Involve v DWP [2026] EWHC 2209 (TCC)

The Technology and Construction Court (O’Farrell J) today handed down judgment in the Involve procurement dispute, dismissing the claimant’s challenge to the exclusion of its tender for non-compliance.

The claimant (Involve) is the incumbent supplier of audio-visual services to DWP for key services including Universal Credit. It submitted a bid for the replacement video solution, but its tender was disqualified on the basis that it failed to meet the minimum score for one of the technical questions (Question 6.4). Although at the original moderation Involve had originally received a score of 7 for that question, one of the evaluators remained concerned that Involve’s solution, which used ‘URL masking’ (where a customer is re-directed to a non-GOV.UK domain, but that is then ‘masked’ from the customer by showing a GOV.UK URL in the address bar), did not meet the requirement for the solution to be “integrated and provided from within DWP web pages”. A re-moderation meeting was therefore convened, at which it was agreed that URL masking did not meet the requirement: Involve’s score for Question 6.4 was therefore reduced to 1, leading to its disqualification and the award of the contract to another bidder (Accenture).

Involve challenged the disqualification on the three grounds, claiming (i) that DWP’s decision to re-moderate the scores for Question 6.4 was in breach of the principle of transparency and/or manifestly erroneous; (ii) that DWP’s conduct of the re-moderation process was in breach of the principles of transparency and/or equal treatment and/or its obligation to act proportionately; and (iii) that the score awarded to Involve for Question 6.4 on re-moderation was manifestly erroneous.

A further issue arose following the service of Involve’s witness evidence, which showed that Involve’s Director of Technical Services had drafted sections of its bid. DWP considered this breached the conflict of interest mitigations which Involve had previously agreed (given its incumbent status), which prohibited the relevant individual from taking part in “detailed bid assembly”. DWP therefore obtained permission at the pre-trial review to amend its Defence to allege that even if Involve had not been disqualified as a result of URL masking, it would have disqualified Involve in any event for breach of the conflict of interest rules in the ITT.

Following a two-week trial in January 2026, the Court dismissed Involve’s challenge, finding for DWP on almost every issue. The Court held that

• DWP’s decision to re-moderate the scores for Question 6.4 was not in breach of the principle of transparency and/or manifestly erroneous.
• Although DWP had breached the principle of transparency by using extraneous material to evaluate Involve’s proposal during the re-moderation, that breach had no effect on the outcome of the re-moderation or the procurement and caused no loss to Involve. DWP’s approach in the re-moderation, that URL masking was not capable of meeting the requirements of Question 6.4, was not manifestly erroneous.
• The score awarded to Involve for Question 6.4 on re-moderation was not manifestly erroneous.
• DWP was entitled to, and would have, rejected Involve’s tender in any event for failure to comply with the conflict of interest rules in the ITT and the agreed mitigation measures.

The judgment therefore provides helpful guidance as to the proper conduct of moderation meetings and how the principle of transparency applies in practice to challenges to disqualification. It also illustrates the risks to tenderers of failing to comply with conflict of interest obligations.

Ewan West KC and Alfred Artley acted for DWP (instructed by the Government Legal Department).

Following rolled-up hearing, the Administrative Court has today refused permission on all grounds in R (Bath Spa University and ors) v (1) Secretary of State for Education and (2) Student Loans Company Limited [2026] EWHC 2129 (Admin), a claim in judicial review brought by five higher education providers against the Secretary of State for Education and the Student Loans Company (SLC).

The claim concerned the classification, for student finance purposes, of a number of higher education courses. On the relevant courses, students were required to attend teaching sessions only at weekends.

The Claimants challenged the Defendants’ position that such courses fell within the statutory definition of “distance learning courses” under the Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011 and were therefore ineligible for certain forms of student support, including maintenance loans and grants.

The dispute arose after it was identified that the courses had not been registered by the higher education providers as distance learning courses. As a result, maintenance support had been paid to students enrolled on those courses before the Secretary of State concluded that the courses had been incorrectly classified under the Regulations.

The Court refused permission on each of the proposed grounds of challenge. The Court also accepted SLC’s argument that the Claimants lacked standing to seek a mandatory order against SLC requiring the reinstatement of student finance payments and that, in any event, the Claimants had not established that SLC acted unlawfully.

The case has been reported in the press:

BBC

Ewan West KC and Clíodhna Kelleher were instructed on behalf of the Student Loans Company by Browne Jacobson LLP.

The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) (“UT”) has released its decision dismissing TikTok’s appeal and upholding the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (“FTT”) ruling in the ICO’s favour on a key preliminary issue concerning the regulator’s power to take action against online platforms hosting user-generated content.

In April 2023 the ICO imposed a £12.7 million penalty on TikTok for breaches of data protection law, including unlawful processing of the personal data of children under the age of 13yrs. TikTok appealed against the penalty, notably on the basis that the penalty was ultra vires because it was made “with respect to processing of personal data for the special purposes” (i.e. journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes) within the meaning of sections 156 and 174 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”). On that basis, according to TikTok, the ICO had no power to issue the penalty notice without first obtaining prior Court approval in accordance with section 174 DPA.

The FTT ordered that the issue be determined by way of a trial of a preliminary issue. In its decision released on 4 July 2025, the FTT ruled in favour of the ICO, rejecting TikTok’s case that data processing for the purposes of providing the TikTok service is processing “for the special purposes” because it is intended to enable and encourage artistic expression by TikTok users.

TikTok then appealed that decision. The appeal was heard in the UT from 11 to 12 May 2026. In its decision released on 28 July 2026, the UT upheld the FTT’s ruling on all counts.

The UT’s decision is available here.

Gerry Facenna KC, Nikolaus Grubeck and Jenn Lawrence act for the ICO.

On 27 July 2026, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Tesla v InterDigital & Avanci [2026] UKSC 27, reversing the majority of the Court of Appeal (Phillips and Whipple LJJ) and holding that the English Courts have jurisdiction to consider claims for declaratory relief as to the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms of a licence to a pool of standard essential patents (SEPs) owned by multiple entities and managed by a single administrator.

The Supreme Court has also confirmed that “implementer-commenced” F/RAND claims may be served on UK SEP holders (i) pursuant to CPR 63.14, where relevant patents have a registered address for service in the UK and (ii) out of the jurisdiction pursuant to Gateway 11, where relevant patents have a registered address for service outside of the UK.

Ligia Osepciu acted for Tesla (instructed by Powell Gilbert) in the Supreme Court and below.

In CMA v Emma Matratzen GmbH & Ors [2026] EWHC 1995 (Ch), Mr Justice Richards has considered the relevance of the volume of products sold to the question of whether the use of reference pricing (for example “was £100, now £50”) will constitute a “misleading action” under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. There is now a new consumer enforcement regime under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, but this judgment remains important reading for practitioners in consumer law.

The central issue in dispute by the time of the hearing was whether the Court should make an enforcement order that included provisions preventing Emma from selling more than two items at a discounted price for every one item sold at the full price, subject to certain safety valves. This mechanism is referred to in the judgment as a 1:2 fixed volume ratio. On balance, the Court held that the CMA had not established that Emma’s use of reference pricing was generally misleading based on data showing low levels of sales at the reference price alone. The Judge held that other relevant considerations included Emma’s subjective beliefs as to whether its reference prices were realistic and the nature of the products it was selling. The Court was accordingly not willing make an order incorporating the 1:2 fixed volume ratio sought by the CMA.

The Court has directed that the parties seek to agree the terms of an enforcement order that takes into account the conclusions expressed in the judgment. If necessary, the Court will hear further submissions on whether, and if so on what terms, the court should make an enforcement order, at a hearing in the Michaelmas term.

Anneli Howard KC and Jonathan Lewis acted for Emma Mattresses.

Rob Williams KC and Daisy Mackersie acted for the CMA.

Jeremy McBride advised ClientEarth in respect of the complaint submitted by it to the European Committee on Social Rights under its collective complaints procedure.

The complaint alleges that Belgium is not in conformity with Article 11(1)-(3 ) (the right to protection of health) of the Revised European Social Charter in several respects, namely, by failing to:

• establish and implement an effective legal, regulatory and policy framework capable of preventing and reducing the risks to human health arising from pollution caused by per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) or “forever chemicals”;
• take timely and effective measures, including, precautionary monitoring and remediation measures, to protect vulnerable groups, particularly children; and
• provide adequate health information and education concerning the risks associated with PFAS exposure.

In addition, the complaint submits that the shortcomings of the current framework expose the population to serious health risks and have resulted in a systemic and continuing failure to protect the right to health.

The Revised European Social Charter is a treaty of the Council of Europe that guarantees fundamental social and economic rights and complements the European Convention on Human Rights.

The High Court has dismissed a claim for judicial review brought by Gatwick Airport Limited of the recently introduced Airports Slot Allocation (Alleviation of Usage Requirements) Regulations.

The Regulations were approved by Parliament, on an urgent basis, in June 2026 in light of the impact of the situation in the Middle East on passenger aviation.  The Regulations are designed to alleviate the requirement otherwise imposed on airlines obliging them to use 80% of landing slots at certain UK airports (or face losing those landing slots in future).

Gatwick had claimed that the Secretary of State lacked vires to make the Regulations and that they were made based on a flawed and unlawful consultation exercise. Gatwick also contended they were enacted in breach of the public sector equality duty set out in the Equality Act 2010.

Mr. Justice Johnson rejected the claim finding that the Secretary of State had power to make the Regulations under Section 14 (3) of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. Gatwick’s criticisms of the consultation exercise conducted by the Department for Transport and its related claim regarding the public sector equality duty were also rejected.

Conor McCarthy, instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright, represented TUI – an Interested Party – in the judicial review proceedings.

The High Court (Lady Justice Cockerill sitting as a High Court judge) today gave judgment on liability issues in the largest group litigation ever mounted before the English courts, which consolidated 1.6 million claims for damages brought on behalf of purchasers of diesel vehicles.  The central issue was whether vehicles produced by 15 leading car manufacturers contained unlawful ‘defeat devices’ designed to distort test results by reducing the effectiveness of emissions control systems that limit nitrous oxides (NOx).  The Claimants argued that the manufacturers had cheated the test by using software that recognised when the vehicle was subject to the test cycle and that their vehicles emitted higher levels of NOx on the road. The Defendants denied that there had been any breach of the regulated emissions limits or any distortion of ECS performance and that their engineering designs and calibrations were necessary to achieve effective diesel combustion and/or prevent engine damage or safety risks.  The case raised very complex issues of fact and expert mechanical engineering and software evidence, as well as many important issues of EU and retained EU law (the relevant regulatory framework being derived from EU law but maintained in Great Britain post-Brexit).

George Peretz KC and George Hilton acted for Ford, and Anneli Howard KC acted for Nissan.  The judge accepted arguments regarding the interpretation of the key provisions in the relevant legislation that were advanced by both Ford and Nissan, and on that basis found that none of the Ford or Nissan vehicles at issue in the trial contained unlawful defeat devices.

The Supreme Court has granted permission to appeal in the joined cases of Vargova v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Molnar v Secretary of State for the Home Department. These cases raise an important issue concerning the interpretation of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement (Articles 20 and 21, in particular) and whether the EU proportionality principle applies to a decision to deport an EU national resident in the UK on grounds of criminal conduct committed after the transition period had expired.

The Secretary of State argued that she is not required to assess whether such deportations are compatible with the EU proportionality principle, and on appeal, a court or tribunal does not need to consider whether the decision to deport is disproportionate under EU law either. The issue has wide-ranging implications for EU citizens resident in the United Kingdom under the Withdrawal Agreement. It is potentially relevant to UK nationals enjoying corresponding accrued residence rights in EU Member States.

In January 2026, the Court of Appeal (Baker, Elisabeth Laing, Falk LJJ) agreed with the Secretary of State in its judgment [2026] EWCA Civ 31.

The Independent Monitoring Authority for the Citizens’ Rights Agreements (“IMA”), the statutory body responsible for monitoring the implementation of Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement, intervened in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and in both applications for permission to appeal in the Supreme Court. The IMA argued that Articles 20 and 21 of the Withdrawal Agreement, properly interpreted in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement, require decisions restricting protected residence rights to comply with the EU law principle of proportionality. It argued that the Court of Appeal adopted the wrong interpretative framework.

The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal, but permission has now been granted by the Supreme Court (Lord Reed, Lord Leggatt and Lady Rose). The appeals will provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine the proper interpretation of Articles 20 and 21 of the Withdrawal Agreement and to clarify whether the EU principle of proportionality continues to govern decisions restricting the residence rights of beneficiaries of the Agreement, or make a reference to the CJEU.

Ian Rogers KC appeared for the IMA in the Court of Appeal and in the intervention in support of the applications for permission to appeal in the Supreme Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is here and the link to the Supreme Court website is here.

In Information Commissioner and the Health and Safety Executive v O’Hanlon [2026] EWCA Civ 838, the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Information Commissioner’s appeal against a decision of the Upper Tribunal, holding that the correct date for determining the application of the exception under reg 12(4)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations and the balance of the public interest under reg 12(1) was the date on which the public authority received the request, rather than the date of any review decision under reg 11(3).

In this case, the requester, Mrs O’Hanlon had asked the public authority, the Health and Safety Executive, in April 2020 for information about its inspection of a demolition site in Merseyside. On 6 May 2020, the HSE refused to disclose the information under FOIA, following which Mrs O’Hanlon asked it to review its decision. The HSE, however, did not complete its review until August 2021, at which time it relied primarily on reg 12(4)(a) EIR, i.e. that it did not hold some of the requested information at the time of the request.

The Commissioner upheld HSE’s decision and Mrs O’Hanlon appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. In the course of that hearing, it came to light that HSE had received further information within the scope of her request following its original refusal in May 2020 but prior to its internal review decision in August 2021. The FTT, however, concluded that the further information in question was not held.

On appeal, however, Upper Tribunal Judge Citron held, relying on a passage in the 6^th edition of Coppell, Information Rights and the Upper Tribunal’s earlier decision in Montague v Information Commissioner [2022] UKUT 104 (AAC); [2023] 1 WLR 1565, that the correct date for determining the application of any exceptions and the balance of the public interest was the date on which the public authority completed its internal review under reg 11(3) EIR. The Commissioner was granted permission to appeal the Upper Tribunal’s decision.

In a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal allowed the Commissioner’s appeal on all grounds, holding that, as a matter of statutory construction and construed in light of Directive 2003/4/EC which the EIR transposed, the application of reg 12(4)(a) EIR and the balance of any public interest under reg 12(1) had to be determined expressly by reference to the date on which the public authority receives the original request, rather than any subsequent review decision under reg 11. The Court declined to rule on the relevant date in relation to the other exceptions under reg 12(4) and (5) but the judgment strongly suggests reg 11 cannot be used to extend the relevant date in any event.

Eric Metcalfe acted for the Information Commissioner as First Appellant.