The Supreme Court has granted permission to appeal in the joined cases of Vargova v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Molnar v Secretary of State for the Home Department. These cases raise an important issue concerning the interpretation of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement (Articles 20 and 21, in particular) and whether the EU proportionality principle applies to a decision to deport an EU national resident in the UK on grounds of criminal conduct committed after the transition period had expired.

The Secretary of State argued that she is not required to assess whether such deportations are compatible with the EU proportionality principle, and on appeal, a court or tribunal does not need to consider whether the decision to deport is disproportionate under EU law either. The issue has wide-ranging implications for EU citizens resident in the United Kingdom under the Withdrawal Agreement. It is potentially relevant to UK nationals enjoying corresponding accrued residence rights in EU Member States.

In January 2026, the Court of Appeal (Baker, Elisabeth Laing, Falk LJJ) agreed with the Secretary of State in its judgment [2026] EWCA Civ 31.

The Independent Monitoring Authority for the Citizens’ Rights Agreements (“IMA”), the statutory body responsible for monitoring the implementation of Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement, intervened in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and in both applications for permission to appeal in the Supreme Court. The IMA argued that Articles 20 and 21 of the Withdrawal Agreement, properly interpreted in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement, require decisions restricting protected residence rights to comply with the EU law principle of proportionality. It argued that the Court of Appeal adopted the wrong interpretative framework.

The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal, but permission has now been granted by the Supreme Court (Lord Reed, Lord Leggatt and Lady Rose). The appeals will provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine the proper interpretation of Articles 20 and 21 of the Withdrawal Agreement and to clarify whether the EU principle of proportionality continues to govern decisions restricting the residence rights of beneficiaries of the Agreement, or make a reference to the CJEU.

Ian Rogers KC appeared for the IMA in the Court of Appeal and in the intervention in support of the applications for permission to appeal in the Supreme Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is here and the link to the Supreme Court website is here.

In Information Commissioner and the Health and Safety Executive v O’Hanlon [2026] EWCA Civ 838, the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Information Commissioner’s appeal against a decision of the Upper Tribunal, holding that the correct date for determining the application of the exception under reg 12(4)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations and the balance of the public interest under reg 12(1) was the date on which the public authority received the request, rather than the date of any review decision under reg 11(3).

In this case, the requester, Mrs O’Hanlon had asked the public authority, the Health and Safety Executive, in April 2020 for information about its inspection of a demolition site in Merseyside. On 6 May 2020, the HSE refused to disclose the information under FOIA, following which Mrs O’Hanlon asked it to review its decision. The HSE, however, did not complete its review until August 2021, at which time it relied primarily on reg 12(4)(a) EIR, i.e. that it did not hold some of the requested information at the time of the request.

The Commissioner upheld HSE’s decision and Mrs O’Hanlon appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. In the course of that hearing, it came to light that HSE had received further information within the scope of her request following its original refusal in May 2020 but prior to its internal review decision in August 2021. The FTT, however, concluded that the further information in question was not held.

On appeal, however, Upper Tribunal Judge Citron held, relying on a passage in the 6^th edition of Coppell, Information Rights and the Upper Tribunal’s earlier decision in Montague v Information Commissioner [2022] UKUT 104 (AAC); [2023] 1 WLR 1565, that the correct date for determining the application of any exceptions and the balance of the public interest was the date on which the public authority completed its internal review under reg 11(3) EIR. The Commissioner was granted permission to appeal the Upper Tribunal’s decision.

In a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal allowed the Commissioner’s appeal on all grounds, holding that, as a matter of statutory construction and construed in light of Directive 2003/4/EC which the EIR transposed, the application of reg 12(4)(a) EIR and the balance of any public interest under reg 12(1) had to be determined expressly by reference to the date on which the public authority receives the original request, rather than any subsequent review decision under reg 11. The Court declined to rule on the relevant date in relation to the other exceptions under reg 12(4) and (5) but the judgment strongly suggests reg 11 cannot be used to extend the relevant date in any event.

Eric Metcalfe acted for the Information Commissioner as First Appellant.

The DIFC Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in Krystal Financial Consultants LLC v NextGen Robopark Investment LLC [2025] DIFC CA 007, dismissing Krystal’s appeal. Sitting as an expanded five-judge bench, the Court used the appeal to clarify the standard of appellate review in the DIFC Courts more generally.

The appeal arose from Krystal’s claim for a success fee under a debt-raising mandate, pursuant to which it had been engaged to help NextGen refinance AED 155m of existing debt through Dubai Islamic Bank. The key issue was whether an email sent by NextGen amounted to an objection to the bank’s refinancing offer. If it did, no success fee fell due. If it did not, the offer was deemed to have been accepted under the mandate’s terms and a success fee became payable.

At first instance, H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere granted NextGen immediate judgment and dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeal, deciding the construction of the email for itself, agreed that it was an objection and dismissed Krystal’s appeal.

The Court of Appeal held the appropriate standard of appellate review was “more nuanced” than any single, universal “plainly wrong” test. Reviewing its own earlier decisions, including Al Khorafi v Bank Sarasin–Alpin (ME) Ltd [2015] DIFC CA 003, DAS Real Estate v First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC [2017] DIFC CA 007, Hormodi v Bankmed (SAL) [2019] DIFC CA 006 and Amira C Foods International DMCC v IDBI Bank Ltd [2021] DIFC CA 004,  the Court of Appeal explained that the amount of appellate deference that should be given to a first instance judge’s decision should depend on the advantage over the Court of Appeal that the first-instance judge actually enjoyed.

At one end of the spectrum lie cases in which it is “quite clear” that the appeal court is at no disadvantage; there, the appeal court is obliged to substitute its own decision if it concludes the judge was wrong.

At the other end of the spectrum lie appeals from findings of fact based on oral testimony or on voluminous and complex documentary evidence; exercises of discretion, including as to costs; multi-factorial evaluative assessments weighing competing factors in the context of the case as a whole; and case management decisions: [52], [60]. These are situations in which it is “quite clear that appellate restraint and deference to the judge at first instance is entirely appropriate”.

In between those extremes lie cases where the degree of deference afforded to the first instance judge is itself “a matter properly assessed by the Court of Appeal having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the decision under review and the extent to which the appellate court considers that it is at a disadvantage as compared to the Judge at first instance” – an approach expressed as consistent with observations made by Clarke LJ in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) [2002] EWCA Civ 1642.

The Court of Appeal declined to embark on a fuller comparative law survey, recording only its tentative inclination that the differences between common law jurisdictions in this area “may be more semantic than substantive” (at [62]).

George Hilton acted for the successful Respondent, NextGen Robopark Investment LLC, instructed by Tarek Shrayh of Al Tamimi & Company.

On 24 June 2026, the Court of Session in Edinburgh granted Aramark Limited permission to appeal against the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s refusal to extend time in a high-profile merger challenge case.

Aramark had sought an extension of time, pursuant to Tribunal Rule 25(3), to file its challenge to a merger decision by the Competition and Markets Authority. The Tribunal refused the application, on the basis that there were no exceptional circumstances within the meaning of that Rule justifying an extension of time. Its judgment contains an important discussion of the Tribunal’s powers to extend time for commencing proceedings. Further details can be found here.

Aramark subsequently appealed the Tribunal’s ruling to the Court of Session (being the relevant appellate court for Tribunal proceedings in Scotland). Aramark argued that the Tribunal had erred in law in multiple respects, including in relation to its assessment of the reasons why Aramark missed the original deadline, as well as the impact of the refusal on Aramark and the Scottish economy.

In granting permission, the Court of Session accepted that Aramark’s arguments are arguable, have substance, and realistic prospects of success. Aramark’s appeal will now proceed to a substantive hearing to determine whether the Tribunal did indeed err in law.

Ronit Kreisberger KC, Ciar McAndrew and Charlie Coverman are instructed by Aramark and acted for Aramark before the Tribunal at first instance.

Rob Williams KC and James Bourke were instructed by the CMA before the Tribunal at first instance but are not instructed in the Scottish proceedings.

The case has been covered by GCR  and MLex.

The Court of Appeal has set aside a judgment entered against a Singapore business which was involved in a money transfer and conversion arrangement. In Fastmove v FMC [2026] EWCA Civ 763, summary judgment had been entered against a defendant, FMC, on the basis that it had no defence to a claim for breach of contract, whilst the same application against a director of a co-defendant, a Mr Salamat, was adjourned. On restoration of the application against Mr Salamat many months later, the application was dismissed based on new evidenced provided to the Court, leaving a potential for there to be a finding that there had been no breach of contract by FMC. Seeking leave to appeal nine months after judgment had been entered against it, FMC, represented on the appeal by William Buck, successfully argued that the Court below had erred in bifurcating the summary judgment application process, then permitting fresh evidence, thereby creating a risk of inconsistency between the judgment which was entered against FMC on the application for summary judgment and that which might arise on the trial of Fastmove’s remaining claims against Mr Salamat.

The Judgment emphasis the need to ensure that all factual enquiries are completed before summary judgment is entered against a defendant and illustrates the exceptional ability of the Court of Appeal to hear an appeal many months out of time.

William Buck was instructed for FMC, the appellant, by Mr Ramie Farag, partner of Spencer West

The judgment can be read here: Fastmove v FMC.

The Supreme Court yesterday heard an appeal in R (Foodrise Ltd, formerly Global Feedback Ltd) v HM Treasury, which concerns the availability of Aarhus Convention costs protection for claimants in environmental challenges. These protections ensure that environmental litigation is not prohibitively expensive, and the appeal is likely to have significant ramifications for environmental access to justice.

The appeal arises from Foodrise’s judicial review concerning regulations implementing tariff preferences under the UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement, which it contends will harm the environment because of the higher climate impact of meat production in Australia. Foodrise obtained cost capping in the High Court, but that decision was subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal.

Conor McCarthy acts for the Appellant, Foodrise.

Nikolaus Grubeck and Will Perry act for an Intervener, Friends of the Earth.

On 10 June 2026, the Divisional Court (Males LJ and Morris J) dismissed Innsworth’s claim for judicial review of the CAT’s decision as to how a £200 million collective settlement sum should be distributed: [2026] EWHC 1393 (Admin).

By a settlement agreement dated 3 December 2024, Mastercard agreed to pay the class representative, Mr Merricks, £200 million to settle the collective proceedings commenced in September 2016 which alleged that 44 million people in the UK had paid higher retail prices because of inflated interchange fees. Accordingly, both parties made a joint application to the CAT for a Collective Settlement Approval Order (“CSAO”) pursuant to Rule 94 of the CAT Rules 2015.

On 23 January 2025, the CAT granted permission to Innsworth, the funder, to intervene in the CSAO Application, as the funder objected both to the amount of the settlement, and to the proposed method of distribution. By judgment dated 20 May 2025, the CAT approved the settlement as just and reasonable, this being the statutory test pursuant to section 49A(5) Competition Act 1998. The CAT rejected Innsworth’s claim for £179 million (89% of the settlement sum) and approved a payment to the funder of £68 million (34% of the settlement sum) which consisted of re-imbursement of the £45.5 million invested and a £22.5 million profit.

Innsworth objected to the payment to it of £22.5 million as net profit and by application dated 10 June 2025, claimed judicial review of the CAT’s judgment on distribution but not of the settlement sum.

The Divisional Court held that there was no material error in the CAT’s judgment that a 50% net profit on the funder’s investment of £45.5 million amounting to a total return of £68 million was fair and reasonable. This paves the way for class members to receive a payment of up to £70.

Mark Brealey KC acted for Mr Merricks in the collective settlement proceedings.

Click here for the full Divisional Court judgment.

Click here for Mark Brealey’s Case Note (also on his web page).

The case has been covered in the press: Global Competition Review, The Law Society Gazette, the Global Legal Post, MLex, ICLG and Legal Futures.

The President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal has dismissed an appeal against a tribunal’s refusal to make witness order mid-way through a final hearing. The appeal had sought to revive the final hearing following the substantive dismissal of the claims.

Lord Fairley clarified the standard set in Remploy Limited v. Lowen-Bulger UKEAT/0027/18/RN as to what was required of a tribunal when assessing the relevance of evidence under the test in Dada v. Metal Box Company Ltd [1974] IRLR 251 NIRC. The Judgment emphasises the need for applicants for witness orders to address the specific content of the proposed evidence a witness would give, rather than merely referring to issues in the case that the evidence would be relevant to, without which a tribunal cannot be criticised for not assessing in detail the relevance of the evidence (§§29-31).

Jen Coyne acted for the respondent Introhive UK Ltd, both below and on appeal, instructed by Matthew Cole and Sheilah Cummins of Prettys Solicitors LLP.

Judgment is available here.

The Supreme Court (Lord Reed PSC, Lord Hamblen and Lord Richards) has granted permission to appeal the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the challenge to the imposition of VAT on private school fees. The Charedi Jewish claimants (BYL and BAU), represented by Khatija Hafesji at Monckton Chambers (led by Stephen Broach KC at 39 Essex Chambers) have been granted permission on all grounds.

 

In a judgment handed down this morning, Mr Justice Murray – sitting in the Administrative Court – quashed the decision of Portsmouth Magistrates’ Court to try and convict Mr David Justice of the charge of harassment in his absence and without any legal representation.

That decision was held to be an irrational exercise of the Magistrates’ Court’s power, under s.11 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, to proceed to trial in the absence of the accused.

The learned Judge also held that, on the facts of this case, an appeal of the decision to the Crown Court was not a suitable alternative remedy to judicial review proceedings. The case is a rare judicial review of Magistrates’ Court decisions of this nature.

Khatija Hafesji was instructed by the charity Advocate, and represented Mr Justice pro bono.