UK Global Healthcare Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2026] EWHC 561 (TCC)

This claim arises out of two contracts for the supply of 320 million medical gloves during the Covid-19 pandemic. Time was of the essence as stipulated in both contracts, which also had expiry clauses, the dates for which have passed. The gloves remain undelivered. DHSC made an upfront payment of £15,350,000 which it sought to reclaim summarily, having sent a letter of termination and/or because the expiry clauses require repayment. UKGH’s position is that it has remained ready, willing and able to supply the gloves and that DHSC waived compliance with the delivery dates, and/or is now estopped from relying on either the delivery dates or the expiry dates, and that as a result the purported termination was unlawful.

On termination, the Court (Constable J) found that If UKGH made out its case either in respect of the delivery dates or rejection, it would follow that there was a real prospect that UKGH could establish that the termination was unlawful.

In relation to the expiry clauses the judge applied a ‘prevention principle of interpretation’, a principle of construction that a contract should be interpreted, so far as possible, in such a manner as not to permit one party to take advantage of their own breach of that contract; and found that the repayment requirement in the expiry clauses was not operative to require reimbursement in circumstances where the non-delivery of the goods has been caused by a breach on the part of DHSC.

The Application was dismissed accordingly.

Philip Moser KC acted for the successful Claimant, instructed by Kleyman & Co.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) has today handed down judgment in the so-called Apple Batteries collective proceedings, refusing Apple’s (second) application to strike out the entirety of the claim.

The Class Representative, Mr Gutmann, had alleged that Apple abused its dominant position in the way in which it introduced a ‘Power Management Feature’ to address unexpected power offs which were causing iPhones to shut down unexpectedly, which in turn had the effect of throttling their performance. Mr Gutmann’s claim was certified by the CAT in late 2023, and had resisted Apple’s first strike out / summary judgment application and their subsequent application for permission to appeal.

Apple’s present application was based on the recent judgments of the Supreme Court in Evans v Barclays Bank and the CAT in Gutmann v First MTR Southwestern Trains Limited. The CAT unanimously rejected Apple’s submissions on the law and refused to strike out the claim. It did however take the opportunity to re-examine the matter afresh and considered that the claim should proceed with some adjustments in respect of new iPhones and the end of the alleged infringement period. Importantly, the CAT noted that it was arguable that a lack of transparency can be a factor – indeed “a dominant factor” – in the abuse of a dominant position.

The CAT’s judgment can be found here.

Philip Moser KC and Natalie Nguyen represented the successful Class Representative, Justin Gutmann, and were instructed by Charles Lyndon.

Anneli Howard KC, Stefan Kuppen and Will Perry also act for Mr Gutmann.

On 10 March 2026, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) refused an application by Aramark Limited (“Aramark”) to extend time to challenge a merger decision by the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”).  The judgment contains a comprehensive review of the CAT’s power to extend time for the commencement of proceedings, with a particular focus on challenges to merger decisions.

In January 2025, Aramark acquired 90% of the issued share capital of Entier Limited (“Entier”). Aramark and Entier are both engaged in the supply of offshore catering and ancillary facilities management services to customers, including in the UK offshore continental shelf.

The CMA launched a merger inquiry into Aramark’s acquisition of Entier. Following a phase 2 investigation, the CMA notified Aramark of its final report (the “Decision”) on 15 January 2026. The CMA concluded that: (i) the transaction has resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market; and (ii) only a sale of Entier to an approved buyer would effectively address the competition concerns.

On Friday 13 February 2026, Aramark filed a notice of application for review of the CMA’s Decision. The CAT Registry took the view that the deadline for the notice of application had expired at 5pm on 12 February 2026 and refused to register Aramark’s notice of application. Aramark applied retrospectively for an extension of time to file the notice of application.  Rule 25(3) of the CAT Rules provides that such an extension can only be made in exceptional circumstances.

The CAT (James Wolffe KC) found that there was no reasonable room for debate that the deadline in this case was Thursday 12 February 2026. There were no such exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of that deadline. The CAT emphasised the compelling public interest in the speedy resolution of disputes in relation to merger decisions and the importance of meeting time limits for initiating proceedings before the CAT. The CAT found that Aramark missed the deadline because of a good faith misinterpretation of the rules by its solicitors and a decision to depart from an internal plan to file on 12 February 2026. These were not exceptional circumstances justifying an extension. The CAT accepted the substantial prejudice which Aramark sustains by reason of losing the opportunity to obtain a review of the Decision but considered that these consequences did not justify characterising the circumstances as exceptional. It was in the nature of time limits that failure to comply may be of great significance to the party concerned and that Aramark would be unable to challenge the CMA’s remedy.

The CAT noted that, under the surrogacy principle, parties to civil litigation need to live with the consequences of errors made by their lawyers. The circumstances of the present case did not justify departure from that general rule.

The CAT’s judgment is available here.

Ronit Kreisberger KC and Charlie Coverman appeared on behalf of the Applicant.

Rob Williams KC and James Bourke appeared for the CMA.

The Administrative Court has handed down judgment in R (BHO) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and the Secretary of State for the Home Department. 

The case concerns the question of whether it is consistent with the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement to levy NHS charges on so-called Late Beneficiaries of the Withdrawal Agreement. For most applicants to the EU Settlement Scheme, the deadline was 30 June 2021. However, under Article 18(1)(d), the UK is obliged to accept late applications where there is good reason for the delay. A Late Beneficiary is a person who makes a late, but successful application to the EUSS.

The crux of this case is whether it is contrary to the WA to levy charges on a Late Beneficiary for NHS case they received between the expiry of the deadline for applications to the EUSS – 30 June 2021 – and the date of their application to the EUSS.

The Administrative Court determined that the recovery of NHS charges from Late Beneficiaries is lawful:

• Ground 1: the grant of status to a Late Beneficiary does not have retroactive (ex tunc) effect and so does not render a period of residence prior to the Late Beneficiary’s application to the EUSS lawful.
• Ground 2: charging Late Beneficiaries for NHS care discriminates against them within the meaning of Article 4 of Reg 883/2004, but the discrimination is justified in order to protect the integrity of the EU Settlement Scheme. The Court dismissed the remainder of the proposed justifications offered by the Secretary of State.

The IMA intervened in relation to Ground 2. The IMA is the post-Brexit citizens’ rights watchdog, established in accordance with the WA to monitor and protect the rights of EU citizens and EEA EFTA nationals and their family members in the UK.

Clíodhna Kelleher acted for the IMA.

In a split decision, the Court of Appeal (CoA) has refused the appeal by Prof. Carolyn Roberts against the decision of the Competition Appeal Tribunal not to grant a collective proceedings order in her competition damages claims against six water and sewerage companies, on the basis that the claims were precluded by section 18(8) of the Water Industry Act 1991.

The majority, the Master of the Rolls and Lady Justice Falk, held that the claims were precluded by section 18(8), although for reasons different from those relied on by the Tribunal.  Lord Justice Zacaroli gave a dissenting judgment in which he concluded that the claims were not so precluded, such that he would have allowed the appeal.

Like other water and sewerage companies, the six proposed defendants are subject to price control regulation by Ofwat.  Under that regime, the revenues that each company is allowed to charge households for the provision of sewerage services are controlled, including by reference to how well each company has performed against certain performance commitments, some of which relate to the number of pollution incidents on their networks.

Prof. Roberts contended that the companies abused their dominant positions by providing misleading information to the Environment Agency and Ofwat (understating the number of pollution incidents on their networks), as a result of which they were permitted to charge consumers higher prices for sewerage services.

The claims will now not proceed, unless Prof. Roberts successfully seeks permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The judgment is available here, and the media summary here.

Before the CoA, Jon Turner KC and Julian Gregory represented Prof. Roberts (funded by Benchwalk), instructed by RPC.  Daisy Mackersie represented the proposed defendants, instructed by Freshfields.

Several other members of chambers have been instructed at earlier stages of the proceedings (see here).

Following the first Case Management Conference post-certification in the “Airwave” collective abuse of dominance proceedings against Motorola, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (Bacon P presiding) has scheduled the claim for a 6 week trial, to commence in October 2027. In so doing, the Tribunal unanimously granted the Class Representative’s application for a split trial, whereby Motorola’s pass-on defence is deferred until a later date, with all other issues being heard together at the first trial. The Tribunal also took the novel step in collective proceedings of requiring the Defendants to produce a costs budget setting out their incurred and estimated costs for the proceedings, accepting the Class Representative’s submissions that this step was important in ensuring costs visibility and placing the parties on an equal footing.

The case has been covered by GCR (subscription only).

Monckton’s Michael Armitage represented the Class Representative, Clare Spottiswoode, at the CMC. Michael is being led by Anneli Howard KC in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal has today given judgment in case concerning the proper scope of the writ of habeas corpus and the (in)appropriateness of its use to challenge conditions attached to immigration bail. The Appellant (CHK) was a Brazilian national convicted of serious criminal offences and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in 2012. Having completed the custodial part of his sentence the Appellant was detained pending deportation but then released on immigration bail. At the time of his application for habeas corpus he was living in the community but subject to various reporting conditions which he contended amounted to a restriction on his liberty that justified the use of the habeas corpus procedure. Despite recognising the constitutional importance of the writ (reflected inter alia in the fact that there is no requirement for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal or indeed the Supremee Court in habeas corpus cases), the Court of Appeal nevertheless rejected the Appellant’s attempt to use the writ to challenge his bail conditions in circumstances where he was not detained.

Michael Armitage acted for the Secretary of State for the Home Department in the Court of Appeal proceedings, instructed by the Government Legal Department.

The Court of Appeal (Vos (MR), Singh LJ and Falk LJ) has today dismissed two appeals brought by Charedi Jewish children and Evangelical Christian children challenging the Finance Act 2025 which removed the exemption on VAT for private school fees.

The Charedi Jewish Claimants, represented by Khatija Hafesji, argued that the failure to implement a “low cost” fee exemption (exempting schools charging less than £7690 a year from the charge) unlawfully discriminated against them contrary to Article 14 ECHR read with A2P1.

The Charedi Jewish Claimants had a number of sub-grounds of appeal, including (i) that the Divisional Court had failed to ask itself  whether the measure was in fact objectively justified, and (ii) that the Divisional Court was wrong to accept the government’s “pluralism policy” justification. The “pluralism policy” was a reference to the government’s assertion that the state education system provides a “pluralist” education suitable for children of all faiths and none. If children from certain religious minorities felt that such education was nevertheless not acceptable to them, the failure to make an exemption was justified in the context of the “pluralism policy”.

Applying the recent Supreme Court decision in Shvidler v SSFCDA [2025] UKSC 30, the Court of Appeal carried out its own proportionality assessment. The Court agreed with the Charedi Jewish appellants that the Divisional Court had failed to apply the 4-stage test in Bank Mellat, and ask itself whether there was an objective justification for the failure to treat Charedi Jewish children differently. Instead, the Divisional Court had considered only whether decision fell within the state’s “margin of appreciation”. The Court of Appeal stated: “it is important not to avoid the question of objective justification which must be addressed in this case… although the authorities make numerous references to metaphors such as “margin”, “area” and to varying degrees of intensity of review, ultimately it seems to us those are not legal tests to be applied by a court. They are helpful tools which may assist the court on its path as it answers the questions posed by the legal test, but they are not the legal test. The legal test, as we have already said, is to be found in the four-stage test for proportionality in Bank Mellatt” (para 85).

The Court of Appeal also agreed with the Charedi Jewish appellants that the “principled” justification favoured by the Divisional Court (the “pluralism policy”) was given too much weight by the Divisional Court in the proportionality analysis. The Court of Appeal departed from the Divisional Court, when making its own fresh assessment of the proportionality of the measure, by placing considerable weight on the “practical” justifications advanced by the government, which had found little favour with the Divisional Court. Those practical considerations included the administrative difficulties of operating an exemption, the risk of abuse, and the loss of revenue.

Khatija Hafesji acted for BYL and BAU (the (Claim 1) Appellants), instructed by Rook Irwin Sweeney.

The Court of Appeal has handed down judgment on Amazon’s applications for permission to appeal against the decision of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) to grant Collective Proceedings Orders in proceedings brought by Robert Hammond and Professor Andreas Stephan relating to the operation of Amazon’s featured merchant algorithm in selecting the “Featured Offer” displayed in the “Buy Box”.  The Court of Appeal (Snowden and Zacaroli LJJ) listed Amazon’s permission applications for an oral hearing but ultimately refused its applications.

The judgment is reported at [2026] EWCA Civ 183.

Jon Turner KC appeared for Amazon in the Hammond proceedings instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP.

Kristina Lukacova appeared for Amazon in the Stephan proceedings instructed by Covington & Burling LLP.

Ben Rayment appeared for Mr Hammond instructed by Charles Lyndon Limited and Hagens Berman EMEA LLP.

Philip Moser KC is also instructed on behalf of Mr Hammond.

The Court of Justice of the EU today handed down final judgment on appeals brought by various airlines against judgments of the General Court dismissing appeals against the European Commission’s 2017 decision finding a worldwide cartel, implemented in the EEA, between various airlines in relation to surcharges on cargo shipments and which operated between 1999 and 2006.  The Court of Justice dismissed all the appeals, bringing to an end EU competition proceedings that have lasted 20 years from the initial dawn raids in 2006.  Those dawn raids were followed by a previous decision of the Commission in 2010 that was annulled by the General Court in 2015 and then largely re-adopted by the Commission in 2017.  The appeals cover various points on the law relating to cartels and fines, including on the test for implementation of a cartel in the EEA and on the concept of a single and continuous infringement.

George Peretz KC and Josh Holmes KC acted for the European Commission in separate appeals. Both George and Josh are called to the Bar of Ireland and therefore hold full rights of audience before the EU Courts.