Today, the CAT handed down judgment following the first trial in the Merchant Interchange Fee Umbrella Proceedings, which concerned whether Mastercard and Visa’s current and historic scheme rules infringe Article 101(1) TFEU and/or the Chapter I Prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. Damages claims, some of which have settled since the trial, were brought on behalf of over 2000 merchants, with a combined value in excess of 1 billion.

The judgment unanimously finds that the “Default Interchange Fee Rule”, by which each of Visa and Mastercard imposes a default charge (multilateral interchange fee / “MIF”) on every transaction by a payment card bearing their brand, is an infringement of UK and EU competition law by object in situations where the level of the MIF is not capped by regulation or by agreement with the European Commission. An infringement by object means that that Rule, by its very nature, reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition such that it is not necessary to examine its effects. The majority further found that, although MIFs did not amount to an object restriction in situations where the level of the MIF is capped by legislation or regulatory agreement, they nonetheless infringe Article 101(1) and Chapter I by effect. Smith J’s minority judgment found that the Default Interchange Fee Rule was infringing by object at all material times, irrespective of regulation.

The relevant restriction of competition takes place on the market for acquiring payments, on which acquirers compete for contracts with merchants. Under those contracts, merchants pay acquirers a merchant service charge (“MSC”) in return for the services by which the merchant, via the acquirer, receives payment from the bank which issues the cardholder’s card. The CAT found that Visa and Mastercard’s default charge, the MIF, sets a “floor” to, or constitutes a non-negotiable element of, the MSC. Accordingly, competition between acquirers is restricted.

These are the first findings, in any jurisdiction, that MIFs infringe competition law by object and the first in the UK or anywhere to deal with the restrictive object or effect of MIFs which have been capped by legislation or regulatory agreement. In the prior Sainsbury’s litigation, the UK Supreme Court upheld findings that the domestic consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer MIFs which applied prior to the EU’s Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR) (which capped those MIFs) infringed Article 101(1) by effect. The CAT’s judgment today extends those findings to findings of object infringement, while making further findings of infringement by object or effect in respect of the uncapped default MIFs applying to commercial card and inter-regional consumer card transactions, and in respect of MIFs capped under the IFR regime and pursuant to certain commitments given by Visa and Mastercard to the European Commission.

Specifically, the CAT found that:

1. Commercial card MIFs are infringing by object.
2.  Before the Interchange Fee Regulation (“IFR”) came into effect in December 2015, domestic UK and Irish consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer card MIFs were infringing by object.
3. Since the IFR came into force, domestic UK and Irish consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer card MIFs have infringed competition law by effect.
4. Visa’s interregional MIFs infringed competition law by object until the entry into force of the Visa Commitments Decision in April 2019 and by effect thereafter.
5. Mastercard’s interregional MIFs infringed competition law by object until the Mastercard II Commitments Decision in September 2019 and by effect thereafter.

The Umbrella Proceedings are ongoing. Trial 2, concerning the pass-on of the MIF from acquirers to merchants and from merchants to consumers, took place in late 2024 and early 2025, with judgment expected in due course. A further trial will deal with exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.

Philip Woolfe KC and Antonia Fitzpatrick acted in Trial 1 for the successful merchant claimants, instructed by Stephenson Harwood LLP and Scott + Scott UK LLP

The judgment is available here.

The TCC has dismissed the Gambling Commission and Interested Party’s application for security for their costs in The New Lottery Company Limited and Northern & Shell PLC v The Gambling Commission litigation (one of the Top 20 cases of 2025). The court ruled that the threshold condition for the Gambling Commission seeking security for its costs under CPR r.25.26 had not been met.

The Interested Party, Allwyn’s, application for security for their costs was legally novel, neither party having been able to identify a case where an Interested Party to a procurement claim had been awarded security for its costs. That application was also refused. The court ruled that “In all the circumstances, I can see nothing in the Rules or in the authorities to which I have been referred to support the proposition that it would be proper for me simply to ignore the longstanding practice of the court and make an order for security for costs in favour of Allwyn. Although in theory an inherent jurisdiction exists…it is not unfettered and there is nothing in the Rules which provides the court with power to make such an order. I reject Allwyn’s case that the provisions of CPR 3.1(2)(p) have that effect. I respectfully adopt the position taken by the Court of Appeal in CT Bowring that, if there is to be an expansion of the Rules to cover applications for security for costs by interested parties, that must be a matter for the Rules Committee or for Parliament.”

Khatija Hafesji acted for The New Lottery Company Limited and Northern & Shell Plc (the Claimants), led by Sa’ad Hossian KC of One Essex Court. The Judgment can be found here.

The High Court has given judgment in a long-running dispute between US-based MGA, one of the world’s largest toy manufacturers, and Cabo, a UK-based start-up.

MGA manufactures the bestselling ‘LOL Surprise’ range of collectible dolls, and had previously had success with ‘Bratz’ dolls. Cabo, the claimant in the proceedings, designed the ‘Worldeez’ line of collectibles, which it was preparing to launch in the UK in May 2017. It alleged that MGA stifled the launch of Worldeez by claiming that the product was a “knock off” of LOL Surprise, making false allegations that Worldeez infringed its IP rights, and by threatening toy retailers that their supplies of LOL Surprise would be withheld if they stocked Worldeez. All the major retailers then withdrew their support for Worldeez, which failed and was discontinued in 2018.

The trial was originally listed for June 2022, but was adjourned shortly before it was due to start after it emerged that MGA had failed to harvest some 900,000 documents (with MGA ordered to pay the costs of the adjourned trial on the indemnity basis: see previous news article here).

Following a trial in the Chancery Division heard over four months, Mrs Justice Bacon held that MGA’s exclusionary campaign was an abuse of dominance, and that MGA had also made unjustified threats of patent infringement proceedings contrary to the Patents Act 1977. Although MGA’s agreements with retailers not to supply LOL had an anticompetitive object, the judge found that they nonetheless benefited from exemption under the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation. However, despite the findings on infringement, Cabo’s claim for damages was unsuccessful, as the judge considered that even in the counterfactual Cabo would not have traded profitably.

The judgment also contains a discussion of the purdah rules for witnesses giving evidence (which MGA’s CEO was found to have breached multiple times) and their relevance to the assessment of a witness’s credibility.

Ronit Kreisberger KC, Stefan Kuppen, and Alfred Artley represented Cabo, instructed by Spector Constant & Williams.

A full copy of the judgment can be found here.

Over 19,000 current and former police officers and the Police Federation of England and Wales (“PFEW”) have reached a settlement after over three years of litigation.

The officers’ claims related to two ransomware cyber-attacks that the PFEW suffered in March 2019. During the attacks, hackers accessed the PFEW’s systems and encrypted several of its databases, making them inaccessible to the PFEW. The attacks also gave cybercriminals access to the same databases, which contained officers’ personal data, including home address data.

On 11 March 2022, the PFEW admitted a breach of the requirements under the GDPR to have appropriate technical and organisational measures in place. In May 2025, the PFEW agreed to settle the claim for a total of £15 million (inclusive of legal and insurance costs).

The settlement has been widely reported on, including by the Telegraph and by Cyber Security Review.

Gerry Facenna KC, Eric Metcalfe and Jenn Lawrence acted for the claimants and were instructed by KP Law.

The Court of Appeal today handed down its judgment dismissing the appeal of various pharmaceutical companies against an earlier judgment of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) finding that they had no limitation defence to a multi-million pound claim by English and Welsh NHS providers arising out of the “pay for delay” cartel in relation to citalopram, an important first-line treatment for depression routinely prescribed by GPs.

In 2013, the European Commission decided that Lundbeck, which held the original patent for citalopram, had breached EU competition law by agreeing with generic manufacturers that they would delay entry to the market for citalopram in return for being paid the equivalent of what they would have earned from earlier entry (hence, “pay for delay”).  Those manufacturers had threatened to enter the market after the expiry of the main patent for citalopram, despite Lundbeck’s assertion that to do so would infringe some other patents held by Lundbeck in relation to the process of manufacturing citalopram (an assertion that the generic manufacturers denied).

Lundbeck and the generic manufacturers involved appealed against that decision to the General Court of the EU and then to the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”).  Their final appeals were dismissed by the Court of Justice on 25 March 2021.

Meanwhile, on the sixth anniversary of the decision, in 2019, the NHS and other providers started High Court proceedings for damages against the companies involved.  In 2021, but before any Particulars of Claim had been pleaded, those proceedings were transferred to the CAT: the order made provision for a Claim Form to be served in accordance with CAT rules in lieu of Particulars of Claim.  The NHS served that Claim Form on 28 February 2023, and an amended version adding a further party (“the 12^th Defendant”) on 17 March 2023.  The Claim Form was entirely a “follow-on” claim relying only on the infringement found in the Commission decision.

It was common ground that: –

• the High Court proceedings were served out of time: the Defendants alleged, and the NHS did not dispute, that the six-year period ran from before the publication of the Commission decision given the material available to the NHS before publication; and
• on the basis of the limitation periods applicable to pre-2015 follow-on claims and preserved by transitional provisions in the CAT Rules, there was a separate limitation period for follow-on claims in the CAT of two years running from the date of the CJEU’s judgment.

On that basis, the issue between the NHS and the Defendants was whether the Claim Form served in February and March 2023 – within two years of the CJEU judgment – validly made a follow-on claim.  The Defendants said it did not, and should only be regarded as a step in the transferred High Court proceedings (which were out of time).  They also claimed that the NHS was estopped by the terms of the transfer order – which preserved the parties “accrued rights” – from relying on the two-year limitation period.

Green LJ, giving a judgment with which Flaux C and Phillips LJ agreed, upheld the CAT in rejecting the Defendants’ limitation defence.  He pointed out that the Defendants’ case was, in the end, that the NHS should have withdrawn the transferred proceedings before serving the Claim Form.  But there was no reason why, even though the NHS had not done that, the Claim Form should not have the effect under rule 30 of the CAT rules of “making” a claim: Green LJ stated that (§62): –

The [Defendants’] case … proceeds upon the basis that an ostensibly regular claim is irregular because of a procedural omission which is external to and uncontemplated by the Rules. That omission is the failure to take a wholly unnecessary procedural step, namely the abandonment of a prior High Court claim. The Appellants’ interpretation of [the relevant rules] collide, in my view violently, with the General Principles of fairness, justice and proportionality, which guide the construction and operation of the Rules.

Green LJ then rejected the Defendants’ estoppel argument on the basis that there was no reason to read the reference to preservation of “accrued rights” as including an agreement by the NHS to give up a right to rely on the two-year period (which had at that stage not yet commenced).  In any event, that argument could not assist the 12^th Defendant, which was not party to the transfer order on which the alleged estoppel was based.

Subject to any application by the Defendants to appeal to the Supreme Court, the NHS’s claim for damages will now proceed in the CAT.

George Peretz KC (instructed by Peters & Peters Solicitors LLP) represented the NHS in the CAT (as from 2024) and the Court of Appeal.  He also represented the European Commission in the General Court and CJEU appeals against its 2013 decision.

A seven-member panel of the Supreme Court has handed down judgment in URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd. The ruling is the first time that the Court has considered the Building Safety Act 2022, the legislative response to the building safety crisis that followed the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, as well as the Defective Premises Act 1972.

The appeal arises out of litigation between a developer, BDW (Barratt Homes, David Wilson Homes etc.), and a provider of consultant engineering services, URS. Following the widespread identification of building safety issues after the Grenfell Tower fire, BDW discovered defects in two sets of high-rise developments which it had developed and received structural designs from URS.

The Supreme Court has dismissed each of URS’s grounds of appeal. The judgment is expected to make it easier to hold wrongdoers responsible for historic building safety defects to account, and to speed up the process of making homes safe for their residents.

Will Perry acted for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (led by Sir James Eadie KC and others), who intervened on Ground 2. The Court relied heavily on those submissions when considering the background, structure and purpose of the Building Safety Act 2022.

The judgment is available here.

On 20 May 2025 the CAT pursuant to section 49A (1) Competition Act 1998 approved the settlement agreed between the class representative, Walter Merricks CBE (“CR”) and Mastercard The settlement sum of £200 million was contested by the funder, Innsworth, as being too low. The CAT will approve a collective settlement approval order (“CSAO”) broadly based on 3 pots proposed by the CR and which determine how the money will be distributed.

The CR’s claim followed on from an EU Commission Decision adopted on 19 December 2007 which held that Mastercard’s EEA interchange fees (MIFs) infringed Article 101 TFEU. EEA MIFs are paid on EEA cross border purchases. The CR claimed damages in respect of these unlawful EEA MIFs, but he also contended that the EEA MIFs caused the UK domestic MIFS to be inflated. The UK MIFs represented 95% of the transactions by value and increased the claim of several hundred £million to a claim for several £billion. Unfortunately for the CR on 26 February 2024, after a three-week trial, the CAT ruled that the EEA MIFs did not in fact cause the UK MIFs to be unlawfully inflated; [2025] CAT 14. Permission to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal. However, the CR also argued that although actual causation had not been proved, in a counterfactual world where the EEA MIFs were zero the UK MIFs would also have been much lower. This argument (the counterfactual causation) was left over but unless it could be resurrected the claim would be reduced by circa 95%.

There were two main issues that called for determination by the CAT at the settlement hearing. First, was the settlement sum of £200 million just and reasonable? Second, if so, how should the sum be distributed? In essence the CR had proposed 3 pots. Pot 1 would contain £100 million and be ringfenced for the class members. Pot 2 of approximately £50 million would be ringfenced as the minimum return of fees incurred by the funder. Pot 3 of circa £50 million would be in reserve for any further sums to be paid to the class (if there was a higher take up), the funder’s return (i.e., profit) and any payments to charity, the Access to Justice Foundation.

On the first issue the CAT stated that it was “entirely satisfied that the terms of the settlement are just and reasonable.” The £200 million gave value to the EEA MIF claim. The CAT rejected the funder’s submission that the CR should have pursued the claim for the counterfactual causation. The CAT regarded the success of this as “low” and there was a risk that the CR might not receive the £200 million if it was not successful at the forthcoming pass-on trial. Whilst the settlement sum reflected an element of pass-on there was a risk that the CR would not beat this in any pass on judgment. In summary, the CR was justified in settling at less than 2% of the original claim.

On the second issue, the CAT adopted the three pots but altered the proposed distribution. The CAT rejected the funder’s submission that it should receive the majority of the settlement sum. The CAT noted that the CR had desired a maximum take-up for the class by way of a reasonable payment to individual class members. It stated that he should be “commended for pursuing that objective.” The CAT accordingly ringfenced half the settlement sum in pot 1 (the CR being advised that a take up of 5% would result in circa £45 to 2.2 million consumers). As regards pot 2 the CAT allowed fees that had already been paid but remitted the outstanding costs to a costs judge to advise the CAT on whether the remaining sums were reasonable and proportionate. As to the funder’s return (profit) the CAT limited the return to a return on investment of 1.5% which reflected the risk underwritten but also the low settlement sum (compared to the original claim). Payment of this return will be made out of pot 2 and pot 3. Pot 3 would also cover any take up by the class members above the 5%. Any remaining monies would be paid to the Access to Justice Foundation.

It is not necessary for class members to have owned a Mastercard as the loss is said to arise from higher prices generally (because retailers are said to have passed on the overcharge). Consumers are eligible to claim if they lived in the UK for 3 months between June 1997and June 2008 (the starting point for Scotland however is 1992).

The judgment is available here.

Mark Brealey KC, Anneliese Blackwood, Ligia Osepciu, Jack Williams and Alastair Holder Ross appeared on behalf of the Class Representative, instructed by Willkie Farr & Gallagher (UK) LLP.

The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) has ordered the Cabinet Office to disclose information about the compliance of Dame Priti Patel MP with the Ministerial Code and Business Appointment Rules.

Ms Patel is alleged to have broken those rules in 2019 when she took up a position as strategic adviser to Viasat, for which she was paid £1,000 per hour, without first clearing the role with the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA). The alleged breach was reported at the time by The Guardian, following which a Freedom of Information Act 2000 request was made to the Cabinet Office for discussions within Government about the situation. Ms Patel was the Home Secretary at the time of the request.

The Information Commissioner ordered the Cabinet Office to disclose the vast majority of the information. The First-tier Tribunal reached the same conclusion, albeit both the Cabinet Office and Information Commissioner agreed that the FTT’s reasoning was flawed.

The UT has upheld the Commissioner’s original decision. Although the UT recognised that revealing internal discussions carried a strong risk of a “chilling effect”, it concluded that disclosure was in the public interest, in particular given the information concerned serious and viable questions about Ms Patel’s compliance with the rules, and because there was a “clear transparency and accountability deficit”. In addition, the UT placed weight on the circumstances surrounding Ms Patel’s resignation as Secretary of State for International Development in 2017, which it considered raised “a serious question about Mrs Patel’s approach to the behavioural standards expected of ministers”. In reaching its conclusions, the UT rejected the suggestion that, because the Prime Minister is the sole arbiter of the Ministerial Code, there is a limited public interest in the disclosure of the views of civil servants about its application.

The judgment also contains a detailed consideration of the approach of Tribunals in FOIA appeals to the evidence of experienced civil servants.

The Upper Tribunal’s judgment is available here.

Will Perry acted successfully for the Information Commissioner.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California has granted Google LLC’s motion for preliminary (anti-anti-suit and anti-enforcement) injunctions against NAO Tsargrad Media, holding that international comity did not require recognition of a judgment obtained by Tsargrad in Russia in breach of a forum selection agreement.

The court noted that “in applying Article 248.1 [of the Russian Arbitrazh Procedure Code], the Russian courts sought to delegitimize the U.S. court system by holding that the U.S. courts were not a fair forum capable of delivering justice”, which was “the culmination of an effort to frustrate the U.S. courts’ jurisdiction in clear violation of U.S. public policy”.

The order granting in part motion for the preliminary hearing can be viewed at www.pacer.gov, ref. Case No.: 5:24-cv-05423.

Drew Holiner was instructed in the case as an expert in Russian law by King & Spalding in New York & San Francisco.

The Upper Tribunal (Tax & Chancery Chamber) has released its decision dismissing HMRC’s appeal and upholding the decision of the First-tier Tribunal that ride-hailing services do fall within the Tour Operators Margin Scheme (“TOMS”). The Upper Tribunal has ruled that the First-tier Tribunal was correct to find that the single supply of ride-hailing falls within TOMS.

Valentina and Jenn were instructed by Deloitte LLP. A copy of the decision is available here.