In a consequentials hearing yesterday, Lady Justice Cockerill refused to grant permission for the claimants on all their proposed grounds of appeal against her PDD liability judgment, handed down in July (news). The claimants are purchasers of over 1 million motor vehicles suing for damages under group litigation orders, alleging that various motor vehicle manufacturers had used unlawful defeat devices in their systems to control harmful emissions, including nitrous oxides. That judgment held that most of the allegations of defeat devices failed, including all of the allegations against Ford, Nissan, and Renault.  The Claimants argued that the findings in the judgment were only decisive in relation to the 20 core sample vehicles considered as part of the proceedings and did not extend to other variants of those vehicles or wider vehicles in the claimant cohort. The judge rejected that submission and refused to let the claimants re-plead or submit further evidence about other vehicles. She also refused to let the Claimants re-open part of the judgment against Nissan and Renault on the basis of new evidence, holding that the two documents in question had been properly disclosed, carried little evidential weight as hearsay evidence and made no difference to her conclusions, which were based on the testing evidence and the jointly agreed position by the parties’ experts. She awarded Nissan and Renault indemnity costs on that application, holding that the application should never have been brought.

The judge did however say that she would grant permission to the manufacturers to appeal against her finding on the actionability of the Emissions Regulations – i.e. that consumers had, in principle, a right to damages in tort where their vehicles contain unlawful defeat devices.  The judge also ruled on issues of costs and awarded Nissan and Renault 90% of their total costs to date of the PDD Trial and 100% of their costs for the quantum trial, with a 60% payment on account.  The total advance payment owed to all Defendants is expected to be over £100m. Detailed written rulings on all issues are to follow.  The claimants will now have a period of time in which to ask the Court of Appeal to reconsider permission to appeal.

George Peretz KC and George Hilton have been acting for Ford in this litigation, and Anneli Howard KC has been acting for Nissan.

Paul Harris KC and Natalie Nguyen acted for Tonda Eckert, manager of Southampton FC, in disciplinary proceedings before an independent Regulatory Commission of The FA.

Mr. Eckert faced three charges of misconduct contrary to FA Rule E3.1 arising from events between December 2025 and May 2026, which he admitted. The charges concerned the observation of training sessions of Oxford United FC, Ipswich Town FC, and Middlesbrough FC ahead of fixtures against Southampton FC. The FA alleged that Mr Eckert had acted in an improper manner and/or brought the game into disrepute by directing and/or authorising these observations.

Paul Harris KC, leading Natalie Nguyen, successfully resisted The FA’s submission for an immediate three-month suspension from football. Following submissions in mitigation, the independent Regulatory Commission declined to impose any immediate sporting sanction and instead ordered a six-week suspension, wholly suspended until the end of the 2027/28 season. The Regulatory Commission also imposed a £28,000 fine and a reprimand.

In its written reasons, the Commission described Mr Eckert as a “particularly impressive witness” who demonstrated “genuine contrition”. It found no evidence that he had pressured members of staff and concluded that, notwithstanding the three breaches, there had not been a systematic or organised course of conduct.

The report praises the arguments put forward by counsel on behalf of their client.

Paul Harris KC and Natalie Nguyen were instructed by Centrefield LLP for Tonda Eckert. The independent Regulatory Commission’s written reasons for its decision are published here.

Drew Holiner appeared for Naftogaz of Ukraine before the Court of Appeal of the Astana International Financial Centre in proceedings concerning the recognition and enforcement of an ICC arbitral award against Gazprom worth approximately US$1.4 billion.

The appeal raises important questions concerning the AIFC Court’s jurisdiction to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards and the interpretation of its constitutional and statutory framework. Permission to appeal was granted following conflicting first-instance decisions on the scope of that jurisdiction.

The Naftogaz appeal was heard alongside a related appeal brought by Posco Co. Ltd. on 30 September 2026, marking the first occasion on which the AIFC Court of Appeal sat as a three-judge panel. Judgment is awaited.

Drew was instructed by Wikborg Rein and appeared alongside Valikhan Shaikenov of ADL Disputes.

The 2023 Monetary Penalty Notice

In April 2023 the ICO imposed a £12.7 million penalty on TikTok for breaches of data protection law, including unlawful processing of the personal data of children under the age of 13. TikTok appealed against the penalty, arguing that the penalty was ultra vires because it was made “with respect to processing of personal data for the special purposes” (i.e., journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes) within the meaning of sections 156 and 174 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”). On that basis TikTok claimed that the ICO had no power to issue the penalty notice without first obtaining prior court approval in accordance with section 174 DPA.

The FTT ordered that the issue be determined by way of a trial of a preliminary issue. In its decision released on 4 July 2025, the FTT ruled in favour of the ICO, rejecting TikTok’s case that data processing for the purposes of providing the TikTok service is processing “for the special purposes” because it is intended to enable and encourage artistic expression by TikTok users.

TikTok then appealed that decision. The appeal was heard in the UT from 11 to 12 May 2026. In its decision released on 28 July 2026, the UT also found for the ICO, upholding the FTT’s ruling on all counts.

Following the UT decision, TikTok has now withdrawn its appeal, meaning that the 2023 monetary penalty notice is final.

Gerry Facenna KC, Nikolaus Grubeck and Jenn Lawrence acted for the ICO.

 

The 2025 Recommender Systems Investigation

In February 2025 the ICO opened an investigation into how TikTok processes the personal information of children between 13–17yrs in its recommender systems. The ICO issued an information notice to TikTok, requiring it to provide information and documents to progress the investigation. TikTok appealed against the information notice on the basis that it was ultra vires because it was made “with respect to processing of personal data for the special purposes” within the meaning of sections 143 and 174 DPA.

The FTT ordered that the appeal be stayed pending determination by the UT of the preliminary issue trial in relation to the 2023 monetary penalty notice.

Following the UT decision, TikTok has also withdrawn this appeal, meaning that the ICO can continue its investigation.

Jenn Lawrence acted for the ICO.

A three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal has given judgment in Cruelty Free International v Information Commissioner and the Home Office [2026] UKUT 328 (AAC), an important case concerning the domestic application of Article 10 ECHR as well as the application of precedent in human rights cases more broadly.

In 2023, the Home Office (“HO”) refused to provide Cruelty Free International (“CFI”) with certain information relating to animal testing. The Information Commissioner found that the HO was entitled to refuse CFI’s request, holding that the prohibition on disclosing such information within s.24 of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (“ASPA”), combined with s.44 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”), created an absolute exemption to disclosure. CFI’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was refused.

The issues on appeal to the Upper Tribunal included whether the domestic application of Article 10 ECHR contained a right to receive information in limited circumstances (following the landmark Grand Chamber judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary (2020) 71 EHRR 2), and, if so, whether s.24 ASPA breached CFI’s Article 10 ECHR rights.

Prior to this case, domestic courts had rejected the notion that the right to receive information applies in domestic law – most notably, in the Upper Tribunal’s earlier decision of Moss v Information Commissioner [2020] UKUT 242 (AAC). This case relied upon comments made in two Supreme Court cases pre-dating Magyar – which expressed doubts as to whether Article 10 ECHR contained such a right  –  in order to hold that lower courts were bound to reject the existence of such a right.

In this case, the Upper Tribunal held that the relevant comments of the Supreme Court were obiter, and that lower courts were not bound by them. It therefore departed from its earlier decision in Moss, and set out important guidance for the circumstances in which lower courts are bound by higher courts not to follow relevant Strasbourg authority.

The Upper Tribunal went on to apply the Magyar-derived right to receive information, finding that the blanket ban on disclosure contained within s.24 ASPA was a disproportionate interference with CFI’s Article 10 ECHR rights. On the issue of remedies, however, the Upper Tribunal held that it was not possible to use s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to interpret s.24 ASPA in a Convention-compatible manner. As the Upper Tribunal is unable to make declarations of incompatibility, the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was ultimately upheld.

Reuben Andrews appeared for and made oral submissions on behalf of CFI, alongside Peter Lockley of 11KBW. Reuben and Peter are led by Brendan McGurk KC.

Involve v DWP [2026] EWHC 2209 (TCC)

The Technology and Construction Court (O’Farrell J) today handed down judgment in the Involve procurement dispute, dismissing the claimant’s challenge to the exclusion of its tender for non-compliance.

The claimant (Involve) is the incumbent supplier of audio-visual services to DWP for key services including Universal Credit. It submitted a bid for the replacement video solution, but its tender was disqualified on the basis that it failed to meet the minimum score for one of the technical questions (Question 6.4). Although at the original moderation Involve had originally received a score of 7 for that question, one of the evaluators remained concerned that Involve’s solution, which used ‘URL masking’ (where a customer is re-directed to a non-GOV.UK domain, but that is then ‘masked’ from the customer by showing a GOV.UK URL in the address bar), did not meet the requirement for the solution to be “integrated and provided from within DWP web pages”. A re-moderation meeting was therefore convened, at which it was agreed that URL masking did not meet the requirement: Involve’s score for Question 6.4 was therefore reduced to 1, leading to its disqualification and the award of the contract to another bidder (Accenture).

Involve challenged the disqualification on the three grounds, claiming (i) that DWP’s decision to re-moderate the scores for Question 6.4 was in breach of the principle of transparency and/or manifestly erroneous; (ii) that DWP’s conduct of the re-moderation process was in breach of the principles of transparency and/or equal treatment and/or its obligation to act proportionately; and (iii) that the score awarded to Involve for Question 6.4 on re-moderation was manifestly erroneous.

A further issue arose following the service of Involve’s witness evidence, which showed that Involve’s Director of Technical Services had drafted sections of its bid. DWP considered this breached the conflict of interest mitigations which Involve had previously agreed (given its incumbent status), which prohibited the relevant individual from taking part in “detailed bid assembly”. DWP therefore obtained permission at the pre-trial review to amend its Defence to allege that even if Involve had not been disqualified as a result of URL masking, it would have disqualified Involve in any event for breach of the conflict of interest rules in the ITT.

Following a two-week trial in January 2026, the Court dismissed Involve’s challenge, finding for DWP on almost every issue. The Court held that

• DWP’s decision to re-moderate the scores for Question 6.4 was not in breach of the principle of transparency and/or manifestly erroneous.
• Although DWP had breached the principle of transparency by using extraneous material to evaluate Involve’s proposal during the re-moderation, that breach had no effect on the outcome of the re-moderation or the procurement and caused no loss to Involve. DWP’s approach in the re-moderation, that URL masking was not capable of meeting the requirements of Question 6.4, was not manifestly erroneous.
• The score awarded to Involve for Question 6.4 on re-moderation was not manifestly erroneous.
• DWP was entitled to, and would have, rejected Involve’s tender in any event for failure to comply with the conflict of interest rules in the ITT and the agreed mitigation measures.

The judgment therefore provides helpful guidance as to the proper conduct of moderation meetings and how the principle of transparency applies in practice to challenges to disqualification. It also illustrates the risks to tenderers of failing to comply with conflict of interest obligations.

Ewan West KC and Alfred Artley acted for DWP (instructed by the Government Legal Department).

Following rolled-up hearing, the Administrative Court has today refused permission on all grounds in R (Bath Spa University and ors) v (1) Secretary of State for Education and (2) Student Loans Company Limited [2026] EWHC 2129 (Admin), a claim in judicial review brought by five higher education providers against the Secretary of State for Education and the Student Loans Company (SLC).

The claim concerned the classification, for student finance purposes, of a number of higher education courses. On the relevant courses, students were required to attend teaching sessions only at weekends.

The Claimants challenged the Defendants’ position that such courses fell within the statutory definition of “distance learning courses” under the Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011 and were therefore ineligible for certain forms of student support, including maintenance loans and grants.

The dispute arose after it was identified that the courses had not been registered by the higher education providers as distance learning courses. As a result, maintenance support had been paid to students enrolled on those courses before the Secretary of State concluded that the courses had been incorrectly classified under the Regulations.

The Court refused permission on each of the proposed grounds of challenge. The Court also accepted SLC’s argument that the Claimants lacked standing to seek a mandatory order against SLC requiring the reinstatement of student finance payments and that, in any event, the Claimants had not established that SLC acted unlawfully.

The case has been reported in the press:

BBC

Ewan West KC and Clíodhna Kelleher were instructed on behalf of the Student Loans Company by Browne Jacobson LLP.

The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) (“UT”) has released its decision dismissing TikTok’s appeal and upholding the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (“FTT”) ruling in the ICO’s favour on a key preliminary issue concerning the regulator’s power to take action against online platforms hosting user-generated content.

In April 2023 the ICO imposed a £12.7 million penalty on TikTok for breaches of data protection law, including unlawful processing of the personal data of children under the age of 13yrs. TikTok appealed against the penalty, notably on the basis that the penalty was ultra vires because it was made “with respect to processing of personal data for the special purposes” (i.e. journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes) within the meaning of sections 156 and 174 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”). On that basis, according to TikTok, the ICO had no power to issue the penalty notice without first obtaining prior Court approval in accordance with section 174 DPA.

The FTT ordered that the issue be determined by way of a trial of a preliminary issue. In its decision released on 4 July 2025, the FTT ruled in favour of the ICO, rejecting TikTok’s case that data processing for the purposes of providing the TikTok service is processing “for the special purposes” because it is intended to enable and encourage artistic expression by TikTok users.

TikTok then appealed that decision. The appeal was heard in the UT from 11 to 12 May 2026. In its decision released on 28 July 2026, the UT upheld the FTT’s ruling on all counts.

The UT’s decision is available here.

Gerry Facenna KC, Nikolaus Grubeck and Jenn Lawrence act for the ICO.

On 27 July 2026, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Tesla v InterDigital & Avanci [2026] UKSC 27, reversing the majority of the Court of Appeal (Phillips and Whipple LJJ) and holding that the English Courts have jurisdiction to consider claims for declaratory relief as to the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms of a licence to a pool of standard essential patents (SEPs) owned by multiple entities and managed by a single administrator.

The Supreme Court has also confirmed that “implementer-commenced” F/RAND claims may be served on UK SEP holders (i) pursuant to CPR 63.14, where relevant patents have a registered address for service in the UK and (ii) out of the jurisdiction pursuant to Gateway 11, where relevant patents have a registered address for service outside of the UK.

Ligia Osepciu acted for Tesla (instructed by Powell Gilbert) in the Supreme Court and below.

In CMA v Emma Matratzen GmbH & Ors [2026] EWHC 1995 (Ch), Mr Justice Richards has considered the relevance of the volume of products sold to the question of whether the use of reference pricing (for example “was £100, now £50”) will constitute a “misleading action” under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. There is now a new consumer enforcement regime under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, but this judgment remains important reading for practitioners in consumer law.

The central issue in dispute by the time of the hearing was whether the Court should make an enforcement order that included provisions preventing Emma from selling more than two items at a discounted price for every one item sold at the full price, subject to certain safety valves. This mechanism is referred to in the judgment as a 1:2 fixed volume ratio. On balance, the Court held that the CMA had not established that Emma’s use of reference pricing was generally misleading based on data showing low levels of sales at the reference price alone. The Judge held that other relevant considerations included Emma’s subjective beliefs as to whether its reference prices were realistic and the nature of the products it was selling. The Court was accordingly not willing make an order incorporating the 1:2 fixed volume ratio sought by the CMA.

The Court has directed that the parties seek to agree the terms of an enforcement order that takes into account the conclusions expressed in the judgment. If necessary, the Court will hear further submissions on whether, and if so on what terms, the court should make an enforcement order, at a hearing in the Michaelmas term.

Anneli Howard KC and Jonathan Lewis acted for Emma Mattresses.

Rob Williams KC and Daisy Mackersie acted for the CMA.