The Court of Appeal has re-affirmed that on an application for judicial review, there will be no breach of the principles of procedural fairness, even if a particular step has not been taken, where that has not resulted in any prejudice to the individual. In R (Singaram) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1375, Lewis LJ repeated and applied the principle articulated in R (Save our Stonehenge World Heritage Site Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2024] EWCA Civ 1227 (albeit, in that case, obiter). This remains an analytically distinct step from the question of whether (in the event of unfairness) relief should be refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

In Singaram, the Claimant had been granted leave to enter the UK as a student, subject to working a maximum of 20 hours per week. Immigration enforcement officers established in interviewing the Claimant that he had been working in breach of that condition, but did not directly ask for representations on whether discretion should be exercised to curtail his leave. He complained that that was procedurally unfair.

Permission to apply for judicial review was refused by the High Court. The Court of Appeal gave permission to appeal and decided to hear the claim for judicial review itself. The Court dismissed the claim. Any failure to comply with the principles of procedural fairness by not making it clear to the claimant that he had an opportunity to make representations as to why his leave should not be cancelled immediately, or at a later date, did not in fact result in any prejudice. As a result of the questions that were asked during the decision-making process, the claimant had, in fact, provided the information that he wanted the decision-maker to consider when deciding whether to cancel his leave immediately. In the circumstances, there was no, or no material, breach of the principles of procedural fairness and certainly none that vitiated the decision.

The judgment is available here.

Robert Palmer KC and James Bourke acted for the Defendant, instructed by Government Legal Department.

 

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has issued its judgment on a preliminary issue in the class action Spottiswoode v Nexans and Ors [2025] CAT 68.

In May 2024, Clare Spottiswoode CBE was authorised to act as the class representative for electricity consumers in collective proceedings against several power cable companies.  The proceedings seek to recover damages for losses flowing through to electricity bills in Britian from the power cables cartel identified by the European Commission in 2014.  One aspect of Ms Spottiswoode’s claim, which accounts for a substantial proportion of the overall loss claimed, is the allegation that, as a result of the cartel, offshore windfarms paid increased prices for high-voltage power cables, which were then passed on to electricity suppliers (and ultimately consumers) via a Government scheme which sought to incentivise the generation of energy from renewable sources (the Renewables Obligation Scheme).  In particular, Ms Spottiswoode claims that two specific banding decisions in 2010 and 2013 under the Scheme were impacted by the alleged cartel overcharge, with the result that the cost of the ROC regime to UK electricity consumers was increased as a result of the cartel.

The CAT’s judgment follows a three-week trial that took place in May 2025 and focused on the impact of the alleged overcharge on the 2010 banding decision.  It finds that, even if cable prices were higher by (an assumed) 26% as a result of the cartel, the 2010 banding decision would not have been any different absent that overcharge and therefore the cost to consumers from that decision would have remained the same.

Ben Lask KC acts for the class representative.

Fiona Banks acts for one of the Defendants, Prysmian.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has handed down judgment in the class action Dr Rachael Kent v (1) Apple Inc. (2) Apple Distribution International Ltd [2025] CAT 67. The judgment summary can be found here.

The claim concerned purchases by users of Apple devices of iOS apps and in-app content (including subscriptions). The CAT concluded that Apple had abused its dominant position by foreclosing competition in the iOS app distribution services market and the iOS in-app payment services market, by tying its payment services for iOS in-app payments to the App Store, and by charging excessive and unfair prices in the form of the Commission that it charges developers for iOS app distribution services and iOS in-app payment services.

Apple charges a headline rate of commission of 30% to iOS app developers. The CAT found that developers had suffered an overcharge in the iOS app distribution services market of the difference between a Commission set at 17.5% and the Commission actually charged, and an overcharge in the iOS in-app payment services market of the difference between a Commission set at 10% and the Commission actually charged. It found that the rate of incidence at which developers passed on the overcharge to iOS device users was assessed at 50%.

The CAT therefore found that Dr Kent is entitled to damages in respect of the claims of class members, assessed on an aggregate basis. Finally, it found that Dr Kent is entitled to interest on those damages at a simple rate of 8%.

Dr Kent’s claim is the first collective action brought under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 to succeed at trial.

Tim Ward KC, Michael Armitage and Antonia Fitzpatrick (instructed by Hausfeld & Co. LLP), appeared on behalf of Dr Rachael Kent.

Earlier in proceedings, Ronit Kreisberger KC acted for the authorised class representative, Dr Rachael Kent, instructed by Hausfeld & Co. LLP.

Julian Gregory (instructed by the Competition and Markets Authority Legal Department) appeared on behalf of the Competition and Markets Authority.

The case has been widely covered by the Lawyer, BBC, Financial Times, GCR and Scottish Legal News.

HMRC v Colaingrove Ltd [2025] UKUT 00360 (TCC)

The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) has allowed HMRC’s appeal and dismissed Colaingrove Limited’s cross‑appeal concerning entitlement to additional discretionary interest under section 84(8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (now repealed). The Tribunal set aside the First‑tier Tribunal’s earlier decision insofar as it had awarded additional interest, and dismissed all applications for further interest by Colaingrove.

The case concerned whether Colaingrove was entitled to discretionary interest under s.84(8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (VATA) in addition to statutory interest already paid by HMRC under s.78 VATA on VAT repaid by HMRC following the resolution of various appeals started between 2000 and 2013, in respect of accounting periods between 1989 and 2011. The appeals were against s.73 VATA assessments and s.80 VATA claims. Section 84(8) was repealed with effect from 1 April 2009, but continued to apply to certain appeals and decisions pursuant to the transitional and saving provisions of the Transfer of Tribunal Functions and Revenue and Customs Appeals Order 2009. The company sought over £8.2 million in additional interest, arguing that the statutory interest paid by HMRC did not reflect the true cost of borrowing incurred due to the overpayments.

The Tribunal allowed HMRC’s appeal on the core issue, ruling that s.84(8) VATA does not apply to repayments made following litigation of s.80 VATA claims. Sections 80 and 83(t) (now 83(1)(t), concerning appeals from refusals of s.80 claims) provide the exclusive statutory remedy and jurisdictional route for reclaiming overpaid VAT; and discretionary interest under section 84(8) is not available in such cases.

The Tribunal, upholding the First-tier Tribunal (FTT), also rejected Colaingrove’s submission on its cross-appeal to the effect that discretionary interest should be awarded in relation to appealable decisions made after the repeal of s.84(8) where those appealable decisions were based on in-principle liability decisions made before 1 April 2009. For the purposes of the TTF Order, a “decision” referred to an appealable decision concerning matters within s. 83 VATA which are adverse to an appellant.

The Tribunal rejected Colaingrove’s EU law-based arguments, concluding by reference to Littlewoods Limited v HMRC [2017] UKSC 70 that the statutory interest regime under UK law provides an “adequate indemnity” and complies with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.

The Tribunal rejected Colaingrove’s appeal against the rate of the additional interest awarded by the FTT in respect of its appeals against assessments, holding that the rate was a matter of discretion for the FTT and that there was no error of law in its exercise of that discretion.

Philip Moser KC and Andrew Macnab appeared on behalf of HMRC.

The Upper Tribunal’s decision is available here.

The FTT’s decision is available here.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has handed down judgment in the class action Justin Gutmann v First MTR South Western Trains Limited, London & South Eastern Railway Limited, Govia Thameslink Railway Limited & Others [2025] CAT 64.

The claim concerned the Defendants’ sale of a particular kind of rail fare known as a Boundary Fare. The CAT concluded that, on the assumption that the Defendants each holds a dominant position, none of the conduct alleged against them constitutes an abuse of that position. The CAT accordingly dismissed the claim.

All instructed counsel in these proceedings were members of Monckton Chambers.

Philip Moser KC, Stefan Kuppen, and Alexandra Littlewood (instructed by Hausfeld & Co. LLP and Charles Lyndon Ltd) appeared on behalf of Mr Gutmann.

Tim Ward KC, James Bourke, and Hugh Whelan (instructed by Slaughter and May) appeared on behalf of First MTR South Western Trains Limited.

Paul Harris KC, Anneliese Blackwood, Michael Armitage and Clíodhna Kelleher (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) appeared on behalf of London & South Eastern Railway Limited and Govia Thameslink Railway Limited and others.

Anneli Howard KC, Brendan McGurk KC and Khatija Hafesji (instructed by Linklaters LLP) intervened on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport.

Jack Williams is appearing in the Supreme Court between Tuesday 14^th October and Thursday 16^th October 2025 in Dillon v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Jack acts for the lead respondents / cross-appellants (Dillon et al),and is led by John Larkin KC and Jude Bunting KC.

The case concerns the compatibility of the Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 with the non-diminution guarantee in Article 2 of the Windsor Framework (formerly the Northern Ireland Protocol). The Act brought to an end Troubles-related inquests, new civil claims, Police Ombudsman and police investigations.

The case will establish the meaning and effect of Article 2, as well as the role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in domestic law post Brexit, and the circumstances in which Acts of Parliament can be disapplied for incompatibility with the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement (and Windsor Framework).

Jack and other members of Chambers will be speaking about some of these topics next week in a UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement Masterclass Webinar. More information and sign up details are available here.

The CAT has certified the first public sector CPO for collective proceedings, funded by the Government, in relation to allegedly excessive and unfair pricing for Motorola’s provision of emergency communication  services, which are essential for public safety in Great Britain (the “Airwave Services”). The PCR, Ms Clare Spottiswoode, sought certification of the proposed collective proceedings on an opt-out basis, with aggregate damages estimated to be in the region of £600–650 million, relying on the CMA’s Final Report in its market investigation, which was upheld by the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal.

The PCR brings her proposed collective proceedings on behalf of a class, comprised for the main part of public sector purchasers of Airwave Services such as Central Government Departments, local authorities, police, fire and ambulance services as well as a range of private companies, NGOs, charities and voluntary organisations.

The Tribunal concluded that the PCR meets the authorisation condition and that the proposed collective proceedings meet the eligibility condition. The Tribunal rejected Motorola’s objections to certification and dismissed its application for strike out for part of the claim. In particular, it held:

• the issues of dominance and duration of the claim were properly matters for trial rather than strike out; and
• the proposed class definition was clear and workable, rejecting Motorola’s contention that it would give rise to a conflict of interest;
• the claim should be certified on an opt-out basis (rather than opt-in as Motorola contended) as there would be a significant impediment to access to justice if smaller users and public sector class members were required to opt-in when they lacked the resources and expertise to actively participate in the proceedings. Opt-in proceedings were more practicable since the calculation of aggregate damages would be easier and the Tribunal could oversee a suitable method for distribution once the damages had been quantified. Class members would benefit from the additional safeguard of judicial supervision over any collective settlement in opt-out proceedings (which was not available for opt-in proceedings).

The Tribunal also amended clauses 7 and 9 of the PCR’s Litigation Funding Agreement following concerns raised by Motorola.

Anneli Howard KC acted for the PCR – a copy of the judgment is here.

The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal brought by Illuminate Skin Clinics Limited, a GMC-registered medical practice offering a range of aesthetic skin care and wellness treatments, including treatments for collagen loss, excess fat, Botox and dermal fillers.  The full decision can be found here.

Describing the appeal as giving rise to important and difficult points of law in what became a lead case, behind which a number of similar cases are stayed, the Upper Tribunal expressed the hope that its decision would provide much-needed guidance for other businesses in the sector. Different approaches had previously been taken by the FTT in various cases concerning the meaning of the term medical care in the context of cosmetic procedures – an issue that had not previously been considered by the Upper Tribunal.

The appeal succeeded on the basis that the FTT had confined its assessment of the therapeutic purpose of the care provided by the Appellant within too narrow a compass, contrary to the relevant case law. The Upper Tribunal concluded that the FTT’s expectations as to how a diagnosis might be evidenced was too high and over-generalised. It allowed the appeal, set aside the FTT’s decision, and remitted it to the FTT, with clear guidance on the approach to be adopted on reconsideration: In summary, the supply in question must be made by a registered person and must have a therapeutic purpose. The assessment of a suitably qualified medical practitioner is significant in identifying that purpose. That practitioner is not obliged to elaborately record a diagnosis. Where a supply has both a therapeutic purpose and a cosmetic purpose, it is necessary to identify the principal purpose. That will involve a multi-factorial analysis which is likely to include consideration of the factors listed by the Upper Tribunal in its decision.  Paragraphs 104 and 105 record the approach to be adopted in future cases.

Melanie Hall KC and Ciar McAndrew of Monckton Chambers represented the Appellant.

A proposed opt-out collective action seeking compensation for approximately 50 million UK consumers is to be brought against Apple in relation to Apple Pay, the digital wallet that enables iPhone users to make contactless payments.

Julian Gregory and Alastair Holder Ross of Monckton Chambers are instructed by Milberg London LLP to act for the proposed class representative, the financial campaigner and journalist James Daley.

The claim will argue that Apple has abused a dominant position by limiting access to the near field communication (NFC) chip in iPhones, making Apple Pay the only digital wallet available on iOS. It is said that banks and card issuers have been forced to accept Apple’s unfair terms to enable contactless payments via iPhone, including fees on every contactless and online transaction made using Apple Pay. The claim will allege that these costs are ultimately passed on to UK consumers who receive a range of financial products from the relevant banks and card issuers (including current account services), whether or not they themselves use Apple pay or own an iOS device.

Funding has been secured from the litigation funder Omni Bridgeway, and proceedings will be issued in the Competition Appeal Tribunal in the coming weeks.

Oxera Consulting are providing expert economic analysis, and Tom de la Mare KC of Blackstone Chambers is also instructed.

Media coverage includes articles by Consumer Voice, Litigation Finance Insider and Legal Funding Journal.

The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) has handed down judgment in a freedom of information appeal brought by Clare Page, a mother who wished to obtain teaching materials used by a charity (School of Sexuality Education) for a sex education session at her daughter’s school, as well as the names of the individuals who delivered the session.

Ms Page’s request was refused by the school, including on the basis that disclosing the materials would constitute a breach of confidence. This decision was subsequently upheld by both the Information Commissioner and, on appeal, the First-tier Tribunal.

The Upper Tribunal has dismissed Ms Page’s further appeal. Amongst other matters, the judgment concludes that section 405 of the Education 1996 – which allows parents to withdraw their children from sex education in state schools – contains an implied obligation to provide information about what will be taught, but does not require a school to provide all materials that will be used.

The judgment is available here.

Will Perry successfully acted for the Information Commissioner.

The case has previously been reported in the Daily Mail, Times and Telegraph.