AXA v CMA featured in The Lawyer’s ‘cases to watch’

A case in which 7 members of Monckton Chambers are acting has been featured as one of The Lawyer’s ‘cases to watch’.

AXA & Others v Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) received the following commentary:

This case constitutes the first substantive challenge to the newly formed Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) decision regarding the UK’s private healthcare market. 

The CMA decided the various players needed to divest assets to ensure fair competition. 

It follows a two-year investigation by a group of independent panel members at the Competition Commission (CC), which became part of the new CMA. 

Measures included a crackdown on benefits and incentive schemes provided to referring clinicians by private hospital operators and measures to increase the availability of information to patients on private fees and hospital performance.

The new regulator argued that many private hospitals faced little competition in local areas across the UK and there were high barriers to entry. 

It concluded this led to higher prices for self-pay patients in many local areas – and for both self-pay and insured patients in Central London, where HCA, a for-profit operator of healthcare facilities that owns more than half of the available overnight bed capacity, charges significantly higher prices to insured patients than its closest competitor. 

The case is listed for a two-week trial from 19th January.

Tim Wards QC, Kassie Smith QC, Josh Holmes, Ronit Kreisberger, Rob Williams, Anneli Howard and Ligia Osepciu are all acting in this case for various parties.

EU-wide framework for antitrust damages claims agreed: national implementation to follow

On 10 November 2014, the European Council formally approved the EU Directive on antitrust damages actions. This requires EU Member States to harmonise their procedural rules for antitrust damages actions, with the objective of making it easier for victims of competition law infringements to obtain compensation for losses suffered.

This was the final stage in the EU legislative approval process, and Member States will have until late 2016 to implement the required measures.

Please click here to view the full European Commission press release : http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1580_en.htm

This matter will be discussed in depth at the Monckton ‘Competition Damages: Latest Developments’ seminar on 20th November.

Administrative Court rules on third party access to licence exempt electricity distribution networks

The Administrative Court (Green J) has today handed down an important judgment concerning the right of third party suppliers to access exempt electricity distribution systems for the purpose of supplying customers under Schedule 2ZA of the Electricity Act 1989 (“the Act”), implementing Article 32 of Directive 2009/72/EC (“the Third Package Electricity Directive”).

The case concerns the licence exempt electricity distribution network at Heathrow Airport, a substantial proportion of which is leased (“the Leased Network”) by Heathrow Airport Limited (“HAL”) to UK Power Networks (Services) Contracting Limited (“UKPNS”). Pursuant to a Distribution Agreement, UKPNS is required to manage and operate the Leased Network in exchange for substantial annual payments from HAL. When a customer connected to the Leased Network sought to switch to a third party supplier, a dispute arose as to which of UKPNS and HAL is the “distribution exemption holder” or “DEH” owing Schedule 2ZA third party access obligations in respect of the Leased Network.

The dispute was determined by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (“the Authority”), which decided that UKPNS was the relevant DEH on the basis of its contractual obligation to operate the Leased Network and the fact that it had greater control over the Leased Network than HAL. UKPNS applied for judicial review of the Authority’s determination essentially on the grounds that:

  1. Given the language used in paragraph 1(1)(b), Schedule 2ZA, the obligation to grant third party access applies only to a DEH that also sells electricity to the customer requesting a change of supplier – which UKPNS does not; and
  2. It was unlawful and/or irrational for the Authority to place the Schedule 2ZA obligations on UKPNS in circumstances where the Distribution Agreement prevented it from discharging those obligations without assistance from HAL.

Green J rejected the first argument, vindicating the Authority’s view that a purposive construction of Schedule 2ZA, in light of Article 32 of the Third Package Electricity Directive, must allow all customers connected to licence exempt distribution networks to choose their electricity suppliers and all suppliers to access these customers. This purpose would not be achieved by limiting the Schedule 2ZA third party access obligations to circumstances in which the DEH for the relevant network was also selling electricity to the customer at the time of the access request. The language used in paragraph 1(1)(b), Schedule 2ZA – in particular, the word “supply” – needed to be interpreted to give effect to that purpose, notwithstanding that such interpretation would give “supply” a different meaning in that provision than its meaning in other parts of the Act or the Directive.

In relation to the second argument, Green J did not deem it appropriate to rule on UKPNS’ detailed factual claims – many of which had not been raised before the Authority. He considered, however, that the Authority’s determination had proceeded on the erroneous legal basis that the third party access obligations could only fall on a single DEH. Instead, those obligations would apply to “all those with any degree of responsibility for the conveyance of electricity between the supplier and the customer” (original emphasis). He, accordingly, quashed the Authority’s determination and remitted it to be considered on the correct legal basis – noting that if both UKPNS and HAL were determined to have some sort of obligation under Schedule 2ZA, UKPNS’s concerns about its ability to satisfy that obligation could well fall away.

The UKPNS v GEMA Approved Judgment is available here.

Daniel Beard QC, Gerry Facenna and Ligia Osepciu acted for HAL, the Interested Party supporting the Authority.

GSM Gateways Francovich decision upheld in Court of Appeal

The Department for Culture Media and Sport has successfully defended an appeal brought by six GSM Gateway operators in the Court of Appeal. The claimants had brought Francovich damages claims for over £400million, alleging that the UK’s restriction on the commercial use of GSM Gateways was incompatible with, in particular, the EU Authorisation Directive. Mrs Justice Rose had found against the claimants in a decision that can be found here Recall Support Services v Secretary of State for Culture Media Sport. She held that DCMS was justified in relying on public security concerns in imposing and maintaining the restriction for multi-user commercial gateways (COMUGs), albeit not in relation to one minor issue on single-user commercial gateways (COSUGs). In relation to all GSM Gateways Rose J also found that there was either no or no sufficiently serious breach of EU law in any event and dismissed all claims.

The Claimants appealed on the basis that the High Court had erred in its interpretation of Article 5 of the Authorisation Directive which they contended did not permit the UK to maintain the commercial use restriction on grounds of public security. They further contended that the UK had not laid a proper basis in domestic law to entitle the UK to restrict the rights conferred on Gateway operators. Also, that such breach was sufficiently serious to justify damages.

Richards LJ, giving the leading decision of the Court of Appeal, rejected each of the grounds of appeal and upheld the judgment of Rose J in full. Thus, the Court of Appeal has held that the UK was permitted as a matter of EU law to maintain the commercial use restriction for COMUGs (and not COSUGs) and that this was properly provided for in domestic law. Accordingly the Court concluded that it could not be said that there was a manifest and grave disregard of EU law by the UK Government. Appeal dismissed.

Click here to read the full judgment of the Court of Appeal Recall Support Services v Secretary of State for Culture Media & Sport

Daniel Beard QC, Philip Moser QC and Brendan McGurk acted for the Respondent.

BSkyB v Ofcom, BT and others (interim relief) [2014] CAT 17

The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has allowed an application by BT to vary the terms of the interim relief in the long-running Pay TV dispute. The effect is to require Sky to wholesale its sports channels Sky Sports 1 and 2 to BT for distribution on BT’s ‘Cardinal’ and ‘YouView’ Pay TV platforms pending the final determination of the appeals.

In 2012 the CAT allowed Sky’s challenge to Ofcom’s 2010 Pay TV Statement, which had imposed conditions requiring Sky to offer its channels Sky Sports 1 and 2 to other pay TV providers on a wholesale basis, at a price fixed by Ofcom (‘the WMO remedy). In 2010, the CAT had suspended the effect of Ofcom’s decision on an interim basis, except in relation to BT, Virgin and Top-up TV (and subsequently Real Digital), who were permitted to benefit from the WMO remedy during the appeals subject to certain conditions and undertakings. The interim relief provided that the WMO remedy was to have effect in relation to certain ‘Qualifying Platforms’, which in BT’s case was defined to mean ‘digital terrestrial television’.

The CAT’s 2012 Order allowing Sky’s appeal was set aside by the Court of Appeal in February 2014 and the case was remitted to the CAT for further consideration. On 31 October 2014 the Supreme Court refused Sky’s application for permission to appeal. The appeals are therefore once again before the CAT.

By its judgment this week the CAT granted BT’s application to vary the terms of the original interim relief so as to require Sky to comply with the WMO remedy in respect of BT’s current Internet Protocol TV platforms, ‘Cardinal’ and ‘Youview’. The CAT President, Roth J., observed that the technical developments that had occurred over the ‘wholly exceptional time’ the appeals had taken meant that the original interim relief order was now largely ineffective as regards BT. He held that the interim relief should therefore be varied to cover BT’s current TV platforms, in particular having regard to the need to protect the public interest in achieving a competitive market, which the WMO remedy was designed to secure, and on the basis that BT has undertaken to continue to retail its own sports channels to Sky’s satellite customers while the interim relief remains in effect.

Jon Turner QC and Gerry Facenna are acting for BT, Josh Holmes acts for Ofcom, and Meredith Pickford acts for BSkyB. Ben Lask also acted for Ofcom in the original CAT appeal proceedings.

Pleas click here to view the CAT’s recent judgment in BSkyB v Ofcom, BT and others (interim relief) [2014] CAT 17

Visa wins strike out/summary judgment on limitation issues

The Commercial Court granted Visa summary judgment in the interchange fees litigation, striking out over 30 years of potential damages sought by a group of 12 retailers, totalling over £500m.

Twelve claimants, including high street retailers such as Asda, Argos, B&Q, Next and House of Fraser sought damages, dating back to 1977, for alleged breaches of competition law arising from Visa’s setting and imposition of multilateral interchange fees (“MIF”) in the EEA, UK and Ireland. The normal statutory limitation period is six years. The Claimants sought to rely on s.32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act to extend their claim beyond six years on the basis that Visa had deliberately concealed facts that were material to their cause of action which had prevented them from issuing their claims earlier.

In a judgment handed down today in Arcadia Group Brands Limited and ors v Visa Inc and ors [2014] EWHC 3561 (Comm)Mr Justice Simon held that there was a narrow issue which could be determined on a summary basis without the need for a full trial – namely whether there were sufficient facts known to the claimants, or reasonably discoverable by them before 2007, which were sufficient for them to plead a statement of case establishing a prima facie case. He gave a detailed summary of the chronology of publically available documents, in the form of notices, press releases and decisions published by the OFT and EU Commission from 1992 onwards as part of their investigations into interchange pursuant to Article 101 TFEU and the Chapter I prohibition. He held that Visa was able to demonstrate the Particulars of Claim could have been derived from material available before 2007.

The Claimants sought to rely on four “key facts” which they argued were essential for it to commence proceedings, namely (i) the manner and mechanisms by which the MIFs were set, the nature and scope of the Visa MIF arrangements, (iii) the identity of the Visa entities involved in setting the MIFs and (iv) the actual levels of the MIFs. Mr. Justice Simon dismissed those arguments, holding that such facts (although useful in providing commercial reassurance in commencing litigation) were either not material to pleading a cause of action and/or , in any event, could have been discoverable by sophisticated retailers and their advisors from the publically available materials or via appropriate use of the CPR procedures.

Importantly, the judge commented that the trigger for the running of time for limitation purposes is not the discovery of every potentially relevant fact in the broadest sense but merely those which are sufficient for a cause of action to be pleaded and which cannot be struck out for want of some essential averment.

The case has important ramifications for limitation periods, which may well now be triggered by commitment decisions and settlement decisions if sufficient facts are set out in the body of the Decision.

Anneli Howard  (instructed by Linklaters LLP) acted for the Applicants, Visa Europe a.o., the Third to Fifth Defendants in the claims and who took the lead role in the Applications

 

Supreme Court gives judgment in landmark consultation case

Ian Wise QC acted for the successful appellant, Michelle Moseley, in a challenge to the lawfulness of Haringey council’s consultation on its proposed council tax reduction scheme which affected over 36,000 people in the borough.  The Supreme Court, in a judgment with wide-ranging consequences for all consultation exercises carried out by public bodies, found that it was unfair and unlawful for Haringey to have only informed consultees about its preferred option without giving them at least an outline of the realistic alternatives and an indication of why they proposed to adopt their preferred scheme.

The court found that in wrongly presenting its preferred option as being the only option available to it the council misled consultees and no assumed knowledge on the part of consultees could save Haringey’s consultation exercise from a verdict that it was unfair and therefore unlawful.  In doing so the Supreme Court confirmed the case law of the lower courts to the effect that the demands of fairness will be likely to be greater when an authority proposes to deprive someone of an existing benefit than when considering a potential future benefit.

This was the first occasion that the Supreme Court (or indeed the House of Lords) has considered the requirements of a lawful consultation and as such will be the leading case on this area of law.

 

Ian Wise QC and Stephen Broach speak at Justice Annual Conference on ‘Disability and Human Rights’

Ian Wise QC and Stephen Broach speak at Justice Annual Human Rights Conference 2014 on 20 October 2014.  Speaking on ‘Disability and Human Rights’ Ian Wise QC and Stephen Broach will examine three recent key judgment of the Supreme Court that they have both been involved in. 

The first of these, Aintree University Hospital v James [2014] AC 591, concerned the correct approach of the courts in deciding whether it was in the best interests of a critically ill man to withhold life-saving treatment.  In a landmark judgment the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to place the threshold for such treatment too low.

In the second case, R(McDonald) v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2011] PTSR 1266, the Supreme Court controversially found that there to have been no breach of Ms McDonald’s article 8 ECHR rights where the local authority refused to continue to provide her with support to access the toilet, instead finding that her needs could be met by providing her with incontinence pads.  This decision was in part rejected by the European Court of Human Rights (McDonald v UK) which found a breach of article 8 for the period when the local authority had a care plan in place to provide Ms McDonald with access to the toilet. 

The third judgment of the Supreme Court that Ian and Steve will be examining is that of Surrey CC v P and Cheshire West  v P [2014] AC 896, which gave guidance on the circumstances when the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) found in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are to be applied, the court finding that article 5 ECHR required the safeguards to be applied far more generally for disabled people who lack capacity and are not free to leave their place of confinement at will than had been found to be the case by the Court of Appeal. 

Speaking in advance of the conference Ian Wise QC said “these important cases show how vitally important human rights protections are for disabled and vulnerable people and how necessary they are to ensure that they are treated with the dignity and respect.”

 

Monckton members featured in Lord Neuberger’s top five Supreme Court cases

In order to mark five years since the opening of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger was interviewed by the Independent on Sunday, and selected the five most significant cases to be heard by the Court in its first five years. Two of the cases featured members of Monckton Chambers.

In Al Rawi & Ors v Security Service & Ors, Daniel Beard QC acted on behalf of the appellants, Security Service & Ors. The case is summarised in the article as follows:

Should protecting national security trump the long-held British legal principle of open justice? That was the point at issue in the case of Al Rawi after a series of former inmates from US-run prisons, including Guantanamo Bay tried to bring claims against UK security services for contributing to their detention, rendition and mistreatment.

To fight the case, the security services said they must be allowed to give evidence to the judge in secret in the interests of national security – resulting in a situation where the former prisoners may have their claim dismissed on the basis of evidence that neither they nor their legal teams had seen.

The Supreme Court decided such an arrangement “simply wasn’t possible”, adding: “However sympathetic one might be to the security services wanting to produce evidence to exonerate themselves, we felt we simply couldn’t approve a trial process which undermined one of the most fundamental principles of a fair trial: that each side hears and sees all the evidence and arguments put before the judge by the other side.”

In HS2 judicial reviews, Kassie Smith QC acted for the second appellants, Buckinghamshire County Council and others. This case is described in the article as follows:

Campaigners opposing the high-speed rail link between London and the North-west (HS2) sought a judicial review of the Government’s plans – specifically whether they complied with EU environmental directives.

The court unanimously dismissed the appeal, saying that until Parliament reached a final decision on the HS2 scheme, its merits remained open to debate. In doing so, said Lord Neuberger, it fired a “warning shot” across the bows of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg.

“We criticised the EU court for saying the directives in question meant something different from that which, frankly, they naturally meant,” he said. “We said that was wrong in principle. That’s not what a court should do. The law should be made by the European Commission and the ministers, not the judges rewriting directives.”

The Supreme Court also criticised observations made in Strasbourg that courts should monitor parliamentary debate. Lord Neuberger described this as “completely contrary” to the long-established British view that judges shouldn’t “poke their noses into what’s going on in Parliament”, adding: “We thought this was risking blurring that important separation.”

 

The Supreme Court has sat on 508 days over five years, hearing 382 appeals and handing down 344 judgments.

To read the full interview in The Independent, please click here.