was that in September 2024 Porsche discontinued supply to Eurospares stating that supply of spare parts could only be made available to authorised dealers under Porsche’s selective distribution system. As part of that system, Porsche generally requires that authorised dealers offer repair services, thereby excluding independent resellers of spare parts who do not carry out repair and maintenance services.

Eurospares claims that this contractual term amounts to a hardcore restriction on competition and amounts to to discriminatory and self-preferencing abuse. Porsche contests the claim. The Tribunal will now adjudicate on the parties’ respective positions in an expedited trial.

In granting the interim injunction, the Tribunal was satisfied that there existed a serious issue to be tried. It accepted that Eurospares would suffer serious harm that would not be compensable in damages. It was also satisfied that the balance of convenience was in favour of ordering the interim injunction as the risk of harm was greater to Eurospares than Porsche.

The Tribunal refused Eurospares’ application for the proceedings to be allocated to the fast-track procedure because it considered that the likely length of trial would make this unsuitable.  However, the Tribunal gave directions for future costs management of the proceedings.

Anneli Howard KC and Khatija Hafesji acted for Eurospares, instructed by Geradin Partners.

Conor McCarthy acted for Porsche (led by Sarah Abram KC), instructed by CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP.

Robert Hammond v Amazon.com, Inc. & Others and Professor Andreas Stephan v Amazon.com Inc. & Others  [2025] CAT 42; 24/07/2025

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has handed down its decision in two certification decisions heard together in this matter and known as the ‘Amazon Buy Box’ case. Both had been subject to prior determinations in carriage disputes ([2024] CAT 8 and [2025] CAT 6).

Each class representative sought and was granted a CPO on an opt-out basis against Amazon: Mr. Hammond for a class of consumers and Professor Stephan for a class of retailers.

Both claims allege that Amazon abused a dominant market position in breach of the Chapter II prohibition in section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 and, for conduct prior to 31 December 2020, Article 102 TFEU.

Amazon opposed the granting of both CPOs on the following grounds:

• Concerns over the litigation funding arrangements.
• Challenges to the expert methodologies presented.
• In Professor Stephan’s case only, an alleged conflict of interest within the proposed class.

The Tribunal rejected those criticisms and found that both applicants satisfied the Authorisation Condition, including representation by experienced legal teams and comprehensive litigation plans.

As to funding, Prof. Stephan’s LFA had already been scrutinised in the carriage dispute and concerns over legal costs were addressed by both class representatives’  agreement to engage specialist costs lawyers.

The Tribunal declined to assess Mr Hammond’s funder’s return at this stage, noting that such scrutiny may follow judgment or settlement.

The Tribunal concluded that both applicants met the Eligibility Condition, including allowing the alternative exclusionary abuse aspect of Mr Hammond’s claim to be supported by Prof. Stephan’s expert’s methodology, in circumstances where Mr. Hammond’s expert methodology was not found to be adequate in its own right, either through joint instruction or other agreement.

Finally, the Tribunal rejected Amazon’s objection to Professor Stephan’s application based on an alleged conflict of interest within the class.

Philip Moser KC and Ben Rayment of Monckton Chambers appeared on behalf of Robert Hammond.

Jon Turner KC of Monckton Chambers appeared on behalf of Amazon.com, Inc. and Others in respect of the Hammond application.

Kristina Lukacova of Monckton Chambers appeared on behalf of Amazon.com, Inc. and Others in respect of the Stephan application.

In an important judgment of the TCC, Azeem Suterwalla KC and Khatija Hafesji (alongside Daniel Toledano KC of One Essex Court) successfully persuaded the court that Interested Parties in procurement claims were capable of being treated as “parties” for the purposes of specific disclosure applications under CPR r.31.12.

Allwyn, the Interested Party to the TNLC v Gambling Commission litigation (one of the Top 20 cases of 2025) unsuccessfully tried to resist a specific disclosure application brought against it by TNLC under CPR r.31.12 on the basis that as an Interested Party it was a “non-party” to the litigation, and the application needed to be brought under r.31.17 instead (which imposes a higher threshold for the making of a disclosure order).

The TCC rejected that argument, accepting TNLC’s submissions that “the position of an interested party… is not that an interested party automatically becomes a party with all the rights and obligations that a party has under the CPR but that the court, on any application against an interested party, has to decide whether it is appropriate to treat the interested party as a party for the purpose of applying a particular provision of the CPR.”

The scope of Allwyn’s involvement in the proceedings, which includes filing a Statement of Case that relies on documents not otherwise disclosed in the proceedings, made it appropriate to treat it as a party for the purposes of a specific disclosure order under CPR r.31.12.

The judgment of Sir Vivian Ramsey can be found here.

 

The European Court of Human Rights has delivered judgment in Google LLC and Others v. Russia (App. no. 44316/20), a freedom of expression case that also addressed Russia’s recent practice of disapplying foreign jurisdiction clauses in sanctions-related disputes.

The case concerned court proceedings in Russia on the refusal to remove certain content from the YouTube platform, including political videos, which the Russian authorities had deemed unlawful; and the failure to restore monetisation features to the YouTube channel of Tsargrad TV, a Russian television outlet owned by a Russian oligarch who had been sanctioned by the US and the EU. Google incurred very heavy fines as a result of these proceedings.  In its judgment, the European Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial).

In the Tsargrad case, the European Court also examined the impact of recent Russian legislation permitting domestic courts to assume jurisdiction over sanctions-related disputes—even where the parties have agreed to a foreign jurisdiction clause—in cases where sanctions are deemed to pose an obstacle to access to justice for the sanctioned party (Article 248.1 of the Code of Commercial Procedure). The Court found that the domestic courts’ presumption that sanctions created such obstacles in the jurisdictions designated by the parties’ contract was not substantiated by any concrete reasons or evidence and failed to address material in the case file that contradicted this conclusion, undermining the very essence of the applicants’ right to a reasoned judgment.

Drew Holiner of Monckton Chambers was instructed on behalf of the applicant to provide expert evidence on Russian law.  The applicant was represented by Will Thomas KC and Joshua Kelly of Freshfields LLP and Tim Otty KC, Charlotte Kilroy KC and Jason Pobjoy KC of Blackstone Chambers.

At a 5 day hearing in the Court of Appeal in May 2025, Phones4U sought to appeal the judgment of Roth J rejecting Phones4U’s allegations of collusion against EE, Vodafone, O2 and their parent companies.  In a detailed and comprehensive judgment handed down today, the Court of Appeal (the Chancellor, Richards and Falk LJJ) has dismissed Phones4U’s appeal on all grounds.

The grounds of appeal were wide ranging and included arguments that:

• the Judge had erred in failing to find collusion between EE and O2 given his findings of fact which included a passive response by an EE executive
• the Judge had erred in finding that the Anic presumption could be rebutted by conduct other than public distancing or a report to the competition authorities
• complaints that the Judge had wrongly found against P4U on the basis of a new explanation for a document which had not been tested at trial
• the judge had wrongly omitted to deal with material evidence as a result of delays in handing down his judgment.  The judgment includes important observations on the risks of “island hopping” where an appellant seeks to reopen selected findings of fact on appeal
• the Judge had erred in applying the legal test for the drawing of adverse inferences from document destruction.

The Judgment can be found here and represents a further success for the MNOs in defending this long running standalone claim.

Meredith Pickford KC and David Gregory acted for EE, instructed by Jeremy Kosky and Sam Ward from Clifford Chance LLP.

Rob Williams KC acted for Vodafone, instructed by John Tillman, Angus Coulter and Alice Wallace-Wright from Hogan Lovells International LLP.