The Court of Appeal yesterday handed down judgment in Fertré v Vale of White Horse District Council [2025] EWCA Civ 1057. In its judgment the Court of Appeal determined that those with pre-settled status (“PSS”) granted under the EU Settlement Scheme, but without a directly effective right to reside in the UK under the Withdrawal Agreement (“WA”) are not protected by the non-discrimination provisions of Article 23 WA. As such, the Appellant was not the subject of unlawful discrimination under the WA when she was refused homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996.

The judgment is likely to carry wider significance regarding access to welfare supports for those with PSS but without a directly effective right to reside under the WA.

Clíodhna Kelleher acted for the AIRE Centre in its intervention in the proceedings.

The Supreme Court has handed down judgment in D.E.L.T.A. Merseyside Limited and another v Uber Britannia Limited [2025] UKSC 31. Monckton members appeared on both sides of the appeal.

The appeal, brought by Uber, concerned the construction of the regulatory regime for the provision of private hire vehicles (“PHVs”) outside London under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (the “1976 Act”). The issue was whether a PHV operator is required to enter into a contract as principal with the passenger at the point of booking. The Supreme Court has held that the 1976 Act does not contain such requirement.

Tim Ward KC acted for Uber, instructed by Hogan Lovells International LLP.

Jen Coyne acted for D.E.L.T.A., led by Philip Kolvin KC and instructed by Aaron & Partners LLP.

Read Supreme Court details on the appeal.

Eurospares (Continental Parts) Limited v (1) Porsche Cars Great Britain Limited (2) Porsche Retail Group Limited

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has today issued an interim injunction, ordering Porsche to continue to supply parts to an independent reseller of luxury car spare parts, Eurospares, pending the determination of Eurospares’ claim alleging breach by Porsche of the Competition Act 1998 in the design of its selective distribution system.

The background to the application was that in September 2024 Porsche discontinued supply to Eurospares stating that supply of spare parts could only be made available to authorised dealers under Porsche’s selective distribution system. As part of that system, Porsche generally requires that authorised dealers offer repair services, thereby excluding independent resellers of spare parts who do not carry out repair and maintenance services.

Eurospares claims that this contractual term amounts to a hardcore restriction on competition and amounts to to discriminatory and self-preferencing abuse. Porsche contests the claim. The Tribunal will now adjudicate on the parties’ respective positions in an expedited trial.

In granting the interim injunction, the Tribunal was satisfied that there existed a serious issue to be tried. It accepted that Eurospares would suffer serious harm that would not be compensable in damages. It was also satisfied that the balance of convenience was in favour of ordering the interim injunction as the risk of harm was greater to Eurospares than Porsche.

The Tribunal refused Eurospares’ application for the proceedings to be allocated to the fast-track procedure because it considered that the likely length of trial would make this unsuitable.  However, the Tribunal gave directions for future costs management of the proceedings.

Anneli Howard KC and Khatija Hafesji acted for Eurospares, instructed by Geradin Partners.

Conor McCarthy acted for Porsche (led by Sarah Abram KC), instructed by CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP.

Robert Hammond v Amazon.com, Inc. & Others and Professor Andreas Stephan v Amazon.com Inc. & Others  [2025] CAT 42; 24/07/2025

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has handed down its decision in two certification decisions heard together in this matter and known as the ‘Amazon Buy Box’ case. Both had been subject to prior determinations in carriage disputes ([2024] CAT 8 and [2025] CAT 6).

Each class representative sought and was granted a CPO on an opt-out basis against Amazon: Mr. Hammond for a class of consumers and Professor Stephan for a class of retailers.

Both claims allege that Amazon abused a dominant market position in breach of the Chapter II prohibition in section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 and, for conduct prior to 31 December 2020, Article 102 TFEU.

Amazon opposed the granting of both CPOs on the following grounds:

• Concerns over the litigation funding arrangements.
• Challenges to the expert methodologies presented.
• In Professor Stephan’s case only, an alleged conflict of interest within the proposed class.

The Tribunal rejected those criticisms and found that both applicants satisfied the Authorisation Condition, including representation by experienced legal teams and comprehensive litigation plans.

As to funding, Prof. Stephan’s LFA had already been scrutinised in the carriage dispute and concerns over legal costs were addressed by both class representatives’  agreement to engage specialist costs lawyers.

The Tribunal declined to assess Mr Hammond’s funder’s return at this stage, noting that such scrutiny may follow judgment or settlement.

The Tribunal concluded that both applicants met the Eligibility Condition, including allowing the alternative exclusionary abuse aspect of Mr Hammond’s claim to be supported by Prof. Stephan’s expert’s methodology, in circumstances where Mr. Hammond’s expert methodology was not found to be adequate in its own right, either through joint instruction or other agreement.

Finally, the Tribunal rejected Amazon’s objection to Professor Stephan’s application based on an alleged conflict of interest within the class.

Philip Moser KC and Ben Rayment of Monckton Chambers appeared on behalf of Robert Hammond.

Jon Turner KC of Monckton Chambers appeared on behalf of Amazon.com, Inc. and Others in respect of the Hammond application.

Kristina Lukacova of Monckton Chambers appeared on behalf of Amazon.com, Inc. and Others in respect of the Stephan application.

In an important judgment of the TCC, Azeem Suterwalla KC and Khatija Hafesji (alongside Daniel Toledano KC of One Essex Court) successfully persuaded the court that Interested Parties in procurement claims were capable of being treated as “parties” for the purposes of specific disclosure applications under CPR r.31.12.

Allwyn, the Interested Party to the TNLC v Gambling Commission litigation (one of the Top 20 cases of 2025) unsuccessfully tried to resist a specific disclosure application brought against it by TNLC under CPR r.31.12 on the basis that as an Interested Party it was a “non-party” to the litigation, and the application needed to be brought under r.31.17 instead (which imposes a higher threshold for the making of a disclosure order).

The TCC rejected that argument, accepting TNLC’s submissions that “the position of an interested party… is not that an interested party automatically becomes a party with all the rights and obligations that a party has under the CPR but that the court, on any application against an interested party, has to decide whether it is appropriate to treat the interested party as a party for the purpose of applying a particular provision of the CPR.”

The scope of Allwyn’s involvement in the proceedings, which includes filing a Statement of Case that relies on documents not otherwise disclosed in the proceedings, made it appropriate to treat it as a party for the purposes of a specific disclosure order under CPR r.31.12.

The judgment of Sir Vivian Ramsey can be found here.

 

The European Court of Human Rights has delivered judgment in Google LLC and Others v. Russia (App. no. 44316/20), a freedom of expression case that also addressed Russia’s recent practice of disapplying foreign jurisdiction clauses in sanctions-related disputes.

The case concerned court proceedings in Russia on the refusal to remove certain content from the YouTube platform, including political videos, which the Russian authorities had deemed unlawful; and the failure to restore monetisation features to the YouTube channel of Tsargrad TV, a Russian television outlet owned by a Russian oligarch who had been sanctioned by the US and the EU. Google incurred very heavy fines as a result of these proceedings.  In its judgment, the European Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial).

In the Tsargrad case, the European Court also examined the impact of recent Russian legislation permitting domestic courts to assume jurisdiction over sanctions-related disputes—even where the parties have agreed to a foreign jurisdiction clause—in cases where sanctions are deemed to pose an obstacle to access to justice for the sanctioned party (Article 248.1 of the Code of Commercial Procedure). The Court found that the domestic courts’ presumption that sanctions created such obstacles in the jurisdictions designated by the parties’ contract was not substantiated by any concrete reasons or evidence and failed to address material in the case file that contradicted this conclusion, undermining the very essence of the applicants’ right to a reasoned judgment.

Drew Holiner of Monckton Chambers was instructed on behalf of the applicant to provide expert evidence on Russian law.  The applicant was represented by Will Thomas KC and Joshua Kelly of Freshfields LLP and Tim Otty KC, Charlotte Kilroy KC and Jason Pobjoy KC of Blackstone Chambers.

At a 5 day hearing in the Court of Appeal in May 2025, Phones4U sought to appeal the judgment of Roth J rejecting Phones4U’s allegations of collusion against EE, Vodafone, O2 and their parent companies.  In a detailed and comprehensive judgment handed down today, the Court of Appeal (the Chancellor, Richards and Falk LJJ) has dismissed Phones4U’s appeal on all grounds.

The grounds of appeal were wide ranging and included arguments that:

• the Judge had erred in failing to find collusion between EE and O2 given his findings of fact which included a passive response by an EE executive
• the Judge had erred in finding that the Anic presumption could be rebutted by conduct other than public distancing or a report to the competition authorities
• complaints that the Judge had wrongly found against P4U on the basis of a new explanation for a document which had not been tested at trial
• the judge had wrongly omitted to deal with material evidence as a result of delays in handing down his judgment.  The judgment includes important observations on the risks of “island hopping” where an appellant seeks to reopen selected findings of fact on appeal
• the Judge had erred in applying the legal test for the drawing of adverse inferences from document destruction.

The Judgment can be found here and represents a further success for the MNOs in defending this long running standalone claim.

Meredith Pickford KC and David Gregory acted for EE, instructed by Jeremy Kosky and Sam Ward from Clifford Chance LLP.

Rob Williams KC acted for Vodafone, instructed by John Tillman, Angus Coulter and Alice Wallace-Wright from Hogan Lovells International LLP.

The Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in Adriatic Land 5 Limited v Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point.

The appeal concerned one part of the ‘leaseholder protections’ in the Building Safety Act 2022 (‘BSA’). The BSA is the legislative response to the building safety crisis that followed the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire. The leaseholder protections were designed to address unaffordable remediation bills (often stretching into the tens of thousands of pounds), a frozen lending market, and a situation where residents were stuck in homes that were not being made safe quickly enough or at all.

By a majority (Newey LJ dissenting), the Court of Appeal has concluded that the provisions in issue apply retrospectively.

The court has gone on unanimously to conclude that this retrospective application is compatible with landlords’ rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘A1P1’).

The judgment considers, amongst other matters:

• With regards to statutory construction: the presumptions against retrospectivity and interference with property rights, the relevance of explanatory notes that post-date Royal Assent, and whether departmental witnesses statements can be used to shed light on the context and purpose of legislation.
• With regards to A1P1: the characterisation of an interference as a ‘deprivation’ or ‘control of use’, and the margin of judgment afforded to Parliament on issues of social and economic policy.

Will Perry successfully acted for the Intervener, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (led by Sir James Eadie KC, Jason Pobjoy KC and Michael Walsh KC).

The Information Commissioner (“ICO”) has secured a significant victory against TikTok, with the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (“FTT”) ruling in the ICO’s favour on a key preliminary issue concerning the regulator’s power to take action against online platforms hosting user-generated content.

In April 2023 the ICO imposed a £12.7 million penalty on TikTok for breaches of data protection law, including unlawful processing of the personal data of children under the age of 13yrs. TikTok appealed against the penalty, notably on the basis that the penalty was ultra vires because it was made “with respect to processing of personal data for the special purposes” (i.e. journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes) within the meaning of sections 156 and 174 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”). On that basis, according to TikTok, the ICO had no power to issue the penalty notice without first obtaining prior Court approval in accordance with section 174 DPA.

The FTT ordered the issue be determined by way of a trial of a preliminary issue. In its decision released on 4 July 2025, the FTT ruled in favour of the ICO, rejecting TikTok’s case that data processing for the purposes of providing the TikTok service is processing “for the special purposes” because it is intended to enable and encourage artistic expression by TikTok users.

The FTT’s decision is available here.

Gerry Facenna KC, Nikolaus Grubeck and Jenn Lawrence acted for the ICO.

Today, the CAT handed down judgment following the first trial in the Merchant Interchange Fee Umbrella Proceedings, which concerned whether Mastercard and Visa’s current and historic scheme rules infringe Article 101(1) TFEU and/or the Chapter I Prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. Damages claims, some of which have settled since the trial, were brought on behalf of over 2000 merchants, with a combined value in excess of 1 billion.

The judgment unanimously finds that the “Default Interchange Fee Rule”, by which each of Visa and Mastercard imposes a default charge (multilateral interchange fee / “MIF”) on every transaction by a payment card bearing their brand, is an infringement of UK and EU competition law by object in situations where the level of the MIF is not capped by regulation or by agreement with the European Commission. An infringement by object means that that Rule, by its very nature, reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition such that it is not necessary to examine its effects. The majority further found that, although MIFs did not amount to an object restriction in situations where the level of the MIF is capped by legislation or regulatory agreement, they nonetheless infringe Article 101(1) and Chapter I by effect. Smith J’s minority judgment found that the Default Interchange Fee Rule was infringing by object at all material times, irrespective of regulation.

The relevant restriction of competition takes place on the market for acquiring payments, on which acquirers compete for contracts with merchants. Under those contracts, merchants pay acquirers a merchant service charge (“MSC”) in return for the services by which the merchant, via the acquirer, receives payment from the bank which issues the cardholder’s card. The CAT found that Visa and Mastercard’s default charge, the MIF, sets a “floor” to, or constitutes a non-negotiable element of, the MSC. Accordingly, competition between acquirers is restricted.

These are the first findings, in any jurisdiction, that MIFs infringe competition law by object and the first in the UK or anywhere to deal with the restrictive object or effect of MIFs which have been capped by legislation or regulatory agreement. In the prior Sainsbury’s litigation, the UK Supreme Court upheld findings that the domestic consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer MIFs which applied prior to the EU’s Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR) (which capped those MIFs) infringed Article 101(1) by effect. The CAT’s judgment today extends those findings to findings of object infringement, while making further findings of infringement by object or effect in respect of the uncapped default MIFs applying to commercial card and inter-regional consumer card transactions, and in respect of MIFs capped under the IFR regime and pursuant to certain commitments given by Visa and Mastercard to the European Commission.

Specifically, the CAT found that:

1. Commercial card MIFs are infringing by object.
2.  Before the Interchange Fee Regulation (“IFR”) came into effect in December 2015, domestic UK and Irish consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer card MIFs were infringing by object.
3. Since the IFR came into force, domestic UK and Irish consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer card MIFs have infringed competition law by effect.
4. Visa’s interregional MIFs infringed competition law by object until the entry into force of the Visa Commitments Decision in April 2019 and by effect thereafter.
5. Mastercard’s interregional MIFs infringed competition law by object until the Mastercard II Commitments Decision in April 2019 and by effect thereafter.

The Umbrella Proceedings are ongoing. Trial 2, concerning the pass-on of the MIF from acquirers to merchants and from merchants to consumers, took place in late 2024 and early 2025, with judgment expected in due course. A further trial will deal with exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.

Philip Woolfe KC and Antonia Fitzpatrick acted in Trial 1 for the successful merchant claimants, instructed by Stephenson Harwood LLP and Scott + Scott UK LLP

The judgment is available here.