Granville Technology Group Ltd & Ors v LG Display Co Ltd & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 409

The Court of Appeal (Males, Snowden and Cockerill LLJ) yesterday handed down judgment in an appeal against an award of damages by the High Court (news item from 9 February 2024) in the long-running claims by Granville and OCT in respect of a cartel in the supply of LCD panels, which operated from 2001 to 2006.

The claimants, whilst successful, had argued on appeal that the High Court had been wrong to follow ‘the cautionary approach’ identified in Asda Stores Ltd v. Mastercard Inc [2017] EWHC 93 (Comm). That approach meant erring on the side of under-compensation when complete precision is not possible, which the Court of Appeal had subsequently found was the wrong approach. When this was brought to the judge’s attention at the draft judgment stage, he amended his judgment to add a footnote stating that he had reviewed his conclusions and was satisfied that they were not influenced by any reliance on such a cautionary principle. The Court of Appeal had no doubt that the Judge had carried out conscientiously the exercise of reviewing his conclusions but held that the text of his judgment had to speak for itself, and that on that basis to allow the judge’s figures to stand would leave the claimants with an understandable sense that the result was unjust.

The Court found that it would not be right to send the matter back to the same judge, and disproportionate to order a trial of the issue by another judge, so that the only possible course was for the Court to make its own adjustments, applying the ‘broad axe’. It held that the overcharge rate found below should be increased (from 4% and 8%, for the main product categories, to  6% and 10%) whilst the rate of downstream pass-on should be reduced (to 60% from 65%).

Separate grounds of appeal concerning the specification of a regression model used to estimate overcharge and the assessment of downstream pass-on were rejected on the basis that they reflected factual assessments open to the judge with  which the Court of Appeal ought not to interfere.

Stefan Kuppen acted for the successful appellants and claimants, instructed by Osborne Clarke LLP.

The Administrative Court in Wales (Lewis LJ and Chamberlain J) has dismissed a judicial review of the Welsh Ministers’ decision to introduce the Prohibition of Greyhound Racing (Wales) Bill into the Senedd. The judgment contains several points of interest for constitutional and public law practitioners.

The Greyhound Board of Great Britain argued that although the Supreme Court’s decision in AXA General Insurance v HM Advocate [2012] 1 AC 868 prevented review of Acts of the Scottish Parliament (and by analogy the Senedd) on grounds of irrationality, it left open the question whether an Act or Bill could be challenged on procedural grounds. The Claimant alleged the Welsh Ministers breached a legitimate expectation to consult on a ban before introducing the Bill. The Court held that the Senedd’s plenary legislative powers have both a substantive and a procedural consequence. The Senedd is, within its areas of competence, the sole arbiter not only of what legislation is in the interests of the people of Wales but also of how that legislation is enacted.

The Court rejected the claim that the act of introduction of a Bill by the Deputy First Minister was a reviewable decision of the executive, no different in principle from any other ministerial act. What matters is not the capacity in which a Bill is introduced, but the nature of the act itself. Introduction of a Bill is the initiating step in Senedd proceedings and an integral part of the legislative process. Reviewing it on procedural grounds would infringe the principle of separation of powers.

The Court agreed  that there was no common law or other duty on the Welsh Ministers to consult before introducing legislation in the Senedd. The legislative process itself fulfils the function of gathering views and evidence. It is for the Senedd, not the courts, to determine the terms on which that process operates. Recognising a pre-legislative consultation obligation would be inconsistent with the devolved constitutional settlement and the separation of powers.

The Claimant abandoned claims for quashing orders during the course of the hearing and sought only declaratory relief. This included declarations that the Welsh Ministers would be expected to seek the permission of the Senedd to withdraw the Bill and that the Senedd would be expected to approve its withdrawal. The Court considered that declarations designed to undermine the validity or progress of a Bill are just as constitutionally impermissible as coercive orders would be.

Having found that the introduction of the Bill by the Deputy First Minister was lawful, the challenge to the earlier political statement announcing the intention to ban greyhound racing should not be determined because first, the issue had become academic, and, secondly, the determination of a claim alleging a procedural flaw at the pre-legislative stage would be an impermissible interference with proceedings in the Senedd and the separation of powers. The adequacy of the process of consultation and evidence gathering by the Welsh Ministers was a matter for the Senedd and it would be wrong for the court to insert itself into that debate at this stage.

Ian Rogers KC represented the Welsh Ministers in Greyhound Board of Great Britain v Welsh Ministers ((1) Senedd Commission and (2) Llywydd as Interested Parties) [2026] EWHC 670 (Admin). The Senedd passed the Bill on 17 March 2026.

Gutmann v First MTR & ors [2026] CAT 21

This is the costs decision of the CAT following its judgment in the Boundary Fares litigation in 2025, in which the CAT determined that the conduct alleged against the defendant train operating companies was not abusive (on the assumption that each of them held a position of dominance) (for news item see here). On costs, the Tribunal has now determined that the CR shall pay the Defendants’ costs subject to detailed assessment. Those costs should not exceed the level of adverse costs provision covered by two deeds of indemnity (i.e. £15 million).

The Tribunal made clear that it was not suggesting that an order for costs should never be made above the amount of the CR’s adverse costs cover accepted at the time of certification, or that a non-party costs order against a funder for that excess should never be made in collective proceedings. However, it emphasised that collective proceedings are subject to a “very different regime” from an ordinary civil action, including a private action before the Tribunal.

Having found that the Defendants were capped at the limit of the indemnities the Tribunal had no need to consider the intervening funder’s alternative argument that any excess of costs over £15 million should be borne by the CR’s solicitors.

Philip Moser KC and Stefan Kuppen (instructed by Charles Lyndon) acted for Mr Gutmann.

Tim Ward KC, James Bourke, and Hugh Whelan (instructed by Slaughter and May) acted for First MTR South Western Trains.

Paul Harris KC, Anneliese Blackwood, Michael Armitage and Clíodhna Kelleher (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) acted for London & South Eastern Railway and Govia Thameslink Railway and others.

UK Global Healthcare Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2026] EWHC 561 (TCC)

This claim arises out of two contracts for the supply of 320 million medical gloves during the Covid-19 pandemic. Time was of the essence as stipulated in both contracts, which also had expiry clauses, the dates for which have passed. The gloves remain undelivered. DHSC made an upfront payment of £15,350,000 which it sought to reclaim summarily, having sent a letter of termination and/or because the expiry clauses require repayment. UKGH’s position is that it has remained ready, willing and able to supply the gloves and that DHSC waived compliance with the delivery dates, and/or is now estopped from relying on either the delivery dates or the expiry dates, and that as a result the purported termination was unlawful.

On termination, the Court (Constable J) found that If UKGH made out its case either in respect of the delivery dates or rejection, it would follow that there was a real prospect that UKGH could establish that the termination was unlawful.

In relation to the expiry clauses the judge applied a ‘prevention principle of interpretation’, a principle of construction that a contract should be interpreted, so far as possible, in such a manner as not to permit one party to take advantage of their own breach of that contract; and found that the repayment requirement in the expiry clauses was not operative to require reimbursement in circumstances where the non-delivery of the goods has been caused by a breach on the part of DHSC.

The Application was dismissed accordingly.

Philip Moser KC acted for the successful Claimant, instructed by Kleyman & Co.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) has today handed down judgment in the so-called Apple Batteries collective proceedings, refusing Apple’s (second) application to strike out the entirety of the claim.

The Class Representative, Mr Gutmann, had alleged that Apple abused its dominant position in the way in which it introduced a ‘Power Management Feature’ to address unexpected power offs which were causing iPhones to shut down unexpectedly, which in turn had the effect of throttling their performance. Mr Gutmann’s claim was certified by the CAT in late 2023, and had resisted Apple’s first strike out / summary judgment application and their subsequent application for permission to appeal.

Apple’s present application was based on the recent judgments of the Supreme Court in Evans v Barclays Bank and the CAT in Gutmann v First MTR Southwestern Trains Limited. The CAT unanimously rejected Apple’s submissions on the law and refused to strike out the claim. It did however take the opportunity to re-examine the matter afresh and considered that the claim should proceed with some adjustments in respect of new iPhones and the end of the alleged infringement period. Importantly, the CAT noted that it was arguable that a lack of transparency can be a factor – indeed “a dominant factor” – in the abuse of a dominant position.

The CAT’s judgment can be found here.

Philip Moser KC and Natalie Nguyen represented the successful Class Representative, Justin Gutmann, and were instructed by Charles Lyndon.

Anneli Howard KC, Stefan Kuppen and Will Perry also act for Mr Gutmann.

On 10 March 2026, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) refused an application by Aramark Limited (“Aramark”) to extend time to challenge a merger decision by the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”).  The judgment contains a comprehensive review of the CAT’s power to extend time for the commencement of proceedings, with a particular focus on challenges to merger decisions.

In January 2025, Aramark acquired 90% of the issued share capital of Entier Limited (“Entier”). Aramark and Entier are both engaged in the supply of offshore catering and ancillary facilities management services to customers, including in the UK offshore continental shelf.

The CMA launched a merger inquiry into Aramark’s acquisition of Entier. Following a phase 2 investigation, the CMA notified Aramark of its final report (the “Decision”) on 15 January 2026. The CMA concluded that: (i) the transaction has resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market; and (ii) only a sale of Entier to an approved buyer would effectively address the competition concerns.

On Friday 13 February 2026, Aramark filed a notice of application for review of the CMA’s Decision. The CAT Registry took the view that the deadline for the notice of application had expired at 5pm on 12 February 2026 and refused to register Aramark’s notice of application. Aramark applied retrospectively for an extension of time to file the notice of application.  Rule 25(3) of the CAT Rules provides that such an extension can only be made in exceptional circumstances.

The CAT (James Wolffe KC) found that there was no reasonable room for debate that the deadline in this case was Thursday 12 February 2026. There were no such exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of that deadline. The CAT emphasised the compelling public interest in the speedy resolution of disputes in relation to merger decisions and the importance of meeting time limits for initiating proceedings before the CAT. The CAT found that Aramark missed the deadline because of a good faith misinterpretation of the rules by its solicitors and a decision to depart from an internal plan to file on 12 February 2026. These were not exceptional circumstances justifying an extension. The CAT accepted the substantial prejudice which Aramark sustains by reason of losing the opportunity to obtain a review of the Decision but considered that these consequences did not justify characterising the circumstances as exceptional. It was in the nature of time limits that failure to comply may be of great significance to the party concerned and that Aramark would be unable to challenge the CMA’s remedy.

The CAT noted that, under the surrogacy principle, parties to civil litigation need to live with the consequences of errors made by their lawyers. The circumstances of the present case did not justify departure from that general rule.

The CAT’s judgment is available here.

Ronit Kreisberger KC and Charlie Coverman appeared on behalf of the Applicant.

Rob Williams KC and James Bourke appeared for the CMA.

The Administrative Court has handed down judgment in R (BHO) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and the Secretary of State for the Home Department. 

The case concerns the question of whether it is consistent with the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement to levy NHS charges on so-called Late Beneficiaries of the Withdrawal Agreement. For most applicants to the EU Settlement Scheme, the deadline was 30 June 2021. However, under Article 18(1)(d), the UK is obliged to accept late applications where there is good reason for the delay. A Late Beneficiary is a person who makes a late, but successful application to the EUSS.

The crux of this case is whether it is contrary to the WA to levy charges on a Late Beneficiary for NHS case they received between the expiry of the deadline for applications to the EUSS – 30 June 2021 – and the date of their application to the EUSS.

The Administrative Court determined that the recovery of NHS charges from Late Beneficiaries is lawful:

• Ground 1: the grant of status to a Late Beneficiary does not have retroactive (ex tunc) effect and so does not render a period of residence prior to the Late Beneficiary’s application to the EUSS lawful.
• Ground 2: charging Late Beneficiaries for NHS care discriminates against them within the meaning of Article 4 of Reg 883/2004, but the discrimination is justified in order to protect the integrity of the EU Settlement Scheme. The Court dismissed the remainder of the proposed justifications offered by the Secretary of State.

The IMA intervened in relation to Ground 2. The IMA is the post-Brexit citizens’ rights watchdog, established in accordance with the WA to monitor and protect the rights of EU citizens and EEA EFTA nationals and their family members in the UK.

Clíodhna Kelleher acted for the IMA.

In a split decision, the Court of Appeal (CoA) has refused the appeal by Prof. Carolyn Roberts against the decision of the Competition Appeal Tribunal not to grant a collective proceedings order in her competition damages claims against six water and sewerage companies, on the basis that the claims were precluded by section 18(8) of the Water Industry Act 1991.

The majority, the Master of the Rolls and Lady Justice Falk, held that the claims were precluded by section 18(8), although for reasons different from those relied on by the Tribunal.  Lord Justice Zacaroli gave a dissenting judgment in which he concluded that the claims were not so precluded, such that he would have allowed the appeal.

Like other water and sewerage companies, the six proposed defendants are subject to price control regulation by Ofwat.  Under that regime, the revenues that each company is allowed to charge households for the provision of sewerage services are controlled, including by reference to how well each company has performed against certain performance commitments, some of which relate to the number of pollution incidents on their networks.

Prof. Roberts contended that the companies abused their dominant positions by providing misleading information to the Environment Agency and Ofwat (understating the number of pollution incidents on their networks), as a result of which they were permitted to charge consumers higher prices for sewerage services.

The claims will now not proceed, unless Prof. Roberts successfully seeks permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The judgment is available here, and the media summary here.

Before the CoA, Jon Turner KC and Julian Gregory represented Prof. Roberts (funded by Benchwalk), instructed by RPC.  Daisy Mackersie represented the proposed defendants, instructed by Freshfields.

Several other members of chambers have been instructed at earlier stages of the proceedings (see here).

Following the first Case Management Conference post-certification in the “Airwave” collective abuse of dominance proceedings against Motorola, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (Bacon P presiding) has scheduled the claim for a 6 week trial, to commence in October 2027. In so doing, the Tribunal unanimously granted the Class Representative’s application for a split trial, whereby Motorola’s pass-on defence is deferred until a later date, with all other issues being heard together at the first trial. The Tribunal also took the novel step in collective proceedings of requiring the Defendants to produce a costs budget setting out their incurred and estimated costs for the proceedings, accepting the Class Representative’s submissions that this step was important in ensuring costs visibility and placing the parties on an equal footing.

The case has been covered by GCR (subscription only).

Monckton’s Michael Armitage represented the Class Representative, Clare Spottiswoode, at the CMC. Michael is being led by Anneli Howard KC in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal has today given judgment in case concerning the proper scope of the writ of habeas corpus and the (in)appropriateness of its use to challenge conditions attached to immigration bail. The Appellant (CHK) was a Brazilian national convicted of serious criminal offences and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in 2012. Having completed the custodial part of his sentence the Appellant was detained pending deportation but then released on immigration bail. At the time of his application for habeas corpus he was living in the community but subject to various reporting conditions which he contended amounted to a restriction on his liberty that justified the use of the habeas corpus procedure. Despite recognising the constitutional importance of the writ (reflected inter alia in the fact that there is no requirement for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal or indeed the Supremee Court in habeas corpus cases), the Court of Appeal nevertheless rejected the Appellant’s attempt to use the writ to challenge his bail conditions in circumstances where he was not detained.

Michael Armitage acted for the Secretary of State for the Home Department in the Court of Appeal proceedings, instructed by the Government Legal Department.