The European Court of Human Rights has delivered judgment in Google LLC and Others v. Russia (App. no. 44316/20), a freedom of expression case that also addressed Russia’s recent practice of disapplying foreign jurisdiction clauses in sanctions-related disputes.

The case concerned court proceedings in Russia on the refusal to remove certain content from the YouTube platform, including political videos, which the Russian authorities had deemed unlawful; and the failure to restore monetisation features to the YouTube channel of Tsargrad TV, a Russian television outlet owned by a Russian oligarch who had been sanctioned by the US and the EU. Google incurred very heavy fines as a result of these proceedings.  In its judgment, the European Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial).

In the Tsargrad case, the European Court also examined the impact of recent Russian legislation permitting domestic courts to assume jurisdiction over sanctions-related disputes—even where the parties have agreed to a foreign jurisdiction clause—in cases where sanctions are deemed to pose an obstacle to access to justice for the sanctioned party (Article 248.1 of the Code of Commercial Procedure). The Court found that the domestic courts’ presumption that sanctions created such obstacles in the jurisdictions designated by the parties’ contract was not substantiated by any concrete reasons or evidence and failed to address material in the case file that contradicted this conclusion, undermining the very essence of the applicants’ right to a reasoned judgment.

Drew Holiner of Monckton Chambers was instructed on behalf of the applicant to provide expert evidence on Russian law.  The applicant was represented by Will Thomas KC and Joshua Kelly of Freshfields LLP and Tim Otty KC, Charlotte Kilroy KC and Jason Pobjoy KC of Blackstone Chambers.

At a 5 day hearing in the Court of Appeal in May 2025, Phones4U sought to appeal the judgment of Roth J rejecting Phones4U’s allegations of collusion against EE, Vodafone, O2 and their parent companies.  In a detailed and comprehensive judgment handed down today, the Court of Appeal (the Chancellor, Richards and Falk LJJ) has dismissed Phones4U’s appeal on all grounds.

The grounds of appeal were wide ranging and included arguments that:

• the Judge had erred in failing to find collusion between EE and O2 given his findings of fact which included a passive response by an EE executive
• the Judge had erred in finding that the Anic presumption could be rebutted by conduct other than public distancing or a report to the competition authorities
• complaints that the Judge had wrongly found against P4U on the basis of a new explanation for a document which had not been tested at trial
• the judge had wrongly omitted to deal with material evidence as a result of delays in handing down his judgment.  The judgment includes important observations on the risks of “island hopping” where an appellant seeks to reopen selected findings of fact on appeal
• the Judge had erred in applying the legal test for the drawing of adverse inferences from document destruction.

The Judgment can be found here and represents a further success for the MNOs in defending this long running standalone claim.

Meredith Pickford KC and David Gregory acted for EE, instructed by Jeremy Kosky and Sam Ward from Clifford Chance LLP.

Rob Williams KC acted for Vodafone, instructed by John Tillman, Angus Coulter and Alice Wallace-Wright from Hogan Lovells International LLP.

The Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in Adriatic Land 5 Limited v Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point.

The appeal concerned one part of the ‘leaseholder protections’ in the Building Safety Act 2022 (‘BSA’). The BSA is the legislative response to the building safety crisis that followed the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire. The leaseholder protections were designed to address unaffordable remediation bills (often stretching into the tens of thousands of pounds), a frozen lending market, and a situation where residents were stuck in homes that were not being made safe quickly enough or at all.

By a majority (Newey LJ dissenting), the Court of Appeal has concluded that the provisions in issue apply retrospectively.

The court has gone on unanimously to conclude that this retrospective application is compatible with landlords’ rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘A1P1’).

The judgment considers, amongst other matters:

• With regards to statutory construction: the presumptions against retrospectivity and interference with property rights, the relevance of explanatory notes that post-date Royal Assent, and whether departmental witnesses statements can be used to shed light on the context and purpose of legislation.
• With regards to A1P1: the characterisation of an interference as a ‘deprivation’ or ‘control of use’, and the margin of judgment afforded to Parliament on issues of social and economic policy.

Will Perry successfully acted for the Intervener, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (led by Sir James Eadie KC, Jason Pobjoy KC and Michael Walsh KC).

The Information Commissioner (“ICO”) has secured a significant victory against TikTok, with the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (“FTT”) ruling in the ICO’s favour on a key preliminary issue concerning the regulator’s power to take action against online platforms hosting user-generated content.

In April 2023 the ICO imposed a £12.7 million penalty on TikTok for breaches of data protection law, including unlawful processing of the personal data of children under the age of 13yrs. TikTok appealed against the penalty, notably on the basis that the penalty was ultra vires because it was made “with respect to processing of personal data for the special purposes” (i.e. journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes) within the meaning of sections 156 and 174 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”). On that basis, according to TikTok, the ICO had no power to issue the penalty notice without first obtaining prior Court approval in accordance with section 174 DPA.

The FTT ordered the issue be determined by way of a trial of a preliminary issue. In its decision released on 4 July 2025, the FTT ruled in favour of the ICO, rejecting TikTok’s case that data processing for the purposes of providing the TikTok service is processing “for the special purposes” because it is intended to enable and encourage artistic expression by TikTok users.

The FTT’s decision is available here.

Gerry Facenna KC, Nikolaus Grubeck and Jenn Lawrence acted for the ICO.

Today, the CAT handed down judgment following the first trial in the Merchant Interchange Fee Umbrella Proceedings, which concerned whether Mastercard and Visa’s current and historic scheme rules infringe Article 101(1) TFEU and/or the Chapter I Prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. Damages claims, some of which have settled since the trial, were brought on behalf of over 2000 merchants, with a combined value in excess of 1 billion.

The judgment unanimously finds that the “Default Interchange Fee Rule”, by which each of Visa and Mastercard imposes a default charge (multilateral interchange fee / “MIF”) on every transaction by a payment card bearing their brand, is an infringement of UK and EU competition law by object in situations where the level of the MIF is not capped by regulation or by agreement with the European Commission. An infringement by object means that that Rule, by its very nature, reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition such that it is not necessary to examine its effects. The majority further found that, although MIFs did not amount to an object restriction in situations where the level of the MIF is capped by legislation or regulatory agreement, they nonetheless infringe Article 101(1) and Chapter I by effect. Smith J’s minority judgment found that the Default Interchange Fee Rule was infringing by object at all material times, irrespective of regulation.

The relevant restriction of competition takes place on the market for acquiring payments, on which acquirers compete for contracts with merchants. Under those contracts, merchants pay acquirers a merchant service charge (“MSC”) in return for the services by which the merchant, via the acquirer, receives payment from the bank which issues the cardholder’s card. The CAT found that Visa and Mastercard’s default charge, the MIF, sets a “floor” to, or constitutes a non-negotiable element of, the MSC. Accordingly, competition between acquirers is restricted.

These are the first findings, in any jurisdiction, that MIFs infringe competition law by object and the first in the UK or anywhere to deal with the restrictive object or effect of MIFs which have been capped by legislation or regulatory agreement. In the prior Sainsbury’s litigation, the UK Supreme Court upheld findings that the domestic consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer MIFs which applied prior to the EU’s Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR) (which capped those MIFs) infringed Article 101(1) by effect. The CAT’s judgment today extends those findings to findings of object infringement, while making further findings of infringement by object or effect in respect of the uncapped default MIFs applying to commercial card and inter-regional consumer card transactions, and in respect of MIFs capped under the IFR regime and pursuant to certain commitments given by Visa and Mastercard to the European Commission.

Specifically, the CAT found that:

1. Commercial card MIFs are infringing by object.
2.  Before the Interchange Fee Regulation (“IFR”) came into effect in December 2015, domestic UK and Irish consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer card MIFs were infringing by object.
3. Since the IFR came into force, domestic UK and Irish consumer and/or Intra-EEA consumer card MIFs have infringed competition law by effect.
4. Visa’s interregional MIFs infringed competition law by object until the entry into force of the Visa Commitments Decision in April 2019 and by effect thereafter.
5. Mastercard’s interregional MIFs infringed competition law by object until the Mastercard II Commitments Decision in April 2019 and by effect thereafter.

The Umbrella Proceedings are ongoing. Trial 2, concerning the pass-on of the MIF from acquirers to merchants and from merchants to consumers, took place in late 2024 and early 2025, with judgment expected in due course. A further trial will deal with exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.

Philip Woolfe KC and Antonia Fitzpatrick acted in Trial 1 for the successful merchant claimants, instructed by Stephenson Harwood LLP and Scott + Scott UK LLP

The judgment is available here.

The TCC has dismissed the Gambling Commission and Interested Party’s application for security for their costs in The New Lottery Company Limited and Northern & Shell PLC v The Gambling Commission litigation (one of the Top 20 cases of 2025). The court ruled that the threshold condition for the Gambling Commission seeking security for its costs under CPR r.25.26 had not been met.

The Interested Party, Allwyn’s, application for security for their costs was legally novel, neither party having been able to identify a case where an Interested Party to a procurement claim had been awarded security for its costs. That application was also refused. The court ruled that “In all the circumstances, I can see nothing in the Rules or in the authorities to which I have been referred to support the proposition that it would be proper for me simply to ignore the longstanding practice of the court and make an order for security for costs in favour of Allwyn. Although in theory an inherent jurisdiction exists…it is not unfettered and there is nothing in the Rules which provides the court with power to make such an order. I reject Allwyn’s case that the provisions of CPR 3.1(2)(p) have that effect. I respectfully adopt the position taken by the Court of Appeal in CT Bowring that, if there is to be an expansion of the Rules to cover applications for security for costs by interested parties, that must be a matter for the Rules Committee or for Parliament.”

Khatija Hafesji acted for The New Lottery Company Limited and Northern & Shell Plc (the Claimants), led by Sa’ad Hossian KC of One Essex Court. The Judgment can be found here.

The High Court has given judgment in a long-running dispute between US-based MGA, one of the world’s largest toy manufacturers, and Cabo, a UK-based start-up.

MGA manufactures the bestselling ‘LOL Surprise’ range of collectible dolls, and had previously had success with ‘Bratz’ dolls. Cabo, the claimant in the proceedings, designed the ‘Worldeez’ line of collectibles, which it was preparing to launch in the UK in May 2017. It alleged that MGA stifled the launch of Worldeez by claiming that the product was a “knock off” of LOL Surprise, making false allegations that Worldeez infringed its IP rights, and by threatening toy retailers that their supplies of LOL Surprise would be withheld if they stocked Worldeez. All the major retailers then withdrew their support for Worldeez, which failed and was discontinued in 2018.

The trial was originally listed for June 2022, but was adjourned shortly before it was due to start after it emerged that MGA had failed to harvest some 900,000 documents (with MGA ordered to pay the costs of the adjourned trial on the indemnity basis: see previous news article here).

Following a trial in the Chancery Division heard over four months, Mrs Justice Bacon held that MGA’s exclusionary campaign was an abuse of dominance, and that MGA had also made unjustified threats of patent infringement proceedings contrary to the Patents Act 1977. Although MGA’s agreements with retailers not to supply LOL had an anticompetitive object, the judge found that they nonetheless benefited from exemption under the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation. However, despite the findings on infringement, Cabo’s claim for damages was unsuccessful, as the judge considered that even in the counterfactual Cabo would not have traded profitably.

The judgment also contains a discussion of the purdah rules for witnesses giving evidence (which MGA’s CEO was found to have breached multiple times) and their relevance to the assessment of a witness’s credibility.

Ronit Kreisberger KC, Stefan Kuppen, and Alfred Artley represented Cabo, instructed by Spector Constant & Williams.

A full copy of the judgment can be found here.

Over 19,000 current and former police officers and the Police Federation of England and Wales (“PFEW”) have reached a settlement after over three years of litigation.

The officers’ claims related to two ransomware cyber-attacks that the PFEW suffered in March 2019. During the attacks, hackers accessed the PFEW’s systems and encrypted several of its databases, making them inaccessible to the PFEW. The attacks also gave cybercriminals access to the same databases, which contained officers’ personal data, including home address data.

On 11 March 2022, the PFEW admitted a breach of the requirements under the GDPR to have appropriate technical and organisational measures in place. In May 2025, the PFEW agreed to settle the claim for a total of £15 million (inclusive of legal and insurance costs).

The settlement has been widely reported on, including by the Telegraph and by Cyber Security Review.

Gerry Facenna KC, Eric Metcalfe and Jenn Lawrence acted for the claimants and were instructed by KP Law.

The Court of Appeal today handed down its judgment dismissing the appeal of various pharmaceutical companies against an earlier judgment of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) finding that they had no limitation defence to a multi-million pound claim by English and Welsh NHS providers arising out of the “pay for delay” cartel in relation to citalopram, an important first-line treatment for depression routinely prescribed by GPs.

In 2013, the European Commission decided that Lundbeck, which held the original patent for citalopram, had breached EU competition law by agreeing with generic manufacturers that they would delay entry to the market for citalopram in return for being paid the equivalent of what they would have earned from earlier entry (hence, “pay for delay”).  Those manufacturers had threatened to enter the market after the expiry of the main patent for citalopram, despite Lundbeck’s assertion that to do so would infringe some other patents held by Lundbeck in relation to the process of manufacturing citalopram (an assertion that the generic manufacturers denied).

Lundbeck and the generic manufacturers involved appealed against that decision to the General Court of the EU and then to the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”).  Their final appeals were dismissed by the Court of Justice on 25 March 2021.

Meanwhile, on the sixth anniversary of the decision, in 2019, the NHS and other providers started High Court proceedings for damages against the companies involved.  In 2021, but before any Particulars of Claim had been pleaded, those proceedings were transferred to the CAT: the order made provision for a Claim Form to be served in accordance with CAT rules in lieu of Particulars of Claim.  The NHS served that Claim Form on 28 February 2023, and an amended version adding a further party (“the 12^th Defendant”) on 17 March 2023.  The Claim Form was entirely a “follow-on” claim relying only on the infringement found in the Commission decision.

It was common ground that: –

• the High Court proceedings were served out of time: the Defendants alleged, and the NHS did not dispute, that the six-year period ran from before the publication of the Commission decision given the material available to the NHS before publication; and
• on the basis of the limitation periods applicable to pre-2015 follow-on claims and preserved by transitional provisions in the CAT Rules, there was a separate limitation period for follow-on claims in the CAT of two years running from the date of the CJEU’s judgment.

On that basis, the issue between the NHS and the Defendants was whether the Claim Form served in February and March 2023 – within two years of the CJEU judgment – validly made a follow-on claim.  The Defendants said it did not, and should only be regarded as a step in the transferred High Court proceedings (which were out of time).  They also claimed that the NHS was estopped by the terms of the transfer order – which preserved the parties “accrued rights” – from relying on the two-year limitation period.

Green LJ, giving a judgment with which Flaux C and Phillips LJ agreed, upheld the CAT in rejecting the Defendants’ limitation defence.  He pointed out that the Defendants’ case was, in the end, that the NHS should have withdrawn the transferred proceedings before serving the Claim Form.  But there was no reason why, even though the NHS had not done that, the Claim Form should not have the effect under rule 30 of the CAT rules of “making” a claim: Green LJ stated that (§62): –

The [Defendants’] case … proceeds upon the basis that an ostensibly regular claim is irregular because of a procedural omission which is external to and uncontemplated by the Rules. That omission is the failure to take a wholly unnecessary procedural step, namely the abandonment of a prior High Court claim. The Appellants’ interpretation of [the relevant rules] collide, in my view violently, with the General Principles of fairness, justice and proportionality, which guide the construction and operation of the Rules.

Green LJ then rejected the Defendants’ estoppel argument on the basis that there was no reason to read the reference to preservation of “accrued rights” as including an agreement by the NHS to give up a right to rely on the two-year period (which had at that stage not yet commenced).  In any event, that argument could not assist the 12^th Defendant, which was not party to the transfer order on which the alleged estoppel was based.

Subject to any application by the Defendants to appeal to the Supreme Court, the NHS’s claim for damages will now proceed in the CAT.

George Peretz KC (instructed by Peters & Peters Solicitors LLP) represented the NHS in the CAT (as from 2024) and the Court of Appeal.  He also represented the European Commission in the General Court and CJEU appeals against its 2013 decision.

A seven-member panel of the Supreme Court has handed down judgment in URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd. The ruling is the first time that the Court has considered the Building Safety Act 2022, the legislative response to the building safety crisis that followed the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, as well as the Defective Premises Act 1972.

The appeal arises out of litigation between a developer, BDW (Barratt Homes, David Wilson Homes etc.), and a provider of consultant engineering services, URS. Following the widespread identification of building safety issues after the Grenfell Tower fire, BDW discovered defects in two sets of high-rise developments which it had developed and received structural designs from URS.

The Supreme Court has dismissed each of URS’s grounds of appeal. The judgment is expected to make it easier to hold wrongdoers responsible for historic building safety defects to account, and to speed up the process of making homes safe for their residents.

Will Perry acted for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (led by Sir James Eadie KC and others), who intervened on Ground 2. The Court relied heavily on those submissions when considering the background, structure and purpose of the Building Safety Act 2022.

The judgment is available here.