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The Administrative Court in Wales (Lewis LJ and Chamberlain J) has dismissed a judicial review of the Welsh Ministers’ decision to introduce the Prohibition of Greyhound Racing (Wales) Bill into the Senedd. The judgment contains several points of interest for constitutional and public law practitioners.
The Greyhound Board of Great Britain argued that although the Supreme Court’s decision in AXA General Insurance v HM Advocate [2012] 1 AC 868 prevented review of Acts of the Scottish Parliament (and by analogy the Senedd) on grounds of irrationality, it left open the question whether an Act or Bill could be challenged on procedural grounds. The Claimant alleged the Welsh Ministers breached a legitimate expectation to consult on a ban before introducing the Bill. The Court held that the Senedd’s plenary legislative powers have both a substantive and a procedural consequence. The Senedd is, within its areas of competence, the sole arbiter not only of what legislation is in the interests of the people of Wales but also of how that legislation is enacted.
The Court rejected the claim that the act of introduction of a Bill by the Deputy First Minister was a reviewable decision of the executive, no different in principle from any other ministerial act. What matters is not the capacity in which a Bill is introduced, but the nature of the act itself. Introduction of a Bill is the initiating step in Senedd proceedings and an integral part of the legislative process. Reviewing it on procedural grounds would infringe the principle of separation of powers.
The Court agreed that there was no common law or other duty on the Welsh Ministers to consult before introducing legislation in the Senedd. The legislative process itself fulfils the function of gathering views and evidence. It is for the Senedd, not the courts, to determine the terms on which that process operates. Recognising a pre-legislative consultation obligation would be inconsistent with the devolved constitutional settlement and the separation of powers.
The Claimant abandoned claims for quashing orders during the course of the hearing and sought only declaratory relief. This included declarations that the Welsh Ministers would be expected to seek the permission of the Senedd to withdraw the Bill and that the Senedd would be expected to approve its withdrawal. The Court considered that declarations designed to undermine the validity or progress of a Bill are just as constitutionally impermissible as coercive orders would be.
Having found that the introduction of the Bill by the Deputy First Minister was lawful, the challenge to the earlier political statement announcing the intention to ban greyhound racing should not be determined because first, the issue had become academic, and, secondly, the determination of a claim alleging a procedural flaw at the pre-legislative stage would be an impermissible interference with proceedings in the Senedd and the separation of powers. The adequacy of the process of consultation and evidence gathering by the Welsh Ministers was a matter for the Senedd and it would be wrong for the court to insert itself into that debate at this stage.
Ian Rogers KC represented the Welsh Ministers in Greyhound Board of Great Britain v Welsh Ministers ((1) Senedd Commission and (2) Llywydd as Interested Parties) [2026] EWHC 670 (Admin). The Senedd passed the Bill on 17 March 2026.