In  R (E) v London Borough of Islington [2017] EWHC 1440 (Admin) the Administrative Court has held that a local authority is liable in damages to a young child (E) for breach of her human right to education under Article 2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (A2P1). The Court (Ben Emmerson QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) also found that the local authority’s assessment of E’s care needs was vitiated by misguided reasoning and therefore unlawful.

The successful education claim marks the first occasion on which the English Courts have upheld a damages claim based on a breach of A2P1, after two Supreme Court judgments as a result of which such claims had failed (A v Head Teacher and Governors of Lord Grey School [2006] 2 AC 363 and A v Essex County Council (National Autistic Society intervening) [2011] AC 280; [2010] UKSC 33).  In the present case, E’s claim concerned three separate periods during which (the Court held) Islington was responsible for providing her with full-time education but – for one reason or another – failed to secure it. Notably, during one of those periods, Islington had accommodated E and her family in temporary homelessness accommodation in another London borough, and yet the Court was satisfied that Islington bore primary responsibility for the breach of E’s A2P1 rights during that period also.  The case will therefore be of interest not only because it is the first example of a successful damages claim based on A2P1 in this jurisdiction, but also because of its implications for local authority’s duties towards homeless children of compulsory school age, including those that they elect to accommodate in a different local authority district.

Following a contested hearing on consequential matters, E was also awarded 100% of her costs, and successfully opposed the local authority’s application for permission to appeal. Having found that E is entitled to damages by way of just satisfaction under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Court has also set down a procedure for the determination of quantum.

Monckton’s Ian Wise QC and Michael Armitage acted for the successful Claimant throughout the proceedings, instructed by Rebekah Carrier of Hopkin Murray Beskine solicitors.

In a high-profile judgment DA and others v SSWP handed down today, the High Court (Collins J) has declared that the government’s controversial “benefit cap” policy is unlawful. An earlier version of the policy was considered by the Supreme Court in SG, in which the Supreme Court narrowly (by a 3-2 majority) ruled that the cap did not unlawfully discriminate against women, but also held (by a different 3-2 majority) that the cap contravened the UK’s obligations under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as a result of its drastic impact on children. In today’s judgment, the High Court has not only re-affirmed that the cap on benefits breaches the UK’s international obligations in respect of children, but that the revised version of the policy also discriminates against lone parents of children under two, as well as against such children in their own right.

The judicial review challenge, brought by four lone parent families, concerned the reduced benefit cap introduced by the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016. The revised benefit cap drastically reduced housing benefits, leaving lone parent families across the country unable to afford basic life necessities to care for their children. Mr Justice Collins has ruled that the application of the revised benefit cap to lone parents with children under two amounts to unlawful discrimination and that “real damage” is being caused to the Claimants and families like theirs across the country. Upon considering the impact of the benefit cap, Mr Justice Collins concluded that “real misery is being caused to no good purpose.”

The government has been granted permission to appeal.

The judgment has already attracted substantial coverage in the print and broadcast media – The Independent, BBC.

A press release summarising the judgment is available here.

Monckton’s Ian Wise QC and Michael Armitage acted (along with Caoilfhionn Gallagher QC of Doughty Street Chambers) for the successful Claimants, instructed by Rebekah Carrier of Hopkin Murray Beskine solicitors. Ian Wise QC also acted for the Claimants in the SG case.

To read the case note written by Imogen Proud, please click here.

Heathrow Airport Ltd v Office of Rail & Road [2017] EWHC 1290 (Admin)

The High Court (Ouseley J.) has dismissed a judicial review challenge by Heathrow Airport to the decision of the Office of Rail & Road concerning Heathrow’s ability to impose track access charges on Crossrail reflecting the costs of building the Heathrow rail spur.

Crossrail services are due to commence operations into Heathrow in 2018 and will use the Heathrow rail spur, which was funded and built privately by the airport in the 1990s for the Heathrow Express. In May 2016 the ORR determined that, when charging Crossrail access fees to use airport rail infrastructure, Heathrow could not take into account its historical long-term costs of constructing the railway. This meant that ongoing costs to Heathrow of around £40m-£60m a year could not be recovered from Crossrail users and would instead fall on airline passengers. This was a matter of concern to the Civil Aviation Authority, who made representations to the ORR and intervened in the judicial review claim.

In his judgment, handed down today, Mr Justice Ouseley has dismissed Heathrow’s challenge to the ORR’s decision. While accepting that there was force in Heathrow’s criticisms of the decision and the quality of the ORR’s reasoning, the Judge found that it was rationally open to the ORR, on the evidence before it, to conclude: (i) that the railway spur would still have been built even if fare revenues were inadequate to recover any of the long-term costs, given the railway’s importance to the development of the airport; and (ii) that the CAA would not have precluded such costs being recovered from airline passengers.

In relation to whether the Heathrow rail spur is properly exempt from the relevant EU framework as a “network intended only for the operation of urban or suburban passenger services”, the Judge found that the answer was not clear at all and that “rail services to its main airport seem an obvious part of rail services for a conurbation”. However, he ultimately declined to decide the point on the basis that a decision in Heathrow’s favour was likely to cause substantial prejudice to the Crossrail sponsors, and since the point was academic between the parties given their contractual relations.

A copy of the judgment is available here.

Heathrow Airport Limited was represented by Gerry Facenna QC and Ligia Osepciu. The Civil Aviation Authority was represented by its standing counsel, Anneli Howard.

The Tribunal has today handed down judgment in Socrates Training Limited v The Law Society, the first Fast-Track case in the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which concerned the Law Society’s training requirements under its Conveyancing Quality Scheme (“CQS”). Socrates claimed that, as the only supplier of accreditation for conveyancing solicitors, The Law Society held a dominant position in the provision of accreditation from the launch of the CQS in late 2010 and that from 2012 onwards it abused that dominant position by requiring CQS accredited firms to purchase exclusively from the Law Society training in respect of Anti-Money Laundering and mortgage fraud. The Tribunal has today found that the Law Society came to hold a dominant position from the end of April 2015 and that it abused that dominant position by thereafter obliging CQS member firms to obtain the training in mortgage fraud and AML required for CQS accreditation exclusively from the Law Society, and that it breached the prohibitions in Chapter I and Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 from that date.

Socrates was represented by Philip Woolfe and The Law Society was represented by Kassie Smith QC and Imogen Proud.

Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v. The Minister for Public Enterprise, Ireland and the Attorney General.

The Irish Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, has decided that a third party funding agreement between a plaintiff and an English third party funder, Harbour Litigation Limited is contrary to the laws on maintenance and champerty under ancient statutes from the 14th century to the Maintenance and Embracery Act 1634.  The statutory prohibitions on maintenance and champerty have not been repealed in Ireland albeit no criminal prosecution has been brought under such statutes since the foundation of the State.

The issue arose out of a claim brought by Persona Digital Telephony against Ireland, Denis O’Brien and, as a third party, Michael Lowry, a former Minister for Communications.  The plaintiffs’ case is based on a finding by a Tribunal of Inquiry that a consortium in which Mr. O’Brien had a major shareholding obtained the award of Ireland’s second mobile telephone license in 1996 on foot of improper payments and other benefits furnished on behalf of Mr. O’Brien to Minister Lowry in relation to the latter’s involvement in securing the license for Mr. O’Brien’s consortium.  The plaintiffs were amongst the other bidders for the licence and claim that had the process been run properly, they had a significant chance of being awarded the licence and thus seek to recover damages against Ireland and Mr. O’Brien.  Lacking the funds to prosecute the action, they entered into a third party funding agreement with Harbour Litigation Limited and then brought an application before the Irish High Court seeking a declaration that in entering into such an agreement, the plaintiffs were not engaged in an abuse of process and/or were not contravening the rules on maintenance and champerty.  The High Court ruled against the plaintiffs but in light of the importance of the issue, the Supreme Court certified for a direct appeal on the issue to the Supreme Court.

Four of the five Supreme Court judges held that the funding agreement contravened the rules on maintenance and champerty and that although it had been argued that the court could develop the common law on maintenance in light of modern policy considerations and constitutional issues, including the constitutional right of access to the court, the policy issues involved were sufficiently complex as to be more suited to legislation than to judicial development.

However, a number of the judges expressed in various ways serious disquiet over the fact that a case which has previously been described by the Supreme Court as “absolutely unique, without precedent or parallel” in the history of the State and where there was a “significant public interest in having these matters of high public controversy determined in a court of law,” may not now proceed because of a lack of funding.  In the leading judgment, Chief Justice Susan Denham stated that “I do have a concern that the defendants and third party who vigorously oppose the plaintiff’s motion are beneficiaries if the case does not proceed.” Clarke J. said that “it is difficult to take an overview of the circumstances of this case without a significant feeling of disquiet” and acknowledged that “it is at least arguable that there is a very real problem in practice about access to justice [which] is growing.” McKechnie J. took the unusual step of deferring the making of an order “until such time as the State has been given an opportunity to address the deeply disturbing situation of the appellants being unable to prosecute this action solely because of the continuing existence of ancient principles of law, such as those of maintenance and champerty.” He stated: “It is of immense concern that legislation of such enormous antiquity has the capacity of preventing any merit review of such allegations. Such, however, is what the defendants and the third party in this case agitate, precisely the same parties who would, if the allegations were sustained, be damnified in a manner heretofore unexpressed in the State’s history.  The significance therefore of the decision arrived at on this application and its consequences cannot be overstated.”

He added: “To terminate an action of such magnitude is both highly disturbing and terribly disquieting… Whilst I fully acknowledge the decision of my colleagues and the reasons therefor, the conclusions so reached represents a deeply unsatisfactory outcome.  As emphasised above, given the critical importance of these allegations being ventilated in full, it is unseemly, almost unpalatable, that the State should try to cut these proceedings off at the pass in this manner… The outcome of this case is manifestly troublesome from the perspective of the giving of effect to the constitutional right of access to the courts; indeed, all the more so given the importance of the questions at issue.  On other occasions, one could expect the State to aggressively engage with the legal process by seeking the speediest trial possible so as to vindicate its integrity.  Not so, however, in this case.  Such is to be regretted.”

It remains to be seen whether the legislature will act upon McKechnie J.’s invitation.

Michael M. Collins SC was leading counsel for Persona Digital Telephony Limited.

Opinion 2/15 (EU:C:2017:376)

The EU Court of Justice has delivered a lengthy Opinion on the power of the EU to sign and conclude a free trade agreement with Singapore without the involvement of the Member States.

While the Commission and European Parliament contended that the EU has exclusive competence to sign and conclude the proposed agreement with Singapore, the Council and Member States who intervened argued that the EU could not do so because parts of the agreement fall within areas of competence shared between the EU and Member States, or within the exclusive competence of the Member States.

In its Opinion, delivered by the Full Court and available here, the CJEU has found that most of the matters covered by the agreement fall within the exclusive competence of the EU, including:

•  access to the EU market and Singapore market for goods and services (including all maritime, rail and road transport services), public procurement and energy generation from sustainable non-fossil sources;
•  protection of direct foreign investments of Singapore nationals in the EU (and vice versa);
•  intellectual property;- competition and subsidies;
•  sustainable development; and
•  rules relating to exchange of information, notification, verification, cooperation, mediation, transparency and dispute settlement (except in connection with non-direct foreign investment).

However, the Court found there to be two areas covered by the agreement where the EU has shared competence with the Member States, meaning that the agreement in its current form cannot be concluded without the Member States’ involvement:

• non-direct foreign investment (portfolio investments made without any intention to influence the management and control of an undertaking); and
• investor-state dispute settlement.

The EU-Singapore agreement is representative of a number of bilateral trade and investment treaties that the EU is seeking to enter into. The Court’s Opinion confirms the broad scope of the EU’s exclusive competence to conclude such agreements, other than in a few areas where Member State involvement will continue to be necessary (including controversial investor-state dispute settlement arrangements). This may make it easier for the EU to negotiate and conclude trade deals in the future, including a potential post-Brexit deal with the UK, provided they do not cover investment matters.

The United Kingdom was represented by Daniel Beard QC and Gerry Facenna QC.

To read the Brexit blog post by Panos Koutrakos “Concluding Free Trade Agreements: the EU-Singapore Opinion and Brexit” please click here.

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has unanimously found in Simeonovi v. Bulgaria that Mr Simeonov’s conditions of detention, in combination with the strict regime under which he was serving his sentence and the length of his period of imprisonment since 1999, had subjected him to an ordeal exceeding the suffering inherent in serving a prison sentence which amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, the Court – by 12 votes to 5 – did not consider that the proceedings against had been irremediably prejudiced by the fact that he had been denied access to legal assistance for the first three days following his arrest. In reaching this conclusion, the Grand Chamber emphasised that no evidence capable of being used against Mr Simeonov had been obtained and included in the criminal file during that period; that, assisted by a lawyer of his own choosing, he had voluntarily confessed two weeks after being charged, when he had been informed of his procedural rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination; that he had actively participated in all stages of the criminal proceedings; that his conviction had not been based solely on his confession but also on a whole body of consistent evidence; that the case had been assessed at three judicial levels and that the domestic courts had provided adequate reasons for their decisions in both factual and legal terms and had properly examined the issue of respect for procedural rights.

The Grand Chamber also declined to depart from its approach of only considering those issues found admissible by the Chamber following the latter’s referral to it of a case. It did so notwithstanding that the inadmissibility ruling in this case – which concerned a complaint that a sentence of life imprisonment was irreducible and thus in violation of Article 3 – had been based on the approach to this issue in a judgment of the Grand Chamber, which the latter had subsequently reversed in a manner that would probably have resulted in Mr Simeonov’s complaint being found admissible if it had been determined later.

However, in application of Article 46 of the European Convention, the Grand Chamber did recommend that Bulgaria: (a) remove the automatic application of the special prison regime to life prisoners to which Mr Simeonov had been subjected and (b) put in place provisions permitting the imposition of that regime on the basis of an individual risk assessment.

Mr Simeonov was represented before the Grand Chamber by Jeremy McBride.

To view the Grand Chamber judgment, please click here.

 

The first ever application for a Collective Proceedings Order (CPO) for an ‘opt out’ competition law class action is to be withdrawn. An order published on the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s website today confirms that the applicant for the CPO “has decided not to pursue her application“.

By the CPO application (which was the first to be made under the new class actions regime introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015), the applicant, Dorothy Gibson, had sought an order allowing her to pursue claims for damages on behalf of consumers who had purchased mobility scooters. In May 2014 the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) had issued a decision finding that a wholesaler distributor of mobility scooters called Pride Mobility Products Limited and eight of its retailer customers had infringed the Competition Act’s ‘Chapter I prohibition’. Each of those eight retailers had agreed to a request from Pride that the retailer refrain from advertising on the internet below-RRP prices for certain models of scooter. Ms Gibson sought damages for losses alleged to have been suffered not only by consumers who bought a scooter from one of those eight retailers, but also by other consumers (i.e. consumers who bought from other retailers) whom Ms Gibson claimed had paid higher prices as a result of ‘umbrella effects’.

Ms Gibson’s decision not to further pursue her application for a CPO follows a judgment of the Tribunal on 31 March 2017 in which the Tribunal concluded that the expert economic evidence relied on by Ms Gibson had been prepared on an erroneous basis. That was because the expert had been instructed to analyse the possible effects on prices of Pride’s “policy” of discouraging its retailer customers from advertising on the internet below-RRP prices for the relevant scooter models. Since the CPO application had been brought in respect of what were said to be “follow-on” claims (i.e. claims brought in relation to the infringements already found by the OFT), the economist should have been instructed to estimate only such alleged consumer losses as may have been caused by Pride’s agreements with the eight retailers (i.e. the retailers who were, together with Pride, the addressees of the OFT’s infringement decision).

By its 31 March judgment the Tribunal did not, however, completely close the door on Ms Gibson’s CPO application. Although it was not prepared to grant a CPO on the basis of the material that had been presented by Ms Gibson at the CPO application hearing, the Tribunal decided to adjourn (rather than dismiss) the application, thus leaving open the possibility for her to return to the Tribunal to seek a CPO on the basis of a fresh expert report prepared on the correct basis.

A news item on the 31 March judgment, and a copy of that judgment, is available here.

As Ms Gibson has now decided not to further pursue her application, the Tribunal has directed that the parties seek to reach agreement on costs.

Monckton barristers Alan Bates, Michael Armitage and Jack Williams are instructed on behalf of Pride.